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Current Status.
Developments in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK) have dominated nuclear issues in Northeast Asia
in recent years. A crisis over apparent DPRK nuclear weapon-related
activities emerged in the autumn of 2002. Direct talks and
some cooperative projects between the DPRK and the Republic
of Korea (ROK) had been launched at an historic meeting between
the DPRK leader Kim Jong-I1 and ROK President Kim Dae-Jung
in June 2000. But relations between the DPRK and the USA worsened
after the Bush administration took office in January 2001
and refused to negotiate with the DPRK. In mid-2002 North
Korea reportedly stepped up work on a clandestine program
to build a uranium enrichment facility. When the DPRK acknowledged
that it might have such a program in October, the United States
cut off the monthly supplies of heavy oil promised under the
1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework. North Korea then withdrew from
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and restarted its plutonium production
and reprocessing facilities.
North Korea said it needed a nuclear weapon program to prevent
a US attack aimed at “regime change” given several
recent developments: President Bush’s comment that the
DPRK was part of an “axis of evil;” the Nuclear
Posture Review statement that the United States was prepared
to use nuclear weapons against “axis of evil”
states; and the US policy of making war on Iraq to change
its government. At the same time, the DPRK said repeatedly
that it would end its nuclear-weapon program if the United
States concluded a formal non-aggression treaty. The United
States said it would not meet any DPRK demand because that
would amount to “giving in to blackmail” and “rewarding
bad actions.”
At the insistence of the USA, US-DPRK talks in 2003–2004
were conducted within a “six-party” framework
that also includes China, Russia, South Korea and Japan. Little
progress was made in these talks, which were suspended in
early 2005 due to North Korea’s refusal to participate.
NUCLEAR
ISSUES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
History
North-South Joint Declaration (1991). After several
years of talks, in December 1991 North and South Korea signed
the Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula,
in which both Koreas promised “not to test, produce,
receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.”
Implementation of this agreement suffered a major setback
when North Korea announced in 1993 that it was withdrawing
from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), only 11 months after
it had finally accepted IAEA safeguards. The North-South Declaration
remained in force but was overshadowed in subsequent years
by the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework.
US-NORTH KOREA AGREED FRAMEWORK
(1994)
Negotiating history. The DPRK signed the
NPT on 12 December 1985, but did not sign the required safeguards
agreement with the IAEA until 30 January 1992. The DPRK’s
Supreme People’s Assembly ratified the agreement on
9 April 1992. During six inspections in 1992–1993, the
IAEA visited every DPRK nuclear site except two undeclared
waste storage facilities where the DPRK refused to allow inspectors
access to check for suspected reprocessing activity. North
Korea said these were military facilities outside the IAEA’s
purview. The IAEA requested a special inspection of the sites
on 11 February 1993, but the DPRK refused and gave notice
of withdrawal from the NPT on 12 March 1993.
On 11 June 1993, as the NPT withdrawal was about to take effect
and following talks between US and North Korean diplomats
in New York, North Korea announced that it would suspend its
withdrawal from the NPT while the two sides continued talks.
A second round of US-North Korea talks opened on 14 July 1993
in Geneva and ended on a positive note, with North Korea agreeing
to consult with the IAEA and to renew contacts with South
Korea. In return, the United States promised to assist North
Korea’s efforts to obtain light water-moderated nuclear
reactors (which produce less fissile material than North Korea’s
existing and planned graphite-moderated reactors). DPRK talks
with South Korea and the IAEA never materialized, however,
and the United States refused to hold a third round of US-DPRK
talks until the other contacts resumed.
On 29 December 1993, North Korea agreed to allow a one-time
inspection of its seven declared nuclear sites (but not the
two disputed sites) as a first step toward renewed IAEA activity
in the country. But the IAEA and North Korea could not agree
on the details. After more talks between the DPRK and the
IAEA and between the DPRK and the United States the IAEA was
allowed to conduct the one-time inspection. The IAEA then
said that North Korea had prevented its inspectors from conducting
all their investigations. The United States refused to meet
again with North Korea until the IAEA was allowed to complete
the inspections. The IAEA conducted inspections again in May
1994, but with limitations that prevented it from determining
either the operating history of the 5-MW research reactor
or the amount of plutonium contained in the spent fuel from
it {ACR 457eNEN98}.
By early 1994 North Korea had started to remove spent fuel
rods from the research reactor without inspection by IAEA
personnel, raising concerns that it could easily divert plutonium
toward a nuclear weapon program. The United States refused
to resume high-level talks as long as the IAEA was unable
to carry out its inspections. After the IAEA Board of Governors
passed a resolution criticizing North Korea for failing to
comply with its safeguards agreement, North Korea withdrew
from the IAEA.
In a crisis during which the United States prepared to bomb
the nuclear facilities at issue, former President Jimmy Carter
visited P’yongyang and met with then leader Kim Il-Sung,
who agreed to be more forthcoming regarding the problem facilities.
