Non-Proliferation Treaty: NPT

Negotiated: 1957 - 1968.
Signed: 1 July 1969 at London, Washington, and Moscow.
Entered into force: 5 March 1970.
Depositaries: UK, USA, and Russia (succeeding USSR).

Introduction. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) seeks to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any state other than the five states ( Britain, France, China, Russia, United States) that meet the treaty's definition of a nuclear weapon state (NWS): that is, a state that manufactured and exploded a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967. The treaty prohibits NWS from assisting other states to acquire nuclear weapons, and it prohibits non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) parties from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The treaty has achieved widespread adherence since 1969. The only countries that have not acceded are India, Israel, Pakistan, and Cuba. India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, but are not recognized as NWS under the NPT. Israel is widely acknowledged to possess nuclear weapons. For the status of North Korea please see below.

In 1995, the NPT Review and Extension Conference agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely. The conference also adopted a Resolution on the Middle East {ACR 602dNPT95 11.5} and a set of "Principles and Objectives" against which to assess future NPT implementation. The conference empowered Preparatory Committees and future review conferences to assess implementation.

CURRENT STATUS

Nuclear disarmament. The 2000 NPT Review Conference adopted a Final Document containing an "unequivocal undertaking" by the NWS "to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals." In order to counteract the NNWS criticism of their failure to fulfill their disarmament obligations and the general air of pessimism that existed when the conference began, the NWS also issued a separate statement during the conference reiterating their unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, the rest of the year saw no concrete action to advance nuclear disarmament. In 2001, the United States and Russia began a new round of bilateral talks on reducing strategic intercontinental nuclear weapons, which resulted in 2002 in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty or SORT (also referred to as the Moscow Treaty) {see ACR 617bST302}.

Improvement of safeguards. Negotiations on safeguard improvement were divided into two phases. Phase I talks, which began in September 1995, focused on expanded declarations. Phase II negotiations were finalized with the adoption of a new safeguards protocol on 15 May 1997. Since then, the Additional Protocols providing for strengthened agreements have been approved by many states. {See the tables on "Additional Protocols" below and in ACR 602bNPT02.}

Horizontal proliferation. Member states endeavor to prevent any state other than the original NWS from acquiring nuclear weapons. In addition to non-parties India, Pakistan, and Israel {see respective regional sections}, all of which are known to have acquired nuclear weapons, three state parties, Iran, Iraq and North Korea, have had programs to acquire nuclear weapons. The program in Iraq was ended by the first Gulf War. Negotiations are currently under way to end the programs in North Korea and Iran.

Vertical proliferation. Under NPT Article VI, the nuclear-armed member states agreed to pursue measures to end the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference defined these measures as: conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was completed and opened for signature in 1996 but has not entered into force {see ACR 608aCTB04}; the early conclusion of a ban on production of fissile material for weapon purposes (no formal negotiations have been started; see ACR 805aCD04); and the pursuit of efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally (no formal negotiations have been started; see ACR 615aNUC04).

By the time the 2000 Review Conference met, several developments had led the NNWS to seriously question the commitment of NWS to Article VI. The US Senate had rejected ratification of the CTBT in 1999; NATO decided to retain forward-deployed tactical nuclear forces in Europe in its 1999 strategy review {ACR 402bEUR99 23 - 25.4; ACR 402dEUR99 24.4}; the prospects for further strategic nuclear arms reduction were threatened by US missile defense plans; and China, Russia, and the United States had obstructed progress on a fissile material cut-off in the CD. China tied the fissile cutoff talks to negotiations to stop the militarization of space (PAROS, Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space), which the United States blocked; and the United States and Russia opposed discussions on global nuclear disarmament in the CD. Despite the "unequivocal undertaking" to pursue nuclear disarmament at the 2000 Review Conference, the stalemate continued, with no movement taking place in 2001­-2004 in the CD or any other multilateral fora.

Title. The formal title is above; IDDS uses the informal "NPT" for Non-Proliferation Treaty.

