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Global Nuclear Disarmament


Note: In arms control literature, the term "Nuclear Weapon States" (NWS) refers exclusively to the five countries that had nuclear weapons before the entry into force of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States. India and Pakistan, which openly acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1990s, are not recognized as NWS under the NPT. Other states widely believed to have (or nearly have) nuclear weapons have typically been called 'threshold states.' Israel has nuclear weapons but does not openly acknowledge that fact, maintaining an official policy of "ambiguity." North Korea, whose nuclear weapon program was suspended in 1994 and appears to have been re-launched in 2002, is currently the only nuclear threshold state. Iran, which in 2002 revealed a major program to build a uranium enrichment gas-centrifuge plant for its nuclear power program, could soon be considered a threshold state.

Governments in favor of taking relatively quick action on global nuclear disarmament look to the Conference on Disarmament, the world's only multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations, as the body that would negotiate a nuclear disarmament treaty. Since the mid-1990s, however, the NWS and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) in the CD have been unable to resolve some major conflicts on priorities and linkage. Lacking an agreed "program of work," the CD has been unable to convene an ad hoc committee to negotiate a multilateral treaty for nuclear arms reductions.

Disarmament proponents raise nuclear disarmament issues at other international fora, chiefly the UN General Assembly and the NPT preparatory committees and review conferences. Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have recommended that the NWS take unilateral or reciprocal unilateral steps toward complete nuclear disarmament. In recent years, NGOs have had a three-hour session at the annual NPT PrepCom (Preparatory Committee) meetings, in which to present their views.

Current status. Despite a widespread demand by many states, international organizations, and NGOs, no formal negotiations aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament have been held, in large part because United States remains steadfastly opposed to multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in the CD.

Recent history. Article VI of the NPT commits the NWS to nuclear disarmament, specifying that they should pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The NWS are often criticized, particularly at the five-year NPT Review Conferences, for not following through on their Article VI obligations. Article VI might originally have been interpreted as requiring only talks, not results; but that changed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, which adopted a well-defined program of action calling for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT or fissban), and "the determined pursuit...of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons." {ACR 602dNPT95 11.5}

The 2000 NPT Review Conference agreed on "13 practical steps" toward nuclear disarmament. The steps listed in the conference's final document included establishing in the CD "an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament" and further efforts by the NWS to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally. The NWS issued a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to nuclear disarmament. Since 2000, however, there has been no progress in any of these areas.

The CD. In autumn 1995, for the first time, the UNGA adopted by a vote of 99-39-15 a resolution proposed by China calling on the CD to work out a program for phased nuclear disarmament within a fixed time span. The United States, France, Britain, other EU countries, Canada, and the majority of East European states voted against the resolution. Russia, Australia, and Japan abstained {ACR 850-9401bSUG95 12.12}.

In 1996, the CD convened an ad hoc committee to complete negotiations for the CTBT. France, the United States, and the United Kingdom opposed the creation of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, viewing the NPT Review Conferences as the appropriate multilateral body for this task {850-9401bSUG96 2.12}. The USA was reluctant to open the new NPT review conference process to discussion of nuclear disarmament. {ACR 850-9401bSUG96 15.12}

India highlighted the issue of nuclear disarmament during the CTBT talks by refusing to support the treaty unless the preamble called for a time-bound program of nuclear disarmament. However, the other CD members found a way to circumvent the CD's consensus procedure and overcome India's opposition by presenting the CTBT to the UNGA for adoption.

In 1997, the non-aligned states (NAM) at the CD, including India, supported the creation of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. However, as in 1996, no ad hoc committee was formed. In the first part of the 1998 session, the CD president made a statement declaring nuclear disarmament as the number one priority of the CD {27.3.98}. At the CD's conclusion, no ad hoc committee on disarmament was established despite calls for such an action {9.9.98}. The position remained unchanged in 1999.