This led the United States to resume high-level talks, at
which North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear activities
and allow IAEA inspectors to verify the freeze. The high-level
talks began on 8 July 1994, but were suspended when Kim Il-Sung
died on 9 July. The talks resumed on 5 August, with Kim Il-Sung’s
son, Kim Jong-Il, installed as the new DPRK leader.
On 21 October 1994, the United States and North Korea signed
the Agreed Framework, with four main components:
-
The DPRK would freeze its Yongbyon nuclear research reactor
and nuclear reprocessing facility, suspected of producing
and reprocessing plutonium for nuclear weapon purposes;
- IAEA
would verify the freeze and eventual dismantling of the
Yongbyon facility;
-
IAEA would verify North Korean statements on past fissile
material production; and
-
The United States, Japan, and South Korea would replace
North Korea’s planned two new graphite-moderated
nuclear power reactors with two light-water moderated
reactors (LWRs), to be built by South Korea, and to supply
of 500,000 tons of fuel oil per year to help meet North
Korea’s energy needs until the new plants were completed.
Implementation
of the Agreed Framework, 1995–September 2002.
In March 1995, Japan, South Korea, and the United States formed
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).
Between 1995 and 2001, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Indonesia,
Chile, Argentina, Czech Republic, Poland, and Uzbekistan joined
the organization. On 19 September 1997, the European Atomic
Energy Community (EURATOM) joined KEDO with representation
on the KEDO Executive Board for a term to coincide with their
support for the LWR project.
Reactor
construction. KEDO took over the LWR supply contract
negotiations in June 1995, when North Korea and the United
States had resolved the issue of which country would provide
the reactors. In 1996, KEDO and North Korea negotiated a series
of protocols to prepare for construction of the LWRs at the
Sinpo site.
Further progress was made in 1997, including the signing of
the last two protocols required for site preparation; a protocol
concerning action in the event of nonpayment; and a final
agreement to allow construction. KEDO and North Korea also
agreed on a cost estimate close to $5.2 bn and had 138 workers
in place by the end of that year. KEDO opened office at the
site for the LWRs and the groundbreaking ceremony took place.
However, KEDO members had disagreements over funding and the
United States held back funds after an incident on the North-South
demilitarized zone (DMZ). EURATOM’s accession to KEDO
helped matters, but KEDO was threatened with insolvency by
the end of 1997.
In 1998, KEDO’s executive board reduced the cost estimate
from $5.2 bn to $4.6 bn. A tentative cost-sharing agreement
was reached in July, with South Korea’s share fixed
at $3.2 bn (70 percent) and Japan’s share at $1 bn.
The split of the remainder between the USA and the EU was
unclear. In 1998, Japan withheld its contribution in retaliation
for the North Korean test firing of a missile on a flight
path that crossed Japan, but later restored its funding. During
1998, due to the many delays in the LWR project, North Korea
charged the United States with failing to meet its commitments
under the Agreed Framework, and threatened to resume its nuclear
program.
In August 1998, the United States detected what it thought
were DPRK nuclear weapon related activities in an underground
facility at Kumchangni and demanded inspection of the site.
North Korea insisted that the Kumchangni site was not-weapon
related. In 1999, after extensive negotiations, an agreement
on inspecting the site was reached, allowing work under the
Agreed Framework to proceed. US inspections of the facility
at Kumchangni, which took place in May 1999 and 2000, revealed
no weapon-related activity. {18–24.5.99, 25–27.5.00}
In December 1999, KEDO signed a turnkey contract for construction
of the LWRs.
Construction quickly fell behind schedule for a variety of
reasons, leading to new North Korean threats that it might
restart its nuclear program {1.2, 2.2, 1.7}. By 8 August 2002,
however, the ground for the two LWRs had finally been fully
prepared and the initial pouring of concrete for the foundation
was conducted at a ceremony attended by high-level representatives
of KEDO members. At that point, the reactors, originally planned
to be operational by 2003, were expected to come on line in
2008 or 2009. Despite the DPRK-US nuclear crisis in late 2002
and 2003, work continued on the reactors and was reported
to be 30 percent complete by the end of April, with 605 South
Koreans, 353 Uzbeks and 99 North Koreans on the site. On 21
November 2003, KEDO announced that reactor construction would
be suspended for one year because the DPRK had failed to meet
the conditions necessary for continuing the LWR project {DPA
21.11.03}. A year later on 26 November 2004, KEDO announced
that it would extend the freeze to 1 December 2005 {WP 26.11.04}.