History and Fora

IAEA. The International Atomic Energy Agency, founded in 1957, is charged with implementing safeguards to assure the peaceful use of nuclear energy and assisting its members in using nuclear energy. Its annual General Conference, held at its Vienna headquarters in September, covers many proliferation topics. Member states of the IAEA are listed at the end of this section.

Verification/Safeguards. All NNWS parties to the NPT agree to institute full-scope IAEA safeguards. The IAEA establishes and maintains the capability to detect promptly the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from civilian to military purposes or the misuse of facilities or equipment subject to safeguards. The IAEA's system of safeguards is described in its annual Safeguards Implementation Report. The IAEA has found both Iran and Libya in breach of their safeguard obligations for having engaged in undeclared nuclear activities. The Director General also stated that information coming from Iran was slow, changing and contradictory. In October, Iran attempted to correct its breaches of obligations and agreed to a contract of transparency. The IAEA had not completed its evaluation of Iran's nuclear program by the end of the year. On 29 December 2003 Libya also agreed to pursue a policy of transparency but the IAEA could not draw conclusions concerning Libya's past or present nuclear programs by 31 December 2003. Top Pakistani scientists AQ Khan and Mohammad Farooq have been implicated as the source of uranium centrifuge design technology that helped Libya make great strides in its nuclear program. { 453bMEN04} Because North Korea did not allow inspections as of late 2002 and through 2004; no conclusion could be made concerning nuclear material in North Korea. No inspections took place in North Korea in 2003 or 2004. (In the early 1990s, it was suspected that North Korea might have diverted some fissile material for weapon purposes. Weapon-related activities were frozen and that freeze was subject to on-site inspection; but the original likely violation was never confirmed because North Korea deferred a comprehensive inspection until the final stages of implementation of the Agreed Framework, which were never reached.)

Review conferences have been held every five years:

1975 First Review Conference

1980 Second Review Conference

1985 Third Review Conference, 27 Aug–21 Sept, Geneva

1990 Fourth Review Conference, 20 Aug–14 Sept, Geneva

1995 Fifth Review and Extension Conference, 17 April–12 May, New York

2000 Sixth Review Conference, 24 April–19 May, New York

The 1995 Review Conference was special because the NPT, which had entered into force 25 years earlier, was due to expire unless renewed and extended at this conference. The Review and Extension Conference did decide to renew the Treaty, and to do so for the indefinite future, without any further conditions.

PrepComs.
During the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, states parties agreed to review the progress in both horizontal and vertical proliferation at annual Preparatory Committee meetings (PrepComs) held between the scheduled five-year Review Conferences. The PrepComs for the 2000 Review Conference were:

1997 First PrepCom, 7–18 April, New York

1998 Second PrepCom, 27 April–8 May, Geneva

1999 Third PrepCom, 10–21 May, New York

The 2000 Review Conference decided that "three sessions of the Preparatory Committee, normally for a duration of 10 working days each should be held in the years prior to the review conference. A fourth session would, if necessary, be held in the year of the review conference."

Two PrepComs for the 2005 Review Conferences have been held to date:

2002 First PrepCom, 8–19 April, New York

2003 Second PrepCom, 28 April–9 May 2003, Geneva

2004 Third PrepCom, 26 April–7 May 2004, New York

Export Controls. Two organizations not directly related to the NPT are dedicated to limiting the transfer of materials that could be used to build nuclear weapons: the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The Zangger Committee (formally, the Nonproliferation Treaty Exporters Committee) has 35 members (see below). Argentina and South Korea joined the committee in 1995. China, Ukraine, Brazil, New Zealand, and Latvia joined in 1997. Turkey attended the second meeting in 1999 as a full member {21.10.99}. Founded in 1970 and named after its first chair, Swiss professor Claude Zangger, the committee supplied a Trigger List to the IAEA: a list of sensitive items which, if exported to an NPT party, would trigger IAEA safeguards of those items. The committee meets in Vienna in May and October of each year in informal but confidential sessions under current chair Fritz Schmidt of Austria {18.10.00}. The term for the chair is indefinite. Members also exchange confidential annual reports on exports to non-NPT parties.

TheNuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), also called the London Club, consists of 44 members (see below). { http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NSG.asp} The group began in November 1974. On 27 January 1976, the initial seven participants ( Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Soviet Union, United States), also the founders of the MTCR {see the section on Missile Nonproliferation (706)}, endorsed a code for restricting nuclear exports that went beyond the NPT's obligations. The code covers the Zangger Trigger List and includes a policy to exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology.

In 1984, the group members minus the Soviet Union met to consider strengthening the regime. The group, including the Soviet Union, met informally from 5 to 7 March 1991 and in Warsaw from 31 March to 3 April 1992, with Russia replacing the USSR. The Warsaw meeting produced a document one official called a revitalization of the NSG, the Export Regime for Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Items. In 1993, the group adopted a full-scope safeguards agreement {30.3 - 1.4.93} and worked on implementing the dual-use export-restraint regime {18 - 20.10.93}.

In 1994, the group discussed guidelines for the supply of key nuclear items to NPT members of proliferation concern (Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria) and China, the only NWS not an NSG member {11 - 14.4.94}. In 1995, the group updated and clarified the list of controlled items in the Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Annex—in part to cover ring magnets {17.10.95; Reporter discussion with Tariq Rauf of Monterey Institute of International Studies 30.1.96; 7.6.96}.

In 1997, the NSG coordinated with the Zangger Committee to further clarify its trigger list {8 - 9.5.97}. The 1998 NSG plenary decided to promote greater transparency about its activities to non-members. It also discussed joint information exchange and procedures for inducting new members {1 - 2.4.98}. The group continued discussing these issues in 1999 and 2000, and formed two new working groups, one on "clarifying appropriate control of components" and the other on studying "possible improvement to the effectiveness of the NSG and Dual-Use Regime" {5 - 6.5.99; 22 - 23.6.00}. In 2001, the NSG decided to establish a standing inter-sessional body, the Consultative Group. In 2001 and 2002, the group also decided to engage with non-regime members with developed nuclear programs in order to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime {ACR 602bNPT01 10 - 11.5; ACR 602bNPT02 16-17.5}. In 2003, members said that discussions with China indicated China would request membership soon and in May 2004 China joined the NSG.

In support of the NSG and other US nonproliferation programs, the US Department of Energy founded a "Non-proliferation Data Exploitation Center" in 1999 as a "joint effort to develop new tools and methods in the study of nuclear proliferation" {3.3.99}.

Full-scope safeguards. The 1990 Review Conference's draft final statement (which was never accepted) urged all exporting parties to demand that recipients of nuclear technology institute full-scope safeguards {15.9.90}. Most nuclear exporters have agreed to require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply of nuclear materials {30.3 - 1.4.93}. The NSG also considered requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply of dual-use items {7.6.96}. Exporters need to review exports most carefully in the cases of Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, since all other states (except the Cook Islands and Niue) have joined the NPT and have or will have full-scope safeguards. Starting in 2003 the same standard was also applied to Iran. Regarding safeguards in North Korea, see the next section.

MEMBERS OF THE ZANGGER COMMITTE AND THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP
1 January 2005

State	Zangger Committee	Nuclear Suppliers Group
Argentina	x	x
Australia	x	x
Austria	x	x
Belarus		x
Belgium	x	x
Brazil	x	x
Bulgaria	x	x
Canada	x	x
China	x	x
Cyprus		x
Czech Republic	x	x
Denmark	x	x
Estonia		x
Finland	x	x
France	x	x
Germany	x	x
Greece	x	x
Hungary		x
Ireland	x	x
Italy	x	x
Japan	x	x
Kazakhstan		x
Latvia	x	x
Lithuania		x
Luxembourg	x	x
Malta		x
Netherlands	x	x
New Zealand	x	x
Norway	x	x
Poland	x	x
Portugal	x	x
Romania	x	x
Russia	x	x
Slovakia	x	x
Slovenia		x
South Africa	x	x
South Korea	x	x
Spain	x	x
Sweden	x	x
Switzerland	x	x
Turkey	x	x
UK	x	x
Ukraine	x	x
USA	x	x
Total 41	36	44

POSITIONS OF GOVERNMENTS

Non-parties
For information about the positions of states that have never joined the NPT, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The Cook Islands and Niue are also not parties.