In 2000, CD President Celso Amorin of Brazil proposed setting up three ad hoc committees. One committee would negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty, while the other two would "deal with" nuclear disarmament and Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS); however the CD failed to achieve a consensus {7.8-21.9.00}. In 2002 the CD was led a bit off track with the threat of terrorism. At the opening session of the 2002 CD session John R Bolton

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security stated that "The main emphasis of the Bush Administration's arms control policy is the determination to enforce existing treaties, and to seek treaties and arrangements that meet today's threats to peace and stability, not yesterday's." {21.1.02}

In January 2003 a group of five Ambassadors, all former Presidents of the CD, presented an initiative to break the program dead-lock. The so called "Five Ambassadors' Initiative" proposal called for four ad hoc committees: negative security assurances; nuclear disarmament; a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and PAROS {23.1.03}. By the end of the 2003 session the Conference had not agreed on a program of work. Throughout this period of stalemate, the United States has opposed negotiating mandates on PAROS and on nuclear disarmament, while China has opposed negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty in the absence of negotiations on PAROS.

The UNGA. The UNGA annually passes a number of resolutions concerning nuclear disarmament, which are presented in detail in the relevant chronology section (801bGA). The nature of these resolutions is generally to encourage sustained efforts to achieve a program of work in the CD, to call for talks on specific topics in that body, or to call for the ratification or implementation of the CTBT or NPT.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ). In 1996, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons. While addressing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, it also concluded that an obligation existed under Article VI of the NPT beyond "that of a mere obligation of obligation to achieve a precise result (nuclear disarmament in all its aspects) by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter." {850-204 8.7.96}

The UNGA passed a resolution in 1997 on the ICJ opinion, calling for multilateral negotiations to commence in 1998, and "leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons, and providing for their elimination." The resolution requested all states to report back on "the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the present resolution and nuclear disarmament." The UNGA passed similar resolutions yearly from 1998 through 2002. The United States and some of its allies voted against these resolutions.

In 1998, the NAM pushed for the inclusion of nuclear weapons on a list of prohibited weapons proposed in the outline for an International Criminal Court. {17.7}

The Canberra Commission. In 1996, Australia established a commission of distinguished experts to work out a realistic path to a nuclear-free world. On 14 August 1996, the commission presented its program: begin by taking nuclear forces off alert and removing warheads from SNDVs and end with the elimination of nuclear weapons and a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes. The development of appropriate verification measures would ensure the implementation of the program. {850-9401b 14.8}

The generals' statement. In December 1996, 50 retired generals from the NWS (except China) jointly called for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

The Hague Peace Appeal. In 1999, the Agenda for Peace and Justice adopted by the Hague Appeal for Peace Conference called for immediate negotiations for a convention to eliminate nuclear weapons. {14.5}

NPT PrepComs. At the Preparatory Committee meetings held between NPT Review Conferences, nuclear disarmament is a central issue. The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference-which extended the NPT's duration from the initial 25 years to the indefinite future-adopted a well-defined program of action calling for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT or fissban), and "the determined pursuit...of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons." {ACR 602dNPT95 11.5} In 1998, the Non-Aligned Movement states (NAM) presented a working paper calling on the NWS to progress towards the abolition of nuclear weapons and to honor their commitments in this area. It also called for the establishment of an ad hoc committee within the CD. South Africa proposed strengthening of the review process as well {27.4-8.5}. The 1999 NPT PrepCom called on NWS to adopt practical steps toward nuclear disarmament {10-21.5}.

After arduous debate, the 2000 NPT Review Conference agreed by consensus on "13 practical steps" toward nuclear disarmament. The steps listed in the conference's final document {ACR 602dNPT00} included establishing in the CD "an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament" and further efforts by the NWS to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally. The 2002 PrepCom discussed Article VI issues, but took no substantive decisions. {ACR 615bNUC02 8-19.4} The 2003 PrepCom was shadowed by a sense of anxiety as North Korea became the first country to pull out of the NPT; and by the invasion of Iraq. The 2003 closed sessions were divided into three clusters: disarmament, regional issues, and peaceful nuclear programs. The US delegation reaffirmed its position that the US does not support all 13 Steps and that it is a mistake to see them as the only measure of the fulfillment of Article VI.


