Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines

Full Name: The Convention On The Prohibition Of The Use, Stockpiling, Production And Transfer Of Anti-Personnel Mines And On Their Destruction: Ottawa Landmine Convention: —LMC

Negotiated: 1996–1997.
Opened for signature: 3 December 1997.
Entry into force: 1 March 1999.
Depositary: UN Secretary General.

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: CCCW

Negotiated: 1978–1980.
Opened for signature (with three Protocols): 10 April 1981.
Entry into force (with consent to be bound by at least two Protocols): 2 December 1983.
Depositary: UN Secretary General.

Amended Protocol II, Protocol IV

Negotiated: 1995–1996.
Opened for signature: 13 October 1995 (IV), 3 May 1996 (Amended II)
Entry into force: 30 July 1998 (IV), 3 December 1998 (Amended II)
Depositary: UN Secretary General.

Titles. The official titles are shown above. IDDS also uses the informal titles “Ottawa Landmine Convention” and “CCW.”

The Ottawa Landmine Convention. The failure of the 1995 First CCW Review Conference (see below) to address the need for a ban on the production, transfer, and use of landmines led to widespread demand for a global treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines (APLs). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in humanitarian issues formed the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and launched a global effort to focus attention on the civilian casualties inflicted by landmines during and after — often long after — armed conflicts. A few states, led by Canada, worked with this campaign in a movement that achieved the Ottawa Landmine Convention.

In October 1996, an international conference sponsored by Canada met in Ottawa and decided to mobilize support for the “Ottawa Process.” This involved accelerated negotiations aimed at the signing of a treaty in Ottawa in December 1997 for a global ban on landmines to enter force by the year 2000 {3–5.10}. Despite resistance from the United States, which favored negotiations on this topic in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and the abstention from the process by key states such as Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and several Middle Eastern states, negotiations made unprecedented progress in 1997, spurred by the activities of the ICBL {box 1.2}. International conferences in Austria and Belgium worked on the treaty text {12–14.2, 24–27.6}. On 18 September 1997, a conference in Oslo adopted the text of the treaty {1–18.9}. In Ottawa on 3–4 December 1997, 122 states signed it.

As of 22 December 2004, 136 countries had ratified the convention and 8 had signed but not yet ratified. The convention entered into force in March 1999, six months after the 40th state, Burkina Faso, ratified it. In 1999, 18 signatories completed destruction of their landmine stocks, and another 27 had destruction under way {9–10.12}. However, renewed use of landmines in Africa and NATO’s use of cluster bombs with effects similar to those of landmines in Kosovo caused concern. {3–7.5, 11.5, 17.11}

Annual meetings. For the first five years, the States Parties are to meet each year. The first meeting was held in May 1999 in Maputo, Mozambique; the second took place in 2000 in Geneva; the third was held in Managua, Nicaragua; and the Fourth in Geneva in September 2002. The Fifth Meeting of States Parties took place in September 2003 in Bangkok, Thailand.
At the first meeting, the States Parties adopted the Maputo Declaration aimed at achieving universalization of the convention and zero mine victims {ACR 708dLMC99 3–7.5}. The meeting stigmatized violators of the convention and expressed concern over NATO operations in Kosovo that used cluster bombs with effects similar to anti-personnel landmines. It adopted a work program calling for intersessional standing committees of experts to address different aspects of the landmine problem. The first such meetings were held in September and December 1999. {13–17.9, 9–10.12}

Review Conferences. The First Review Conference was held from 29 November-3 December 2004 in Kenya. The United States did not participate, but China sent a delegation which said that although it was not a member, it agrees with it in principle and that China is ready to cooperate with state parties to the convention. The Conference adopted a five-year plan of action to expedite the abolition of landmines {ACR 708LMC04 29.11-3.12}.

CCW. Until 1997, the CCW or “Inhumane Weapons Convention” was the only international treaty that dealt directly with landmines. The convention and its four Protocols restrict or prohibit the use of conventional weapons whose effects are deemed to be excessively cruel or indiscriminate (not discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate, especially civilian, targets). Protocol I prohibits the use of fragment weapons made of material that cannot be detected inside the body; Protocol II restricts the use of mines, booby-traps and similar devices; Protocol III restricts the use of incendiary weapons; and Protocol IV prohibits the use and transfer of blinding laser weapons.

Negotiated in conferences under UN auspices in 1978–1980, the CCW was opened for signature on 10 April 1981. It entered into force on 2 December 1983 when 20 states had deposited their instruments of ratification.