North Korea acceded to the NPT on 12 December 1985 and accepted full-scope safeguards on 9 April 1992. North Korea became the first and only country to withdraw from the treaty on 12 March 1993. It suspended its withdrawal on 11 June 1993 just as the withdrawal was legally taking effect, after a required 90-day waiting period but withdrew from the IAEA in 1994 (there is no legal provision for suspension). {For the conditions of the original withdrawal see ACR 457bNEN94 21.10; for a brief history of the 1993–94 nuclear crisis, its resolution, and subsequent developments, see the 2002 Northeast Asia Nuclear Issues status section, ACR 457aNEN02. For the new crisis that developed in 2002–2003 see the ACR chronology sections, 457bNEN.} The same year North Korea concluded the "Agreed Framework" with the United States, which provided for North Korea's Yongbyon research reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility to be shut down, with IAEA seals and cameras placed outside and continually monitored by 2-3 IAEA personnel. In December 2002, North Korea announced that it was re-opening those facilities and, after the IAEA failed to remove the cameras and seals, proceeded to do so itself. On 30 December, the North Korean government asked the IAEA inspectors to leave the country, and it announced that it was considering ending its "suspension" of withdrawal from the NPT (a status for which there is no legal provision). On 10 January, North Korea announced that it would end the suspension and fully withdraw from the NPT effective 11 January 2003. {See the section on Northeast Asia Nuclear Issues, ACR 457NEN.}.

Nuclear-weapon states
Britain supported requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply, and implemented such a policy in 1991. Britain signed an Additional Protocol on IAEA safeguards in 1998{8 - 12.6.98}, offering to place 4.4 tons of plutonium (including 0.3 tons of weapon-grade) and 9000 tons of surplus uranium under IAEA safeguards {ACR 612b1FIS98 22.5}. Britain opposes multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations to meet Article VI obligations until the United States and Russia reduce their arsenals to roughly the same levels as the other three NWS (that is, fewer than 1000 nuclear weapons); and it has been a strong supporter of a continued NATO nuclear capability.

China acceded to the NPT in 1992 and placed some facilities under safeguards. In October 1997, China joined the Zangger Committee {16.10.97} and issued new regulations, tightening control over nuclear exports {11.10.97}. In 1998, China began drafting its first nuclear non-proliferation legislation {6.5.98}. A 1985 US-China agreement on nuclear cooperation went into effect on 19 March 1998 and the US Commerce Department began accepting license applications for nuclear exports to China. {4.5.98}

France acceded to the NPT on 3.8.92. In 1981, it agreed with the IAEA to accept some safeguards covering its commercial fission reactors and its Superphoenix fast-breeder reactor {ACR 602e1NPT94} under the auspices of the European Atomic Energy Organization (EURATOM) {Science 18.5.84}. In 1998, France signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA on safeguards {8 - 12.6.98}. France, like Britain and China, opposes entering into multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations to meet Article VI obligations until the United States and Russia reduce their arsenals to roughly the same levels as the other three NWS.

Russia continued support for the NPT, succeeding to the Soviet Union's IAEA membership {17.1.92}. In 1985, the Soviet Union voluntarily provided a list of facilities, on some of which the IAEA could place safeguards. In 1998, Russia announced new controls on nuclear and missile exports and established a Joint Commission of Experts with the United States to monitor such exports {13.5.98}. It also offered to place 40 percent of fissile material from dismantled weapons under IAEA safeguards {see the ACR Fissile Cutoff section (612b1FIS98)} 22.5}. Despite US objections, Russia has continued construction on Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant {see ACR Middle East Nuclear Issues (453)} and signed a contract to build a nuclear power plant at Kudankulam, India {ACR South Asia Nuclear Issues (454bSAN 20.7.98, box 30.4.99)}. Russia agreed to supply fuel to the nuclear power plant at Kudankulam for its entire life span and were ready to build more. Russia continues cooperative bilateral initiatives with the United States to transform its nuclear complex, secure its fissile material and dispose of its excess weapons-grade material in ways that prevent proliferation {see the ACR Fissile Cutoff section (612bFIS) for full details of US-Russian programs}. Russia, like the United States, supports immediate negotiations on a fissile material cutoff in the CD, while also advocating a slower, step-by-step approach to arms control that takes into account "international developments" outside the NPT regime.