Negative Security Assurances. Because the NPT does not contain explicit security assurances to NNWS, in 1968 the UNGA passed Res. 255 containing the principles of negative and positive security assurances {ACR 801bGA94 30.8}. In the Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) I, the NWS were asked to indicate what guarantees (negative security assurances or NSAs) each NWS was willing to extend to the NNWS about not using or threatening to use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. Beginning in 1980, the CD took up the topic and, annually from 1987 to 1994, formed an ad hoc committee with the title "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons." The CD re-established an ad hoc committee on NSAs in 1998, but did not make any progress in talks on the topic. It was unable to reconvene the committee in any later year. As part of the negotiations for including the successor states to the Soviet Union in START, Britain, France, Russia, and the United States provided security assurances to Ukraine {ACR 611bST194 5.12}.

In 1995, in order to strengthen their position prior to the 25-year NPT Review and Extension Conference, each NWS submitted a new text of its security assurances to the UN (see below). In addition, the NWS passed Security Council Res. 984 providing positive assurances to NNWS parties to the NPT that the NWS will seek Security Council action to provide necessary assistance to any state that is a victim of nuclear-weapon use. Non-aligned countries expressed disappointment that the Security Council did not take stronger action {11.4.95}.

At the 1997 NPT PrepCom, several states suggested that legally-binding assurances be added to the NPT at the 2000 Review Conference {7-18.4}, an idea reiterated at the 1999 PrepCom by South Africa and Iran. During the 1998 and 1999 PrepComs, China and the NAM separately called for a legally binding agreement on NSAs, which the United States opposed {27.4-8.5.98, 10-21.5.99}.

At the 1999 PrepCom, Chairman's Working Papers, which were passed along to the 2000 Review Conference, contained language dealing with NSAs. Some of the NWS rejected this language. Other states, including South Africa, wanted the NPT review process to take up NSAs and therefore disapproved of the idea of addressing security assurances at the CD. Five NATO countries called for the identification of further steps on NSAs that "could take the form of a legally binding treaty." A number of other states laid out similar positions. {10-21.5}

The final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference agreed that "legally binding security assurances" by the five NWS to the NNWS parties to the NPT "strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime" and called on the PrepCom to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue {ACR 602dNPT00}. At the 2002 PrepCom, many states called for negative security assurances. {615bNUC02 8-19.4} At the 2003 PrepCom closed sessions the UK reiterated its NSAs and US stated that its NSAs had not changed. This was in response to several questions and widespread concerns that were raised about this issue and about the possibility of future US nuclear weapons tests {21.5.03}.

Excerpts from unilateral declarations made by NWS. The full text of pledges recorded by the CD in 1983 is given in the 1995 status section 840-204. The renewed pledges made at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference {5-6.4} are as follows.

United Kingdom. "The United Kingdom will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, States towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State, in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."

China. "China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances. China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances."

France. "France affirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on it, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State toward which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a State, in alliance or in association with a nuclear-weapon State.

In response to the requests made by a large number of countries, France has sought to harmonize the content of its negative assurances to the maximum extent possible with those of the other nuclear powers. We are happy that this effort has succeeded. The declarations concerning negative security assurances made by France, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom, are now practically identical."

Russia. "The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against non nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or other attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."

United States. "The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or States towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State, in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."


Four former US government officials proposed in April 1982 that NATO renounce the doctrine of possible first use of nuclear weapons to increase confidence and minimize the risk of escalation to nuclear war.

In 1986, the UNGA approved a resolution praising no-first-use declarations by China and the Soviet Union and proposing a convention that would prohibit the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons; be of unlimited duration; and come into force after ratification by 25 states, including the five NWS {12.11.86; 4.12.90}. In May 1990, the United States said it would not change its first-use doctrine, and it reiterated this determination on 27 September 1991. On 5 October 1991, Soviet leader Gorbachev called for a no-first-use statement from all nuclear powers. Russia's new security doctrines issued in 1997 and 2000 permit first use of nuclear weapons. {9.5.97, 10.1.00, 22.4.00}

In 1998, following the South Asian nuclear tests in May, India proposed, but Pakistan rejected, a no-first-use pact between the two countries {29.5, 16-18.10}. Also in 1998, China proposed a US-China no-first-use agreement {10.6}; Britain clarified that it was prepared to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for chemical or biological attacks against it {30.7}; and Germany and Canada proposed a no-first-use doctrine for NATO. {8.12}