IAEA
inspections. From 1995 through mid-2002, North Korea
maintained an ambiguous relationship with the IAEA. As provided
under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the DPRK shut down its Yongbyon
research reactor and reprocessing facility, stored all the
existing spent fuel (8000 rods) in steel canisters in a waste
storage pond, and permitted the IAEA to put seals and cameras
at all those facilities, which were continuously monitored
by IAEA on-site inspectors. The DPRK did not, however, permit
a full IAEA survey the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and the spent
fuel to verify whether or not any plutonium had been removed
prior to the shut down. This type of IAEA investigation, required
under the NPT and under the 1994 agreement, takes several
years to complete. The 1994 Agreed Framework provides that
the full IAEA assessment must be finished before the nuclear
cores for the new LWRs will be shipped to North Korea. Expressing
skepticism about completion of the LWR project, the DPRK refused
to permit the IAEA investigation until the LWR work was much
further along. The IAEA, the United States, and other KEDO
members, meanwhile, have continually accused the DPRK of violating
the NPT safeguards because the full IAEA assessment had not
been conducted. Moreover, as LWR work progressed in 2001 and
2002, there were increasing demands from KEDO members that
the DPRK let the IAEA investigation begin, so that it would
be completed by the time the reactor cores were due to be
installed. In late 2002, however, the DPRK halted ongoing
IAEA inspections and ordered IAEA inspectors to leave the
country {22.12.03 – 30.12.03}.
The US-DPRK Nuclear Proliferation Crisis, October 2002–.
During a trip to P’yongyang in October 2002 to discuss
possibly resuming US-DPRK negotiations, US envoy James Kelly
said that there was evidence that North Korea had a secret gas-centrifuge
uranium-enrichment program, which would violate the 1994 Agreed
Framework (under which the DPRK had promised to freeze its nuclear-weapon
efforts). After briefly denying that it had such a program,
senior North Korean officials said that the DPRK had a right
to have a nuclear-weapon program since the United States had
already violated the 1994 Framework by failing to produce the
promised light-water reactors on time, calling the DPRK part
of the axis of evil (showing lack of good faith in moving toward
normal relations), and threatening to use nuclear weapons against
North Korea. On 16 October (after Congress had given President
Bush the authority to wage war in Iraq), the US government published
the details of the Kelly-North Korean exchange. The United States
then resumed its long-standing position that holding bilateral
talks with the DPRK on its nuclear program and other issues
would amount to “giving in to blackmail” and “rewarding
bad behavior.” In November, the United States persuaded
KEDO members South Korea and Japan, along with the EU, to support
a halt in shipments of heavy oil to North Korea starting in
December, on the grounds that North Korea had violated the 1994
agreement. (Work on the LWRs, financed and conducted mainly
by South Korea, continued steadily {15.5.03}. However in December
2003, North Korea announced plans to reactivate its nuclear
facilities at Yongbyon. Over the next several months the DPRK
took the following steps:
-
12 December: Formally announced withdrawal from the 1994
Agreed Framework.
-
22 December: Announced that it would remove IAEA seals
and cameras from its Yongbyon facilities (following the
failure of the IAEA to implement North Korea’s request
that it do so).
-
23 December: Began to dismantle IAEA seals and cameras
at the waste storage pond containing 8000 spent fuel rods.
-
25 December: Opened the 5-MW research reactor to begin
work on restarting it.
-
26 December: Loaded 1000 new fuel rods into the reactor.
-
29 December: Warned that its conditional membership in
the Non- Proliferation Treaty was “in peril.”
-
30 December: Ordered IAEA inspectors to leave the country.
-
10 January 03: Announced withdrawal from Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
-
27 February: Restarted the Yongbyon reactor.
-
8 May: Restarted the coal-fired steam plant at the Yongbyon
reprocessing facility, apparently after repairing a leak
in the pipes that carry steam into the facility.
-
3 October: Declared all “technological matters”
involved in using the plutonium extracted from nuclear
fuel rods to build atom bombs as solved.
- 4
November: Voted against a UN resolution in support of
an IAEA report that cited North Korea in violation of
international agreements.
{Sonni Efron in LAT 1.3.03; Korea Times 9.5.03; AP 8.5.03,
3.10.03, 4.11.03}
Through
this time, the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia,
and China, and representatives of the European Union, the
IAEA, and the UN all pressed North Korea to stop its nuclear
activities and comply with the terms of the 1994 agreement
and the NPT. In addition, the other parties urged the United
States to meet North Korea’s demands for one-on-one
negotiations and reassurance regarding the North’s fears
of US military aggression. Meanwhile the United States reiterated
its position that it would not engage in one-on-one talks
until the North had dismantled its nuclear facilities and
permitted unfettered IAEA verification of that situation.
During 23-25 April, North Korea and the United States participated
in preliminary talks in Beijing, with each side making a slight
concession in its previous position by accepting China as
a third party in the talks. North Korea said that it would
end its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for economic
aid and normalization of relations, along with a nonaggression
pact. At the same time, the DPRK announced that it had finished
reprocessing the 8000 spent fuel rods and had nuclear weapons.
Because there was no evidence that the Yongbyon reprocessing
facility had been working, nor evidence of the existence of
any other reprocessing facility, the comments about the state
of its reprocessing were widely believed to be another example
of North Korean “brinkmanship.” US officials began
to discuss the idea of blocking North Korean exports of plutonium
or nuclear bombs, rather than insuring that the DPRK had no
fissile material.