The United States strongly supports the NPT and requires full-scope safeguards as a condition of trade in nuclear technology. It supports the cutoff of production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons. On 9 December 1980, it agreed with the IAEA to place some civilian and military material under safeguards. Since 1996, the United States has pledged to place under IAEA safeguards 226 tons of fissile material. By mid-1998, twelve tons were already under IAEA safeguards and 78 more tons were scheduled for placement under safeguards soon {DD 5.98}. The United States agreed to accept new safeguard measures and provide the IAEA with information on nuclear imports and exports {16 - 20.9.96}. In 1997, the United States said that it would entirely accept all of the new Phase II measures except when they conflicted with national security interests {15.5.97}. In 1998, the United States signed an Additional Protocol, which would allow it to deny information or access to activities having "direct national security significance" {8 - 12.6.98}. In 2002, the Bush administration submitted the Additional Protocol to the Senate for ratification but it has not yet been approved {ACR 602bNPT02 9.5}.

The United States, more than the other NWS, has increasingly come under attack at successive PrepComs for its failure to meet Article VI nuclear disarmament obligations, as well as its continuing reliance on nuclear threats to deter potential chemical and biological weapons threats from "rogue" states. The latter practice has drawn fire because it implicitly contradicts official US commitment to negative security assurances, which were part of the 1995 Principles and Objectives and were sought by NNWS in later PrepComs as a condition for continued commitment to the NPT.

The United States has sought to supplement the global NPT framework by undertaking nonproliferation discussions with China, which were back on track in 2000 after being terminated by China in response to NATO actions in Kosovo in March-June 1999 {ACR 402bEUR99 24.3}. The United States has also funded two bilateral efforts with Russia, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program and the Nuclear Cities Initiative, which seek to employ former Russian nuclear weapons scientists and personnel and to convert facilities to peaceful industry.

SUMMARY OF THE TREATY

Introduction
Parties declare their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.

I. No NWS to transfer nuclear weapons to any recipient. Assistance and encouragement also barred.

II. Each NNWS party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

III. Each NNWS is required to enter a full-scope safeguards agreement on all source or special nuclear material with the IAEA. Negotiations to begin when ratification deposited, and agreement to enter into force 18 months after beginning of negotiations. {See below for status of agreements; see 1986 weapon subsection for description of IAEA safeguards.}

IV. Assistance to NNWS to develop nuclear energy has been rendered, but more should be given.

V. Benefits of PNEs should be made available by NWS.

VI. Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

VII. Nuclear-weapon-free zones favored.

VIII (2). Any amendment to the Treaty must be approved by a majority of all the parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon states-parties to the Treaty and all other parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the IAEA.

IX. Signature, entry into force, ratification.

X (2). Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the parties to the Treaty.

NPT AND IAEA SAFEGUARDS
Ratification and signatures as of 1 January 2005
States in italic have no safeguards in force; those in bold are not NPT parties.