The United States refused in 1998 to rule out the use of nuclear weapons against Iraq {2.2}. Clarifying the US position on NSA, a senior US official said, "It is the policy of the United States...not to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict unless the state attacking us or our allies or our military forces is nuclear-capable or not in good standing under the NPT or an equivalent regime, or third, is attacking us in alliance with a state with nuclear capability" {18.2}. A US Joint Chiefs of Staff report claimed that US policy allowed for the first use of non-strategic nuclear weapons against terrorist targets. {27.8}

In February 1999, Germany again proposed reviewing NATO's-no-first use doctrine at the NATO Summit in April 1999, but was strongly opposed by the United States {23-25.4.99}. Britain wanted to discuss the matter in NATO's High Level Working Group {6-7.2.99}. A senior US official indicated that the United States was unlikely to adopt a no-first-use doctrine {9.11.99}. Also in 1999, India released a draft nuclear doctrine that proposed a no-first-use treaty {17.8}, while Russia released a draft national security doctrine that appeared to lower the threshold for first use of nuclear weapons {9.10}. China, for the first time, extended a no-first-use pledge to Taiwan. {2.9}

At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, China reiterated its no-first-use commitment and its undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS or states in NWFZs. In 2000, Pakistan reiterated its first-use policy {20.7, 16.10}. However, in late 2001, it seemingly backed away from this policy {29.12}, while China repeated its no-first-use commitment. {7.9}

In 2002, the United States and the United Kingdom explicitly supported policies that would permit first use of nuclear weapons. Contravening all earlier pledges, the US Nuclear Posture Review laid out contingencies in which the United States might be prepared to use nuclear weapons against NNWS {ACR 615bNUC02 9.3}. In addition to this major departure from previous US policy, the Bush administration announced a policy of preemption {ACR 615bNUC02 20.9} and a new strategy for responding to attacks in which any WMD (nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons) were employed {ACR 615bNUC02 11.12}. The UK said it was prepared to use nuclear weapons against states that used any form of WMD (not just nuclear, but also chemical or biological) against British forces {ACR 615bNUC02 20.3}. In addition, Pakistan said it was prepared to use nuclear weapons first if attacked with conventional forces. {ACR 615bNUC02 29.5} In 2003, Pakistan introduced a draft resolution (A/C.1/58/L.8) to the DC that called for its adoption on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons {21.10.03}


When the INF Treaty banning intermediate-range nuclear weapons neared completion in 1987, concern arose about the shorter-range nuclear weapons that would remain in Europe. The USSR called for their complete elimination {ACR 401bSNF87 1.8}. NATO members stated that with the intermediate-range missiles gone, the remaining weapons were needed more than ever {ACR 403bSNF88 8.2}. NATO later called for modernizing the remaining nuclear weapons, even though some of them would be eliminated. {5-6.7.90}

NATO endorsed Soviet-US short-range nuclear forces talks, however, to begin following the conclusion of the CFE Treaty {5-6.7.90}. In December 1990, NATO said it was developing an arms control framework for the talks, but that working out a mandate would require six months and that talks would begin "within a year" {17-18.12}. In June 1991, NATO ministers said preparations for the talks were continuing {6-7.6}; but the impending breakup of the Soviet Union after the failed August coup led President Bush to announce that the United States would unilaterally withdraw its short-range nuclear forces worldwide, keeping only some air-delivered weapons in Europe {27.9.91}. In response, Gorbachev announced reciprocal steps {5.10.91}.

On 17 October 1991, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) agreed to remove all but 700 air-dropped nuclear bombs from Europe. On 29 October, Gorbachev and Bush agreed to discuss what measures could be taken to verify reciprocal cutbacks. Two sessions on this topic took place {ACR 611bST191 6-8.10 and 25-27.11}. In 1992, Russia {ACR 408eINF92 7. 11} and the United States {ACR 408eINF92 5-7} announced that they had completed the promised withdrawals Further cuts have been made in US air-dropped nuclear weapons in Europe over the past decade. At present, the number is around 150.

On 21 December 1991, the four former Soviet republics with strategic nuclear weapons (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine) agreed to withdraw all nuclear weapons to central storage depots by 1 July 1992, and to ultimately destroy them. By mid-1992, all short-range nuclear forces had been withdrawn to Russia {2-4.92 for Kazakhstan; 4-5.92 for Ukraine and Belarus; 1-2.92 for all other republics}.

