Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: START I

Negotiated: 1985-1991.
Signed: 31 July 1991 in Moscow by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev.
Additional (Lisbon) Protocol: 23 May 1992.
Additional (Helsinki) Protocol: 26 September 1997.
Entered into force: 5 December 1994.

Current status. The United States and Russia fulfilled their commitments under the treaty by meeting its final ceilings by the end of 2001 {5.12}. Data exchanges and inspections under the treaty continue. The United States and Russia reaffirmed the continuance of the treaty despite the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2002 {24.5}.

Treaty Structure. START I consists of 19 articles; 38 agreed statements; seven protocols; numerous associated documents (including letters and correspondence); 47 Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) agreements; 36 JCIC joint statements; 19 ‘S’ series JCIC joint statements; a definitions annex; and annexes to the Inspection Protocol and MOUs.

Title. The full title is given above; IDDS refers to it as “START I.”

History and Radification. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed on 7?8 January 1985 to conduct negotiations on strategic offensive weapons under the umbrella Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), which also included a group conducting talks on intermediate-range forces {resulting in the INF treaty, see 403} and a group on space weapons {see ACR 575, 1993}. All negotiating sessions took place in Geneva.

The NST represented the fourth set of talks on strategic nuclear weapons. They were preceded by earlier talks leading to SALT I {see ACR 840-604} and SALT II {see ACR 840-607}, and aborted early talks on START {see ACR 1982?1984}. The Soviet Union refused to set a date for resumption of the talks after the fifth round of START on 8 December 1983. Following the creation of the NST, the first session of the group on strategic arms — in essence a resumption of the previous START talks — was held on 27 March 1985.

At the Malta summit held on 2?3 December 1989, the two sides agreed to resolve outstanding issues by June 1990. At the Washington summit of 1 June 1990, the two sides agreed to complete the treaty by the end of the year. Delayed by various matters {see status 1992}, Bush and Gorbachev signed it in Moscow on 31 July 1991. On 25 November 1991, following the finalization of the text {25.11.91}, President Bush submitted the treaty to the US Senate. The Senate consented to ratification on 1 October 1992 pending completion of implementation arrangements among the four former Soviet republics.

The breakup of the Soviet Union prevented ratification by the USSR Supreme Soviet, which dissolved on 26 December 1991 {see ACR 240b1STI 11–12.91}. After some discussions about how to treat the four republics that retained strategic nuclear weapons, the foreign ministers of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States signed the Lisbon Protocol {23.5.92}. The Protocol provided that the four former Soviet republics would become parties to START I and assume the responsibilities of the USSR (see above).

The Russian government ratified the treaty on 4 November 1992 with the condition that Russia would not exchange the instruments of ratification until the other former Soviet parties had acceded to the NPT.

Belarus ratified START I on 4 February 1993 and acceded to the NPT as a NNWS on 22 July 1993. Kazakhstan ratified START I on 2 July 1992 and acceded to the NPT as a NNWS on 14 February 1994.

Ukraine, however, balked at its Lisbon Protocol obligations. Its legislature, Verkhovna Rada, required certain conditions before ratification. On 14 January 1994, Presidents Clinton, Kravchuk, and Yeltsin signed the Trilateral Statement, which laid out an agreement whereby Ukraine would transfer all nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia within seven years and possibly within three years. In return, Russia and the United States promised to compensate Ukraine for the highly-enriched uranium contained in the nuclear warheads and to offer security assurances once Ukraine acceded to the NPT and START I entered into force. In addition, the United States would continue to provide assistance with the dismantlement of SNDVs.

The Rada nevertheless continued to refuse to accede to the NPT, wanting security assurances from Britain and France, as well as from Russia and the United States. These assurances were produced in November 1994, clearing the way for the five START I parties to exchange the instruments of ratification in Budapest on 5 December 1994. {For a more detailed history of ratification see ACR 611aST195}

Phase I of the Treaty ended on 5 December 1997, with all parties below the required limits {5.12.97}. Belarus and Kazakhstan reached zero SNDV holdings {1.1.97} and Ukraine destroyed its last SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missile in February 1999 {26.2.99}. START memorandum of understanding data valid on 1 July 1999 indicated that the former Soviet republics had reduced to 1,478 SNDVs while the United States had cut to 1,466 {1.1.99}. The United States was considering going below START I levels without START II’s entry into force {13.1.99}, but the US Senate later ruled out this idea {24.5.99}. The March 1997 US-Russia Helsinki summit decided to discuss the permanence of the treaty in the context of the prospective START III treaty {ACR 614bST297 22.3}. In 1998, Russian officials expressed concerns over alleged US treaty violations {16.6.98}. These allegations were repeated in 1999 {23.1.99}. In 2000 and 2001, US and Russian reductions under the Treaty continued. Reductions were completed before the deadline for compliance with the third and final phase, 5 December {ACR 611bST101 5.12}. The Treaty celebrated its 10th anniversary in December 2004.