	NPT Ratification		IAEA Mem.	IAEA Safeguards			Additional Protocols
Afghanistan	R	4-Feb-70	y	I	20-Feb-78	F
Albania	A	9-Dec-90	y	I	25-Mar-88	F	S	2-Dec-04
Algeria	A	12-Jan-95	y	I	7-Jan-97	F
Andorra	A	7-Jun-96	n	S	9-Jan-01		S	9-Jan-01
Angola	A	14-Oct-96	y	None
Antigua & Bar.	S	1-Nov-81	y	I	9-Sep-96	F
Argentina	A	10-Feb-95	y	I	4-Mar-94	F
Armenia	A	15-Jul-93	y	I	5-May-94	F	S	29-Sep-97
Australia	R	23-Jan-73	y	I	10-Jul-74	F	I	12-Dec-97
Austria	R	27-Jun-69	y	A	31-Jul-96	F	S	22-Sep-98
Azerbaijan	A	22-Sep-92	y	I	29-Apr-99	F	I	29-Nov-00
Bahamas	S	11-Aug-76	n	I	12-Sep-97	F
Bahrain	A	3-Nov-88	n	None
Bangladesh	A	27-Sep-79	y	I	11-Jun-82	F	I	30-Mar-01
Barbados	R	21-Feb-80	n	I	14-Aug-96	F
Belarus	A	22-Jul-93	y	I	2-Aug-95	F
Belgium	R	2-May-75	y	I	21-Feb-77	F	S	22-Sep-98
Belize	S	9-Aug-85	n	I	21-Jan-97	F
Benin	R	31-Oct-72	y	None
Bhutan	A	23-May-85	n	I	24-Oct-89	F
Bolivia	R	26-May-70	y	I	6-Feb-95	F
Bosnia & Herz.	S	15-Aug-94	y	I	28-Dec-73	F
Botswana	R	28-Apr-69	n	None
Brazil	A	18-Sep-98	y	I	4-Mar-94	L
Brunei Dar.	A	26-Mar-85	n	I	4-Nov-87	F
Bulgaria	R	5-Sep-69	y	I	29-Feb-72	F	I	10-Oct-00
Burkina Faso	R	3-Mar-70	y	None			I	17-Apr-03
Burundi	A	19-Mar-71	n	None
Cambodia	A	2-Jun-72	y	I	17-Dec-99	F
Cameroon	R	8-Jan-69	y	S	21-May-92		S	16-Dec-04
Canada	R	8-Jan-69	y	I	21-Feb-72	F	I	8-Sep-00
Cape Verde	A	24-Oct-79	n	None
Central Afr.Rep.	A	25-Oct-70	y	None
Chad	R	10-Mar-71	n	None
Chile	A	25-May-95	y	I	5-Apr-95	F	I	3-Nov-03
China	A	9-Mar-92	y	I	18-Sep-89	L	S	31-Dec-98
Colombia	A	8-Apr-86	y	I	22-Dec-82	F
Comoros	A	4-Oct-95	n	None
Congo	A	23-Oct-78	n	None
Congo,Dem.Rep	R	4-Aug-70	y	I	9-Nov-72	F	I	9-Apr-03
Cook Islands
Costa Rica	R	3-Mar-70	y	I	22-Nov-79	F	S	12-Dec-01
C™te dÕIvoire	R	6-Mar-73	y	I	8-Sep-83	F
Croatia	S	29-Jun-92	y	I	19-Jan-95	F	I	6-Jul-00
Cuba	A	4-Nov-02	y	I	5-May-80	L	S	15-Oct-99
Cyprus	R	10-Feb-70	y	I	26-Jan-73	F	I	19-Feb-03
Czech Republic	S	1-Jan-93	y	I	11-Sep-97	F	S	28-Sep-99
Denmark	R	3-Jan-69	y	I	21-Feb-77	F	S	22-Sep-98
Djibouti	A	16-Oct-96	n	None
Dominica	S	10-Aug-84	n	I	3-May-96	F
Dominican Rep.	R	24-Jul-71	y	I	11-Oct-73	F
Ecuador	R	7-Mar-69	y	I	10-Mar-75	F	I	24-Oct-01
Egypt	R	26-Feb-81	y	I	30-Jun-82	F
El Salvador	R	11-Jul-72	y	I	22-Apr-75	F	S	5-Sep-03
Equ. Guinea	A	1-Nov-84	n	A	13-Jun-86	F
Eritrea	A	3-Mar-95	n	None
Estonia	A	31-Jan-92	y	I	24-Nov-97	F	S	13-Apr-00
Ethiopia	R	5-Feb-70	y	I	2-Dec-77	F
Fiji	S	14-Jul-72	n	I	22-Mar-73	F
Finland	R	5-Feb-69	y	A	1-Oct-95	F	S	22-Sep-98
France	A	3-Aug-92	y	I	12-Sep-81	L	S	22-Sep-98
Gabon	A	19-Feb-74	y	S	3-Dec-79
Gambia	R	12-May-75	n	I	8-Aug-78	F
Georgia	A	7-Mar-94	y	S	29-Sep-97	F	I	3-Jun-03
Germany	R	2-May-75