In August 2003, North Korea and the United States participated
in the first-round of six-party talks with China, Russia,
Japan and South Korea {27-30.8} Both the United States and
North Korea did not concede their basic positions: the United
States insisted on the “complete, verifiable and irreversible
elimination” of North Korea’s nuclear program
before it considered improving relations with North Korea.
The DPRK declared that they would dismantle their nuclear
weapons program in exchange for economic aid and a nonaggression
treaty with the United States.
Other
US-DPRK talks. After several rounds of talks in 1993
and 1994, North Korea proposed a new round of security talks
in early 1996. The parties met on 28 June 1996 to discuss
the nuclear agreement, Four-Party Talks (talks including China
and South Korea), and other issues. Bilateral talks resumed
in 1997 and liaison offices were established by the two nations
{30.1}.
In 1998, North Korea called for negative security assurances
from the United States and the end of the US nuclear umbrella
for South Korea {6–28.4}. Bilateral US-DPRK contact
resulted in agreements to expedite completion of canning fuel
rods, to resume Four-Party Talks, to begin missile talks,
and to discuss removing North Korea from the US list of states
sponsoring terrorism {31.8}. US Policy Coordinator for North
Korea William Perry met with DPRK officials in May 1999. On
his return Perry recommended a comprehensive and integrated
US approach to the DPRK {15.9.99}.
In 2000 a series of high-level US-DPRK contacts held promise
of a breakthrough in bilateral relations as well as on peninsular
security issues. Following the 15 June summit meeting between
Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Il, the United States lifted its
50-year-old trade embargo against the DPRK and began serious
talks on ending North Korea’s testing and export of
missiles with a range over 300 miles. On 25 July 2000, US
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met with DPRK Foreign
Minister Paek Nam-Sun in Bangkok. In October 2000, First Vice
Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission Vice Marshal
Jo Myong-Rok visited Washington and held talks with President
Clinton. Later that month, Albright visited North Korea and
held talks with Kim Jong-Il to finalize the terms of a missile
agreement within the framework of a larger treaty that would
normalize US-North Korean relations. An expected visit by
Clinton to the DPRK and the signing of a treaty did not materialize,
however, when, in the wake of the uncertainty about the US
Presidential election, the Clinton decided not to go to P’yongyang
or sign the treaty.
In March 2001 President Bush announced a new approach to North
Korea, which was confirmed by a policy review completed in
June. The United States would not offer any quid pro quo for
DPRK steps to end its production and export of missiles with
a range over 300 miles, eliminate stocks of missiles over
that range, open up potential missile production and storage
facilities to US challenge on-site inspection, open up all
its nuclear facilities to full IAEA inspections under NPT
terms, reduce troop concentrations at the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ) on the border with South Korea, and improve its human
rights record. After North Korea had completed those steps,
Bush said, the United States would begin talks on normalizing
relations, economic aid, and other matters. As a result of
this tough position, requiring extensive action to take place
before any negotiations, no talks were held between North
Korea and the Bush administration until October 2002. At that
point, the senior US negotiator, Ambassador James Kelly, visited
P’yongyang to explore a possible agenda for talks, apparently
signaling a softening in the US position.
Once North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors and officially withdrew
from the NPT in January 2003, no bilateral meetings were held
between the North Korean and the USA. However, various unofficial
channels between North Korean and US officials remained open.
On 13 February, USA and North Korean nuclear experts met in
Berlin to discuss the type of inspections the United States
would require in order to verify progress of DPRK nuclear
dismantlement. In early June 2003, the DPRK Counselor to the
UN met with US officials in California. On 6 December 2004,
the USA confirmed that US officials held two direct negotiations
with North Korean officials in New York on 30 November and
3 December. The US officials conveyed to their North Korean
counterparts that the USA was ready to resume the fourth round
of six-party talks without any preconditions.
IAEA-DPRK
Talks. In 1993, one substantive meeting was held
{31.8–3.9}. Technical meetings to discuss outstanding
issues with the new inspection regime were initiated in November
1994 following the conclusion of the Agreed Framework, and
implementation talks for ongoing inspections took place.
From 1996 through 2002, North Korea refused to permit an IAEA
assessment of whether any plutonium had been removed from
the fuel rods taken out of the Yongbyon reactor (shutdown
in 1995 under the Agreed Framework) and potentially diverted
to make nuclear weapons. It was widely reported that enough
plutonium might have been diverted to make one or two bombs.
North Korea refused to permit full-scope IAEA inspections
pending fulfillment of US commitments under the Agreed Framework;
and IAEA inspectors were limited largely to confirming the
shutdown of all facilities at Yongbyon. The United States
and IAEA officials repeatedly underscored that the DPRK had
an obligation under the NPT (from which it had “suspended”
its withdrawal) to permit full-scope inspections. (For developments
in October 2002 and thereafter, see the section on the DPRK
proliferation crisis above.)