The CCW First Review Conference met initially on 25 September–13 October 1995, pursuant to 1994 UN General Assembly Res. 49/703. At this session, the Review Conference added Protocol IV to the CCW, prohibiting the use of blinding laser weapons. The protocol entered into force on 30 July 1998, six months after Hungary deposited the twentieth ratification {30.1, 30.7}.

The initial session of the Review Conference failed to reach a consensus, however, on strengthening Protocol II on landmines. The conference reconvened on 15–19 January 1996 and focused on technical aspects of this problem, such as detection and deactivation mechanisms. In its third session, 22 April–3 May 1996, the conference reached a consensus on tighter restrictions on the use of anti-personnel landmines, incorporated in Amended Protocol II {22.4–3.5}. The Amended Protocol II entered into force on 3 December 1998, six months after the 20th ratification was deposited by Lithuania. {3.6, 3.12}

To make mine clearance easier and safer, Amended Protocol II requires that states cease production, use, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines that are undetectable (having a magnetic signature less than 8 grams of iron). To prevent civilian casualties, it requires that mines without a self-destruction device and self-deactivation back-up (“dumb” mines) no longer be produced, used, or transferred except for use in minefields that are controlled, clearly marked, monitored, and fully cleared after the end of hostilities.

These restrictions prohibit the use of anti-personnel mines in the ways that have caused nearly all casualties among civilians and mine-clearance personnel. The United States, a leading producer, has already ceased production of “dumb” mines and converted its stock of APLs to meet Amended Protocol II standards. The other leading producers, Russia and China, still have very large stocks of “dumb” mines that will make their conversion costs very high. They accepted the amended Protocol II at the Review Conference when a clause was added permitting parties to defer implementation for up to nine years.

The usefulness of Amended Protocol II lies in the fact that it eliminates the sources of nearly all civilian casualties (albeit slowly) and is supported by important mine-using states that will not join the Ottawa Landmine Convention because they consider minefields essential for border protection. China, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Korea, Finland, and Greece are among the 14 states that have not joined the Ottawa ban but have ratified Amended Protocol II (see table below). Russia has not ratified, but will probably do so eventually {Michael Matheson, US representative at the First Review Conference, in ACT 11.01}.

Annual conferences of states parties to the Amended Protocol II meet in Geneva in December {15–17.12.99, 14.12.00, 10.12.01, 11.12.02}.

A CCW Second Review Conference was held on 11–21 December 2001 in Geneva. The Conference amended the basic Convention to make it applicable to armed conflicts within states as well as between states. Like other amendments, this one will take effect when 20 parties have deposited their ratifications. As of 30 April 2003, 10 parties had done so. The Second Review Conference also agreed to establish a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to discuss ways and means to address the issue of “explosive remnants of war” (ERW), including cluster bombs. This GGE was asked to consider:

1. The factors and types of munitions that could cause humanitarian problems after a conflict;
2. Technical improvements and other measures for relevant types of munitions, including sub-munitions, which could reduce the risks of such munitions from becoming ERW;
3. The adequacy of existing international humanitarian law in minimizing post-conflict risks of ERW, both to civilians and the military; and
4. Warning to the civilian population in or close to ERW affected areas, clearance of ERW, the rapid provision of information to facilitate early and safe clearance of ERW, assistance and co-operation, and associated issues and responsibilities.

The GGE on ERW met three times in 2002. {http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/ siteeng0.nsf/iwpList254/2585F562862B5672C1256B660060D8C6} Following up on the GGE discussions, the CCW parties meeting in Geneva on 12–13 December 2002 created a formal mandate for negotiation of a new protocol on ERW in on-going GGE sessions, with the task defined as follows:

(a) (i) To negotiate an instrument on post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature which would reduce the risks of ERW. These measures would be based on a broad definition covering most types of explosive munitions, with the exception of mines. Abandoned munitions would have to be included. In these negotiations, questions need to be considered regarding, inter alia, responsibility for clearance, existing ERW, the provision of information to facilitate clearance and risk education, warnings to civilian populations, assistance & co-operation, and a framework for regular consultations of High Contracting Parties. These negotiations would have to establish the scope of this instrument consistent with Article I of the Convention as amended at its Second Review Conference.
(a) (ii) To explore and determine whether these negotiations could successfully address preventive generic measures for improving the reliability of munitions that fall within the agreed broad definition, through voluntary best practices concerning the management of manufacturing, quality control, handling and storage of munitions. Exchange of information, assistance and co-operation would be important elements of such best practices.
(b) Separate from the negotiations under (a): to continue to consider the implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian Law and to further study, on an open ended basis, possible preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific types of munitions, including sub- munitions, with a view to minimize the humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming ERW. Exchange of information, assistance and co-operation would be part of this work.
(c) In the context of the activities described above, meetings of military experts can be conducted to provide advice in support of these activities.