On 29 January 1992, Yeltsin stated: "We recently halted production of nuclear warheads for ground-based tactical missiles, as well as nuclear artillery shells and nuclear mines. Stockpiles of such nuclear charges will be eliminated. Russia is eliminating one-third of all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and one-half of nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles. Measures to this end have already been taken. We also intend to reduce stockpiles of tactical nuclear ammunition for the Air Force by one-half. The remaining tactical nuclear weapons for the Air Force could be removed from front-line (tactical) air force units on the basis of reciprocity with the United States, and deployed at bases for centralized stockpiling" {CD/1123 31.1.92}.

In late 1996, US officials voiced concern about alleged Russian delays in destroying tactical warheads, and offered to discuss their destruction {17.12}.

In 1997, Finland proposed a policy of transparency for short-range nuclear forces, as well as unilateral constraints, at the NPT PrepCom {7-18.4}. During the year, a Russian Foreign Ministry official claimed that Russia still had 13,000 short-range nuclear warheads {27.5}.

At the 1999 NPT PrepCom, one of the Chairman's Working Papers contained a provision reaffirming "the need for the nuclear-weapon States to reduce further their reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons and to pursue negotiations on their elimination as an integral part of their overall nuclear disarmament activities." An earlier Chairman's Working Paper invited "increased transparency by the NWS on the dismantlement of tactical nuclear weapons." Language from both papers was rejected by Russia and the USA. {10-21.5}

Also in 1999, Russia developed a new short-range missile and approved plans for the use of tactical nuclear weapons {29.4}. China was reportedly increasing production of its M-class short-range ballistic missiles, which it has deployed at a base off Taiwan {11.2.99; 1.10}, and in 2002, China test-fired a new SRBM. {ACR 615e5NUC02 13.12}

At the 2002 First PrepCom meeting to the 2005 NPT Review Conference Russia promised to complete the elimination of its tactical nuclear weapons by 2004. The Russian delegation requested that the United States withdraw all of its tactical nuclear warheads from Europe {23.4.02}. During the summer US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he would like Russia to increase its nuclear warhead transparency measures, including tactical nuclear warheads {7.25}

In 2003, in providing advice and consent for the ratification of SORT the US Senate adopted a declaration encouraging President Bush to engage Russia on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. It was in their opinion that further cooperation would help secure and catalogue Russia's stockpile which could increase confidence in the accounting and security measures in place {6.3.03}


Britain voted against a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament {ACR 850-9401.B 18.1.95}, against negotiations and the forming of an ad hoc committee on this topic in the CD, and against a multilaterally negotiated convention that was proposed in a UNGA resolution. However, in the mid-1990s it was more flexible than the United States and Russia on convening nuclear disarmament talks {28.7-12.12.97}. The 2003 Defense White Paper: Delivering Security in a Changing World stated that "'We are committed to working towards a safer world in which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons and continue to play a full role in international efforts to strengthen arms control and prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. However, the continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weaponsÉmean that our minimum nuclear deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident, is likely to remain a necessary element of our security."

China supports a time-bound framework for complete nuclear disarmament and a nuclear weapons convention. In 1999, China called for a convention banning nuclear weapons {16.6.99}.

France opposes a time-bound framework, CD negotiations, and a multilaterally negotiated nuclear disarmament convention. In 2001, President Jacques Chirac stated that France's nuclear arsenal existed to protect its vital interests, to serve as a deterrent to political blackmail of smaller countries with nuclear weapons, and to ensure Europe's security and that of the Atlantic alliance {8.6.01}.

India supports negotiating a multilateral nuclear disarmament treaty to be negotiated in the CD. In the mid-1990s, it linked its acceptance of negotiations on conventional arms limitations, the CTBT, and a fissban to progress on general nuclear disarmament {9.12.97}. However, in 1998, India stopped requiring progress on the CTBT and FMCT as a condition for nuclear disarmament talks {ACR 608bCTB98 24.9 and 612bFIS98 11.5-26.6}. More recently India has called for early negotiations on a nuclear weapon convention to deal with the issue of nuclear weapons in a "global nondiscriminatory framework." In the UNGA, India has regularly sponsored a resolution on reducing nuclear danger, addressing de-alerting options for nuclear weapons {ACR 615NUC02 22.11}.