North-South
Korea Talks. After Jimmy Carter’s 1994 visit
to North Korea, the North and South Korea agreed to hold a
summit meeting in July 1994; but Kim Il-Sung’s death
put this plan on hold indefinitely. The Agreed Framework called
for North-South contacts to resume. The talks did resume in
1995 in Beijing, but no formal negotiations took place in
1996 or 1997 despite North Korea’s expressed willingness
{1.3.96} and efforts by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
to facilitate contact. In 1997 North and South Korea held
a meeting in the context of the Four Party Talks {7.3}.
In 1998, the two Koreas held vice-minister-level talks for
the first time since 1995. North Korea agreed in principle
to reunion talks, but refused to set a date {12–19.4}.
In 1999, North Korea proposed continuing talks, but attached
a number of conditions, including the termination of US-South
Korean military training exercises and the abolition of South
Korea’s National Security Law. Despite these conditions,
the offer was warmly received by South Korea {4.2}.
On 15 June 2000, ROK President Kim Dae-Jung held a summit
meeting P’yongyang with DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il. The
two sides agreed to work for reunification. Lower-level officials
held a series of follow-up meetings. Starting in November,
however, a turn for the worse in US-DPRK relations cast a
shadow on inter-Korea relations. By March 2001 {14.3}, relations
with the new Bush administration had deteriorated to the point
that North Korea cancelled further ministerial talks with
South Korea. Following Kim Jong-Il’s return from visits
to Moscow and Beijing in August 2001, it appeared that North-South
talks might resume; but they were again put on hold by the
North when the South declared a military alert following the
11 September attacks in the United States.
Toward the end of 2001, North-South contacts resumed, and
they continue somewhat fitfully throughout 2002. By the autumn
of 2002, contacts were at their most fruitful, with a number
of important bilateral projects under way. On 9 November at
the Third Meeting of the North-South Committee for the Promotion
of Economic Cooperation, the following points were agreed:
1. The North and South decided to take measures to simultaneously
and quickly push the linking of the East and West Coast railways
and roads.
(1) First, the two sides will link the East Coast railway
and road at the Mt. Kumgang region and the West Coast railway
and road at the Gaeseong Industrial Zone and actively take
... measures so that the Mt. Kumgang tourism project...and
the Gaeseong Industrial Zone construction can progress....
(2) The two sides will hold a working-level contact for the
linking of the railways and roads in mid-November at Mt. Kumgang
and discuss and resolve the pending working-level issues.
2. The North and the South will actively cooperate with each
other to ensure that the construction of the Gaeseong Industrial
Zone starts at the end of December 2002 and proceeds smoothly.
(1) The North will promulgate a law on the Gaeseong Industrial
Zone in mid-November and the South will build necessary infrastructure
in a commercial way as soon as possible.
(2) The two sides will have working contacts for the construction
of the Gaeseong Industrial Zone in early December and discuss
and settle pending working issues.
3. The North and the South will hold working contacts at Mt.
Kumgang on 19 December for a maritime cooperation agreement
allowing the two sides’ commercial vessels to pass through
each other’s territorial waters and sail safely, and
will hold another round of working contacts at Mt. Kumgang
at an early date to discuss allowing South Korean fishermen
to use part of the North’s East Sea Yellow Sea fishing
areas.
4. The North and the South will effectuate the already agreed
four agreements on the institutional guarantee of economic
cooperation at an early date by going through their respective
legal procedures....
5. The North and the South will exert efforts to realize a
visit to the North by a South Korean economic observation
team.
6. The fourth-round talks of the North-South Committee for
the Promotion of Economic Cooperation will be held in Seoul
in early February 2003.
In late 2002 and early 2003, during the escalating nuclear
crisis between the DPRK and the USA (see above), North and
South Korea proceeded to implement this agreement, albeit
slowly. Over the objections of US military personnel in South
Korea, the two sides conducted mine-clearing operations in
the two areas where the road and rail links were to be established.
The mine-clearing work was completed on both sides on 14 December.
Additional work on laying tracks and roadbeds for the eastern
link to Mt. Kumgang and the western link to the Gaeseong Industrial
Zone continued on both sides in early 2003, with August as
a target completion date. In February 2003, 22 tour buses
inaugurated a road that linked the two Koreas. Hyundai Corporation
announced plans to expand the Mt. Kumgang resort in addition
to seven other construction projects in the DPRK {14.2}. In
April 2003, North and South Korean cabinet ministers met in
P’yongyang to discuss nuclear issues, the ongoing and
future inter-Korean economic projects, railroad construction,
and the provision of fertilizer and rice to North Korea.
DPRK-Japan talks. Talks on normalizing DPRK-Japan
relations stalled in 1992 after eight rounds. Japan was willing
to resume the talks before North Korean nuclear issues were
fully resolved, and some informal contacts were maintained.
In 1995 Japan and North Korea agreed to resume talks, but held
no formal meetings. In April 1999, the two sides held informal
high-level talks, but no concrete progress was reported {12.4}.