The Second Review Conference also created an expert group to consider tighter restrictions on anti-vehicle mines, or, more broadly “mines other than anti-personnel mines” (MOTAPM). The December 2002 CCW meeting extended this mandate, with the following terms:

(a) To continue to explore the issue of mines other than anti-personnel mines. The group shall consider the most appropriate way to reduce the risks posed by the irresponsible use of mines other than anti-personnel mines, including the possibility to conclude a negotiating mandate for a new instrument and other appropriate measures. The Group of Governmental Experts shall take into account:
– the necessity to strike the right balance between humanitarian concerns and military utility of MOTAPM;
– existing restrictions on such mines in Amended Protocol II to the CCW;
– technical and other measures aimed at minimizing the humanitarian risks posed by such mines as well as the modalities for their effective implementation, such as international cooperation and assistance, transition periods etc.;
– questions involving the use of MOTAPM by non-state actors;
– any question involving other aspects of such mines.
(b) In the context of the activities described above, meetings of military experts can be conducted to provide advice in support of these activities.
{CCW/MSP/2002, available at the UN web site www.mineaction.org}

CD negotiations. In 1997, the United States called for negotiations in the CD on a global ban on landmines which would include Russia and China {17.1}. The CD took up the question, but failed to form an ad hoc group to negotiate a treaty {27.3.97}. Objections came from states that did not want to interfere with the Ottawa Process, or did not want a landmine ban, or wanted to link the ban to progress in nuclear disarmament, or opposed the CD as a forum for the topic. The CD appointed a special coordinator to consult member states on a possible mandate for treaty negotiations. The special coordinator made little headway. He reported that most states were waiting for the outcome of the Ottawa Process {28.8.97}. In 1998 the CD again appointed a special coordinator but made no further progress {26.3, 26.6, 27.7–9.9}. In 1999, the United States and Finland called for CD talks on a ban on landmines and the appointment of a special coordinator {18.1–26.3}; but CD negotiations on all issues were stalled that year and in 2000-2004 by the member states’ failure to agree on a work program.

POSITIONS OF GOVERNMENTS

By ratifying or acceding to the Ottawa Landmines Convention, 142 states have now committed themselves to a global ban on landmines. Only the positions of major non-signatories of this convention are discussed here.

China and Russia. Parts of Russia’s borders with China and other countries are heavily mined with marked and fenced minefields. Russia accepted Amended Protocol II at the First Review Conference, but has not ratified it. China maintains that the CCW is the appropriate forum for dealing with landmines. It favors a comprehensive, but gradually phased approach to eliminate landmines {27.7.98}. In 1999, China de-mined its border with Vietnam {11.8}.

South Korea, whose border with North Korea is heavily mined, has opposed the Ottawa ban on landmines; but it ratified Amended Protocol II in 2001 and has imposed a moratorium on the export of APLs.

The United States favors an international anti-personnel landmine ban that is supported by all leading producers and users. In 1996, it introduced a UN General Assembly resolution calling for such an agreement. It favors negotiations on APL in the CD, where China and Russia (the other primary producers) will be parties {18.1–26.3.99}. After the United States failed to persuade the Oslo conference to exempt mines on the Korean peninsula and the use of anti-personnel mines in mixed canisters (along with anti-tank mines), it refused to sign the Ottawa landmine ban {ACR 1996: 16.5, 3–5.10, 5.11; 1997: 17.1, 8.4, 15.5, 16.7, 18.8, 1–18.9, 17.9, 23.11, 1999: 1.3}. The United States does not export landmines. In 1997, it announced a new initiative to mobilize resources for demining, the “Demining 2010 Initiative” {31.10}, under which it may sign the Landmines Convention if alternatives to landmines are found over the next few years {15.5.98; 1.3.99}. The United States destroyed the last of its “dumb” anti-personnel mines in 1998 {30.6}. They have been replaced with “smart” mines with self-destruct devices. The United States announced plans to use such landmines in Iraq {3.13.03}.