Israel opposes the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. In talks on a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone, Israel has linked the elimination of its own nuclear weapons to the resolution of the long-standing conflicts in the region.

Japan has consistently supported realistic and steady reductions towards a nuclear-free world {ACR 850-9401.B 28.11.95}. In 1997, it sponsored a moderate UNGA resolution on disarmament {ACR 850-9401.B 10.12.96; 9.12.97}. It supported the appointment of a special coordinator for nuclear disarmament in the CD {27.6, 28.7, 12.9.97}. In 1998, Japan supported South Africa's initiative for the establishment of a CD committee on nuclear disarmament {19.1.98}. In the UNGA, Japan annually sponsors a resolution on the elimination of nuclear weapons {ACR 615bNUC02 22.11}.

Pakistan has a declared "first-use" policy (being prepared to use nuclear weapons first under certain circumstances). However, at the height of a confrontation with India in late 2001, Pakistan appeared to back away from this policy, declaring that the use of nuclear weapons is "inconceivable for any state" {29.12.01}. Pakistan regularly sponsors a resolution in the UNGA on negative security assurances {ACR 615bNUC02 22.11}.

Russia supported multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in 1995 {ACR 850-9401.B 22.9.95}, but opposed them in 1996-2000. In 2001, Russia proposed setting up an ad hoc committee in the CD that would "deal with" the topic of nuclear disarmament and also "address questions related to its mandate." In July 2001, Russian President Putin proposed nuclear arms reduction talks among the five NWS {2.7.01}

The United States opposes multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations and is mainly responsible for the CD's failure to convene an ad hoc committee to negotiate nuclear disarmament. It opposes the inclusion of nuclear weapons on the International Court of Justice list of prohibited weapons {17.7.98}. In 1999, it declared de-alerting "off the table," favoring, instead, the establishment of early warning centers {22.9.99}. Under the Bush administration, the United States has taken several major steps away from nuclear disarmament. In 2003 the US consistently voted against UN GA resolutions on disarmament: the CTBT; the "Path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;" "New Agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world;" "Obligation of nuclear disarmament;" and the "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" {9.12.03}.


Harold A Feiveson and Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons," The Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2003):

Jean du Preez, "2003 NPT Preparatory Committee: Progress Towards 2005 or Business as Usual?" Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (7 May 2003):

Jean du Preez, "Security Assurances Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons: Is Progress Possible at the NPT Prepcom?" Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (28 April 2003):

David Krieger, "The Second Nuclear Age," Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (23 September 2003): _second-nuclear.htm

David Krieger, "Fueling the Nuclear Fire: Nuclear Policies of the Bush Administration," Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (19 August 2003):

"UK Actions Towards Verifiable Global Nuclear Disarmament," Foreign and Commonwealth Office:

George Perkovich, "Bush's Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation," Foreign Affairs (March 2003): http://www.carnegie

Joseph Cirincione, "How Will the Iraq War Change Global Nonproliferation Strategies?" Arms Control Today (April 2003): /act/2003_04/cirincione_apr03.asp

"Curbing Nuclear Proliferation An Interview with Mohamed ElBaradei," Arms Control Today (November 2003): 11/ElBaradei_11.asp

Christine Kucia, "NPT Meeting Confronts New Nuclear Threats," Arms Control Today (June 2003): /npt_june03.asp

George W Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," The White House (17 September 2002):

Rose Gottemoeller, "Beyond Arms Control: How to Deal with Nuclear Weapons," Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief 23 (February 2003).

Michael A Levi, "Fire in the Hole: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Options for Counterproliferation," Carnegie Paper No 31 (November 2002).

"Collective Security: A New Role for Britain," Current Decisions Report No 24 (March 2000).

"Statement on Nuclear Disarmament, NATO Policy and the Churches," World Council of Churches Central Committee Document No PI5 (6 February 2001).

Jayantha Dhanapala, "Eliminating Nuclear Arsenals: the NPT Pledge and What It Means," Disarmament Diplomacy 47 (June 2000):

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