The first formal talks since 1992 took place in April 2000 {4–8.4}
and were followed by two more rounds later in the year, but
proved inconclusive. In September 2002, however, North Korea
admitted and apologized for having abducted 11 Japanese citizens
decades earlier. Then, on 17 September, Japan’s Prime
Minister Koizumi visited P’yongyang to launch full-scale
talks on normalizing relations, for the first time since 1948.
Talks between the two sides continued until late October; the
DPRK refused to discuss Japan’s request for additional
information about abducted citizens who had died in North Korea,
or its request for the release of family members of five abducted
citizens who had been returned to Japan. North Korea claimed
that it had provided all of the relevant information, and no
further talks had been held through the end of April 2003. During
six-party talks in August 2003, North Korea and Japan again
clashed over the issue of the abducted citizens during their
first bilateral discussions, which occurred after a ten month
hiatus in negotiations {28.8}. Japan demanded that the DPRK
fulfill its responsibility for the abduction of Japanese citizens
in the 1970s and 1980s—one of Tokyo’s three conditions
for helping the Stalinist state’s collapsed economy. The
DPRK rejected the demands, countering that Japan had broken
conditions by refusing to return the abductees after their visits
home to Japan. {AFP 30.8.03}
DPRK-Russia
talks. On 9 February 2000, the two states signed
a treaty of friendship and cooperation after years of negotiations
to replace the 1961 Soviet-DPRK mutual security pact scrapped
by Russia in 1995 {9.2.00}. In 2001, talks were held on possible
arms supplies from Russia to North Korea, focusing on spare
parts for older Soviet systems still in service {27.4}; and
North Korea leader Kim Jong-Il traveled to Moscow for the
first time (by railroad) {4–5.8}. A joint statement
by Kim and Russian President Putin at the conclusion of Kim’s
visit underlined the importance of the ABM Treaty for “strategic
stability and basis for further reduction of strategic offensive
weapons.” Kim and Putin met again in 2002, when Putin
was vacationing near Vladivostok. Throughout the US-DPRK nuclear
crisis, Russia repeatedly offered to mediate and also encouraged
the United States to negotiate directly with North Korea.
In 2001 and again in 2002, Russia offered to help North Korea
refurbish a power plant that would be used to supply power
to one of the rail links that will eventually be created on
North Korean territory, which could connect the Trans-Siberian
railway with rail links in South Korea. This will facilitate
the shipment of goods from the Pacific region not only to
western Russia but also to the rest of Europe; and trade over
this link is expected to strengthen economies on all sides.
Discussing the importance of the rail link to South Korea
at a meeting with ten regional governors, Putin said, “If
we do not link the railways here, it will be done, ...through
the territory of our esteemed and dearly beloved neighbor,
the People’s Republic of China” { 24.8.02}.
Four-Party
Talks. On 17 April 1996, South Korea and the USA
proposed Four-Party Talks with North Korea and China to replace
the Korean War armistice agreement with a permanent peace
treaty. On 30 December 1996, North Korea agreed to a three-party
(USA, DPRK, and ROK) “joint briefing” to discuss
Four-Party Talks {30.12}. Preparatory meetings for Four-Party
Talks were held in 1997 without any substantial breakthroughs.
Disagreement over food aid to North Korea and a working agenda
for an August 1997 preparatory meeting {15.9} left the talks
stalled for a while. In November 1997, North Korea finally
agreed to US demands on the working agenda; and the two countries
issued a joint statement saying the talks would focus on the
“establishment of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula
and [on] issues concerning tension reduction there”
{21.11}. The talks commenced in December 1997 in Geneva {8.12}.
Several rounds of the talks were held in 1997, 1998, and 1999,
but achieved no result. The talks did not resume thereafter.
Six-Party
Talks. On 10 June 2003, the USA invited North Korea
to five-way talks that would include the USA, DPRK, ROK, Japan
and China. On 31 July 2003, North Korea agreed to the multilateral
talks if Russia was included. The US State Department agreed
to this condition. The first session of talks commenced in
August 2003, and was followed by a US-DPRK bilateral meeting
{27.8}. The DPRK demanded that the US present a roadmap for
giving up its hostile policy toward P’yongyang, starting
with a nonaggression treaty. Washington ruled out signing
a non-aggression treaty. No consensus or formal solution was
reached, but the six nations agreed to continue efforts to
denuclearize the Korean peninsula maintaining dialogue. Both
the US and the DPRK have not compromised their basic positions.
After months of delay and stalemate, North Korea agreed to
continue with the six-party talks during a meeting between
Chinese premier Wu Bangguo and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il
on 30 October 2003. North Korea announced, however, that it
would participate only if the USA accepted their package deal.
(See the section on the DPRK proliferation crisis above for
the US-DPRK basic positions, and the b-section chronology
for details on North Korea’s package deal).
The second round of talks, held in 25–28 February 2004,
also failed to establish a framework for ending North Korea’s
nuclear program because the United States and North Korea
both refused to make any concessions. In the third round of
talks, 23–26 June 2004, the participants demonstrated
more flexibility and willingness to compromise. The parties
managed to reach consensus on the first phase of the denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula. They also approved working document
that delegates operational authority over denuclearization
processes to a working group. The fourth round of talks, scheduled
for September 2004, was postponed due to South Korea’s
revelation of past secret nuclear experiments.