OTTAWA LANDMINE CONVENTION OUTLINE

Preamble

1. General Obligations
States-parties undertake never to use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer antipersonnel mines, and to destroy all antipersonnel mines.

2. Definitions

3. Exceptions
For the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques and for the purpose of destruction.

4. Destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines
Not later than three years after each party’s entry into force.

5. Destruction of antipersonnel mines in mined areas
Not later than ten years after entry into force; undertake to identify all mined areas and ensure that such areas are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected. An extension of the deadline for a period of up to ten years may be sought from a meeting of states-parties or a review conference.

6. International cooperation and assistance

7. Transparency measures
Report to the UN Secretary General not later than 180 days after entry into force full details of mines, mined areas, mine clearance activities, and destruction of mines and update them annually.

8. Facilitation and clarification of compliance
Provides for a fact-finding mission appointed by the Secretary General to visit a state about which another state has referred a compliance clarification.

9. National implementation measures

10. Settlement of disputes

11. Meetings of the states-parties
The first meeting of the states parties shall be convened by the Secretary General within one year after entry into force and subsequently meetings will occur annually until the first Review Conference.

12. Review Conferences
The first five years after entry into force; further review conferences if requested by one or more of the states-parties, at not less than five-year intervals.

13. Amendments
Amendments will be adopted by an Amendment Conference, following approval by a two-thirds majority.

14. Costs

15. Signature
Open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, 3–4 December 1997 and at the UN Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until entry into force

16. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

17. Entry into force
On the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited. For later signatories, on the first day of the sixth month after the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession.

18. Provisional application

19. Reservations
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

20. Duration and withdrawal
Unlimited duration; right to withdraw after giving six months’ notice, but not if engaged in war on the expiry of the six-month period.

21. Depository
United Nations Secretary General.

CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS OUTLINE

The Convention serves as the legal framework for three original Protocols and a fourth Protocol added in 1996, which limit the use of particularly injurious or indiscriminate weapons. Originally applied to armed conflicts between states, in 2001, it was amended to apply to internal armed conflicts as well. (That amendment is not yet in force, pending submission of the 20th ratification). The framework Convention has review, amendment, ratification and entry into force provisions.

Protocol I. Nondetectable Fragments

Prohibits the use of weapons whose primary effect is to injure by fragments that cannot be detected in the human body by X-ray.

Protocol II. Mines, Boobytraps and Other Devices

I-II. Applicability of the Protocol and nature of the proscribed weapons.
III. Prohibition of use or transfer of “dumb” mines (not programmed to self-destruction or de-activate within 120 days) except in controlled, marked fields.
IV. Prohibition of use in populated areas where combat is not taking place, unless directed at a specific military target.
V. Prohibits use of remotely delivered “dumb” mines.
VI. Prohibits the use of especially “treacherous or perfidious” weapons.
VII. Requires recording the location of minefields and disclosing them at the end of hostilities.
IX. International cooperation to remove mines, etc., at the end of hostilities.

Protocol III. Incendiary Weapons

I. Definition of “incendiary weapon.”
II. Prohibits attacks on civilian populations per se with incendiary weapons and air delivered incendiary weapons on military targets located in civilian population concentrations. Restricts the use of non delivered weapons to cases where the military targets are clearly separated from the surrounding civilian populations and partially bans the use of incendiary weapons against forests and plant cover.

Protocol IV. Blinding Laser Weapons

I. Prohibits the use of lasers designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision. Also prohibits the sale of such weapons.
II. Requires states using laser systems to take “all feasible precautions to avoid the incidence of permanent blindness.” III. Defines what was not covered by the protocol. Lasers that might have blinding capabilities as a collateral effect are not prohibited. IV. Defines blindness as “irreversible and uncorrectable loss of vision” equal to “visual acuity of less than 20/200 Snellen measured using both eyes.”

PARTIES TO OTTAWA APL BAN AND CCW PROTOCOL II AS OF 22 December 2004

Note: The table baseline (normal type face) is countries that have ratified the Ottawa ban. Also included are 23 countries not party to the Ottawa ban which have ratified the original CCW Protocol II only (shown in italic) or the Amended Protocol II (shown in bold) have ratified Amended Protocol II.

Country	Ottawa Ratified	CCW Ratified	Original II	Amended II
Afghanistan	11-Sep-02
Albania	29-Feb-00	28-Aug-02		y
Algeria	9-Oct-01
Andorra	29-Jun-98
Angola	5-Jul-02
Antigua &Barbuda	3-May-99
Argentina	14-Sep-99	02-Oct-95	y	21-Oct-98
Australia	14-Jan-99	29-Sep-83	y	22-Aug-97
Austria	29-Jun-98	14-Mar-83	y	27-Jul-98
Bahamas	31-Jul-98
Bangladesh	6-Sep-00	06-Sep-00		y
Barbados	26-Jan-99
Belarus	3-Dec-03	23-Jun-82	y
Belgium	4-Sep-98	07-Feb-95	y	10-Mar-99
Belize	23-Apr-98
Benin	25-Sep-98	27-Mar-89
Bolivia	9-Jun-98	21-Sep-01		y
Bosnia & Herzegovina	8-Sep-98	01-Sep-93	y	07-Sep-00
Botswana	1-Mar-00
Brazil	30-Apr-99	03-Oct-95	y	04-Oct-99
Bulgaria	4-Sep-98	15-Oct-82	y	03-Dec-98
Burkina Faso	16-Sep-98	26-Nov-03
Burundi	22-Oct-03
Cambodia	28-Jul-99	25-Mar-97		y
Cameroon	19-Sep-02
Canada	3-Dec-97	24-Jun-94	y	05-Jan-98
Cape Verde	14-May-01	16-Sep-97		y
Central African Republic	8-Nov-02
Chad	6-May-99
Chile	10-Sep-01	15-Oct-03
China		07-Apr-82	y	04-Nov-98
Colombia	6-Sep-00	06-Mar-00		y
Comoros	19-Sep-02
Congo	4-May-01
Costa Rica	17-Mar-99	17-Dec-98		y
Côte d'Ivoire	30-Jun-00
Croatia	20-May-98	02-Dec-93	y	25-Apr-02
Cuba		02-Mar-87	y
Cyprus	17-Jan-03	12-Dec-88	y	17-Jan-03
Czech Republic	26-Oct-99	22-Feb-93	y	10-Aug-98
Dem Rep of the Congo	2-May-02
Denmark	8-Jun-98	07-Jul-82	y	30-Apr-97
Djibouti	18-May-98	29-Jul-96	y
Dominica	26-Mar-99
Dominican Republic	30-Jun-00
East Timor	7-May-03
Ecuador	29-Apr-99	04-May-82	y
El Salvador	27-Jan-99	26-Jan-00		14-Aug-00
Equatorial Guinea	16-Sep-98			y
Eritrea	27-Aug-01
Estonia	12-May-04	20-Apr-00		20-Apr-00
Ethiopia	17-Dec-04
Fiji	10-Jun-98
Finland		08-May-82	y	03-Apr-98
France	23-Jul-98	04-Mar-88	y	23-Jul-98
Gabon	8-Sep-00
Gambia	23-Sep-02
Georgia		29-Apr-96	y
Germany	23-Jul-98	25-Nov-92	y	02-May-97
Ghana	30-Jun-00
Greece	27-Sep-04	28-Jan-92	y	20-Jan-99
Grenada	19-Aug-98
Guatemala	26-Mar-99	21-Jul-83	y	29-Oct-01
Guinea	8-Oct-98
Guinea-Bissau	22-May-01
Guyana	5-Aug-03
Holy See	17-Feb-98	22-Jul-97		y
Honduras	24-Sep-98	30-Oct-03
Hungary	6-Apr-98	14-Jun-82	y	30-Jan-98
Iceland	5-May-99
Indonesia	4-Dec-97
India		01-Mar-84	y	02-Sep-99
Ireland	3-Dec-97	13-Mar-95	y	27-Mar-97
Israel		22-Mar-95	y	30-Oct-00
Italy	23-Apr-99	20-Jan-95	y	13-Jan-99
Jamaica	17-Jul-98
Japan	30-Sep-98	09-Jun-82	y	10-Jun-97
Jordan	13-Nov-98	19-Oct-95		06-Sep-00
Kenya	23-Jan-01
Kiribati	7-Sep-00
Lao People's Dem Rep		03-Jan-83	y
Latvia		04-Jan-93	y	22-Aug-02
Lesotho	2-Dec-98	06-Sep-00	y
Liberia	23-Dec-99
Liechtenstein	5-Oct-99	16-Aug-89	y	19-Nov-97
Lithuania	12-May-03	03-Jun-98
Luxembourg	14-Jun-99	21-May-96	y	05-Aug-99
Madagascar	16-Sep-99