OTHER NORTHEAST ASIAN NUCLEAR
ISSUES
Japan. Japan is engaged
in a major program to build several dozen nuclear power plants.
This concerns North and South Korea and nonproliferation advocates
around the world because Japan is building “breeder
reactors” that generate plutonium as waste and rely
on reprocessed plutonium for fuel. The very large quantities
of stockpiled plutonium could easily be diverted to the production
of nuclear weapons.
In 1997, US-Japanese negotiations produced revised “defense
guidelines” that committed Japan to assist the United
States in “situations surrounding Japan” {7.6}.
In May 1999, the Japanese parliament passed US-Japanese military
partnership legislation that further specified the nature
of this cooperation {24.5}. Under these guidelines, Japan
will provide logistical support to US armed forces even if
they conduct operations far from Japan and have no direct
Japanese involvement. Japan is contemplating a theater missile
defense system, which it may develop jointly with the United
States {ACR 603e3ABM00}. On 10 December 2001, Japan and the
USA pledged to work together on sea-based missile defense
systems. After the meeting, a Japanese official said that
Japan was committed to continue funding research and development
for the program, but had not decided whether or not to deploy
a system. On 28 August 2003, Japan’s Defense Ministry
announced its decision to introduce a US-built missile defense
system, and requested Y142.3 bn ($1.2 bn) for FY 2004 funding
and procurement. In October 2003, Japan’s Air Force
test-launched three Patriot missiles as part of its efforts
to build a missile defense system. Joint US-Japan theater
missile defense development continued in 2004 {ACR 603e3BMD04}.
China-Taiwan
conflict. In 1999, China reportedly expanded a missile
base 275 miles from Taiwan to allow the deployment of up to
100 CSS-7 Mod 2 (M-11) short-range missiles. China denied
the reports, leaked by US intelligence sources and backed
up by Taiwanese officials {mid-October 99}. Tensions in China-Taiwan
relations persisted in 2000 and 2001. The missile threat from
China prompted Taiwan to consider building a missile defense
system {ACR 603e3ABM00}. In 2001, Taiwan’s President
Chen Shui-Bian called for a joint US-Japanese-Taiwanese program
to develop missile defenses against Chinese missile threats
{16.7}. In early 2003, China reportedly test-fired a medium-range
ballistic missile believed to carry multiple re-entry vehicle
warheads. Shortly thereafter, Taiwanese Minister of National
Defense Tang Yao-ming announced that the Taiwanese military
was considering a comprehensive low-altitude missile defense
system to defend against China’s ballistic missiles.
{AFP 9.2.03; CNA, AFP 27.2.03}
NUCLEAR
FACILITIES
North
Korea. For a brief description of the current state
of North Korean nuclear facilities, see the section on the
DPRK proliferation crisis above.
South
Korea. South Korea gets 34.3 percent of its electrical
power from 14 nuclear plants, and the Korean Ministry of Trade,
Industry and Energy expected the share to grow to 45.5 percent
by the year 2010 (see e2). South Korea is self-sufficient
in nuclear power technology. South Korea planned to use mixed
oxide fuel in its commercial reactors. This was contingent
upon political conditions, including the conclusion of a Korean
Peace treaty. North Korea opposed the shipment of South Korean
spent fuel to France or Britain, even if no reprocessing would
take place {box 31.8.97}. Reports that South Korea had a nuclear
weapons research program surfaced in 1999. One US expert believed
ROK had such a program in the 1970s but officially disbanded
it {box 1.3.99}. In September 2004, the South Korean Foreign
Ministry announced government scientists had conducted a series
of unsanctioned nuclear experiments, including plutonium enrichment
tests between April and May 1982 at the state-run Korean Atomic
Energy Research Institute. The Science and Technology Ministry
issued a further statement claiming that scientists had also
conducted an unsanctioned uranium enrichment test as a by-product
of unrelated laser experiments in January and February 2000.
Despite ROK’s denial that the tests were for military
purposes, the DPRK announced that South Korea’s secret
nuclear experiments ruined prospects for a fourth round of
six-party talks.
Japan.
Japan has as many as 53 nuclear power reactors and 21 research
reactors (see e3) and has accumulated 5,000 kg of separated
plutonium in addition to an estimated 49,500 kg of plutonium
in spent fuel {box 1.3.98}. Under the terms of a US-proposed
cutoff on production of fissionable materials for weapons,
Japan would be allowed to retain its plutonium-based civilian
power network{850-109 27.9.93}. Under a 1988 nuclear cooperation
agreement between the United States and Japan, Japan sends
its spent nuclear fuel (US-origin uranium) to Europe for reprocessing.