Malawi	13-Aug-98
Malaysia	22-Apr-99
Maldives	7-Sep-00	07-Sep-00		y
Mali	2-Jun-98	24-Oct-01		y
Malta	7-May-01	26-Jun-95	y
Mauritania	21-Jul-00
Mauritius	3-Dec-97	06-May-96	y
Mexico	9-Jun-98	11-Feb-82	y
Monaco	17-Nov-98	12-Aug-97		y
Moldova	08-Sept-00
Mongolia		08-Jun-82	y
Morocco		19-Mar-02		19-Mar-02
Mozambique	25-Aug-98
Namibia	21-Sep-98
Nauru	7-Aug-00	12-Nov-01		y
Netherlands	12-Apr-99	18-Jun-87	y	25-Mar-99
New Zealand	27-Jan-99	18-Oct-93	y	08-Jan-98
Nicaragua	30-Nov-98	05-Dec-00		y
Niger	23-Mar-99	10-Nov-92	y
Nigeria	27-Sep-01
Niue	15-Apr-98
Norway	9-Jul-98	07-Jun-83	y	20-Apr-98
Pakistan		01-Apr-85	y	09-Mar-99
Panama	7-Oct-98	26-Mar-97	y	03-Nov-99
Paraguay	13-Nov-98	22-Sept-04
Papua New Guinea	28-Jun-04
Peru	17-Jun-98	03-Jul-97
Philippines	15-Feb-00	15-Jul-96	y	12-Jun-97
Poland		02-Jun-83	y
Portugal	19-Feb-99	04-Apr-97	y	31-Mar-99
Qatar	13-Oct-98
Republic of Korea		09-May-01		09-May-01
Republic of Moldova	8-Sep-00	8-Sep-00	y	16-Jul-01
Romania	30-Nov-00	26-Jul-95	y
Russian Federation		10-Jun-82	y
Rwanda	8-Jun-00
Saint Kitts & Nevis	2-Dec-98
Saint Lucia	13-Apr-99
Saint Vincent & the Gren	1-Aug-01
Samoa	23-Jul-98
San Marino	18-Mar-98
Sao Tome & Principe	31-Mar-03
Senegal	24-Sep-98	29-Nov-99		y
Serbia & Montenegro	18-Sep-03	12-Mar-01	y
Seychelles	2-Jun-00	08-Jun-00		y
Sierra Leone	25-Apr-01	30-Sept-04
Slovakia	25-Feb-99	28-May-93	y	30-Nov-99
Slovenia	27-Oct-98	06-Jul-92	y	03-Dec-02
Solomon Islands	26-Jan-99
South Africa	26-Jun-98	13-Sep-95	y	26-Jun-98
Spain	19-Jan-99	29-Dec-93	y	27-Jan-98
Sri Lanka		24-Sept-04
Sudan	13-Oct-03
Suriname	23-May-02
Swaziland	22-Dec-98
Sweden	30-Nov-98	07-Jul-82	y	16-Jul-97
Switzerland	24-Mar-98	20-Aug-82	y	24-Mar-98
TFY Rep of Macedonia	9-Sep-98	30-Dec-96	y
Tajikistan	12-Oct-99	12-Oct-99		12-Oct-99
Thailand	27-Nov-98
Timor Leste	7-May-03
Togo	9-Mar-00	04-Dec-95	y
Trinidad & Tobago	27-Apr-98
Tunisia	9-Jul-99	15-May-87	y
Turkey	25-Sep-03
Turkmenistan	19-Jan-98	19-Mar-04
Uganda	25-Feb-99	14-Nov-95	y
Ukraine		23-Jun-82	y	15-Dec-99
United Kingdom	31-Jul-98	13-Feb-95	y	11-Feb-99
United Rep of Tanzania	13-Nov-00
United States		24-Mar-95	y	24-May-99
Uruguay	7-Jun-01	06-Oct-94	y	18-Aug-98
Uzbekistan		29-Sep-97	y
Venezuela	14-Apr-99
Yemen	1-Sep-98
Zambia	23-Feb-01
Zimbabwe	18-Jun-98
Totals: States 157	144	97	66	69
Ottawa only	67
Ottawa and Orig. or Am. II	66
Amended II, not Ottawa				13
Original Protocol II only			9

For notes see end of following table.
{http://disarmament2.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf}

PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW) AS OF 15 MAY 2003