Under this agreement, the United States approved the transport
of MOX fuel from Japan to Europe in 1999 {12.5}. In 1998,
Japan and the UK renewed a 30-year-old agreement covering
Anglo-Japanese trade and shipment of fissile material {25.2}.
During the first quarter of 1999, Japan shipped 5,610 tons
of spent fuel for reprocessing in Britain and France {box
1.4}. In September 1999, a severe criticality accident occurred
at a fuel conversion plant in Tokaimura, resulting in two
deaths, hundreds of injuries and exposure to high levels of
radiation in the surrounding community {30.9}. In January
2003, the operators of the Tokaimura facility revealed that
206 kg of plutonium were missing (out of a total of 6890 kg
processed since 1977). They said that the plant was under
IAEA Safeguards, and the discrepancy had to be the result
of measurement errors, not theft. {AFP 28.1.03} The same day,
a Japanese court ruled against restarting the Monju experimental
fast-breeder reactor “because of flaws in the government’s
safety assessment.” The reactor has been closed since
an accident in 1995, in which a sodium coolant leak led to
a fire. The government is expected to appeal the ruling {FT
28.1.03}.
US
nuclear weapons As part of its plan to eliminate
its tactical nuclear weapons, the United States removed all
tactical nuclear weapons stationed in South Korea by 18 December
1991.
POSITIONS OF GOVERNMENTS
North
Korea. For North Korea, see the section on the US-DPRK
crisis above.
South
Korea ratified the NPT on 23 April 1975. It wanted
bilateral inspections as well as IAEA inspections of North
Korea’s nuclear facilities {19.6.92, 23.11.93}. In late
1996, South Korea suspended implementation of the Agreed Framework
after a North Korean submarine with commandos on board infiltrated
South Korean territory {18.9.96}. South Korea agreed to move
forward on the Agreed Framework after North Korea apologized
for the incident {29.12.96}. In 1998, following a North Korean
missile test over Japan, South Korea agreed to coordinate
its policy on North Korea with Japan {15–16.12.98}.
When progress in US-DPRK talks on ending the North’s
missile program ended with the advent of the Bush administration
in January 2001, senior South Korean officials came to the
United States several times in 2001 and 2002 to press the
Bush administration to resume talks with North Korea
China
has expressed its support for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula
and for an independent, peacefully reunified Korea. In the
mid-1980s, when the Cold War rhetoric was peaking, China said
DPRK calls for US withdrawal from South Korea were “justified”
{850-103 5.9.86}. Since the conclusion of the Agreed Framework
in 1994 and the inauguration of Four Party Talks in 1997,
which include China as a primary party, China has generally
taken a neutral stance in debates between the other parties
{21–24.10.98; 5–7.8.97; 17.4.96}.
Japan
dismissed fears that it would develop nuclear weapons in 1992
statements and in 1993, promised close cooperation with the
IAEA to safeguard its nuclear facilities and materials. In
1998, Japan suggested six-party talks {8.10} and agreed to
coordinate its policy on North Korea with South Korea {15–16.12}.
The call for six-party talks, involving Japan and Russia as
well as the United States, North Korea, South Korea, and China,
was repeated in 1999 without comment by the United States
{3.5}. In March 1999, Japanese officials met with their South
Korean counterparts to review their separate policies towards
North Korea {20.3}, and Japan planned to participate in a
Coordination and Oversight Group to coordinate its policy
on North Korea with South Korea and the United States {23–26.4.99}.
On 31 May 2002, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo
Fukuda told reporters on background (not for attribution)
that Japan might reconsider the three nuclear weapon principles:
not to possess, produce, or permit them on Japan’s soil.
When published, this information created great distress in
China and South Korea, and among Japanese Parliamentarians.
As a result, Fukuda publicly acknowledged making the statement
and said that in the context of national debate on the Constitution,
“I meant it could be possible that Japanese people discuss
the nation’s security on any level in line with international
situations and eras...but I did not indicate any direction
that the government should take in the future.” Later
the same day Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi asserted that
Japan would not change the three principles. {Xinhua 3.6.02}
Russia allowed its military mutual assistance
pact with North Korea to lapse and replaced it in 2000 with
a friendship and cooperation treaty {9.2}. Russia proposed an
eight-party (United States, North Korea, South Korea, China,
Japan, Russia, IAEA, UN) conference on regional security {24.3.94,
17.4.96, 18.5.99}. On nuclear energy-related matters, North
Korea urged Russia to join KEDO, but the Western participants
did not invite Russia to join. Russia has discussed nuclear
issues with South Korea {27–30.5.99; see also 612bFIS
and 612b1FIS for details on trade issues involving nuclear waste
storage and reprocessing}. During his official visit to Moscow
in 2001 North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il met with Russian president
Putin and confirmed the 2000 joint declaration and the Treaty
of Friendship {4-5.8}. In 2002 Russia made numerous offers to
try to facilitate US-DPRK talks.
The
United States’ position on nuclear non-proliferation
in Northeast Asia is covered in the section above on the US-DPRK
crisis in 2002–2003. |
Nuclear Proliferation