Chronology up to signature. For a complete list of negotiating meetings, see the 1986, 1990, and 1992 Arms Control Reporter (ACR) status subsections. These include the dates proposals were tabled.

Weapons. START I covers US and former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons: ICBMs, SLBMs, nuclear-armed heavy bombers, nuclear ALCMs, and nuclear SLCMs. “Heavy bombers” have a range of 8000 km or greater, while “ICBMs” have a range of 5500 km or greater (the distance across the Atlantic between the two countries). “SLBMs” have a range greater than 600 km.

Timetable. Article I of the treaty specifies the following timetable:

[E]ach Party shall implement the reductions pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article in three phases, so that its strategic offensive arms do not exceed:
(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 36 months after entry into force of this Treaty, an thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:
(i) 2100, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associate launchers, and deployed heavy bombers;
(ii) 9150, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;
(iii) 8050, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;
(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than 60 months after entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:
(i) 1900, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers;
(ii) 7950, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;
(iii) 6750, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;
(c) by the end of the third phase, that is, no later than 84 months after entry into force of this Treaty: the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article (details given under ‘Limits’ below).

Limits. Under the original provisions of the treaty, the United States and Russia were supposed to reduce to the ceilings listed below after seven years (by 5 December 2001), with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine retaining no SNDVs. Because of predicted financial and logistical difficulties in the Russian Federation, including possible delays in the storage and disposal of spent naval nuclear fuel and nuclear warheads, the United States and Russia agreed to a new protocol extending the implementation deadline to 31 December 2004 for the following limits. {see ACR 614bST297 26.9}

SNDVs. 1600 total, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers. Of the 1,600, no more than 154 heavy ICBMs (launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms—only the SS-18) and their associated launchers can be deployed.

Warheads. 6000 total, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. No more than 4,900 warheads may be attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; no more than 1,100 warheads may be attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers; and no more than 1540 warheads may be attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

Throw-weight. Aggregate throw-weight limit of 3600 metric tons.

SLCMs. In equivalent political declarations, the two sides agreed to declare annually the maximum number of nuclear SLCMs they planned to deploy, not to exceed 880, at entry into force and for each of the following five years (1994?1999). Unilaterally, each side has taken all nuclear SLCMs out of deployment {27.9.91, 5.10.91}.

Eliminations. START I proceeds from the numerical limits and counting rules. A launcher is counted unless it has undergone conversion or elimination pursuant to strict procedures (Article VII). START I does not count most missiles, nor does it count actual warheads; instead, it counts each SNDV as carrying its full declared capacity. Therefore, to reach the START I limits, a party does not need to subject most missiles to conversion or elimination, only launchers.

For mobile ICBM launchers and for SLBM launchers (SSBNs), the treaty requires elimination at specified conversion or elimination facilities. This permits the other side to verify that the launchers have actually been destroyed and have not been hidden.

Inspections. START I permits 13 types of inspection. Baseline inspections permitted verification of data presented in the Memorandum of Understanding; these were completed on 28 June 1995. Closeout inspections verify that all treaty-limited items were removed from the site. Conversion or elimination inspections monitor the destruction of treaty-limited items. Other inspections include: data update, new facility, re-entry vehicle on-site, post-dispersal exercise, formerly declared facility, exhibitions, and continuous monitoring. Under suspect site (short-notice) inspections, the parties may visit facilities listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Of the former Soviet republics, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine have inspectable START facilities.

Continuous monitoring
Each party may conduct continuous monitoring at production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs for up to one year after cessation of production. The United States ceased production of its only mobile ICBM, the MX. The United States continuously monitors the Votkinsk Machine Building plant which once assembled the SS-20 and now assembles a complete SS-25 {5.2.96}. The United States also monitors the Votkinsk facility under the INF Treaty {see ACR 403}; the START monitoring team also constitutes the INF monitoring team {ACR 611bST195 6.1}. In 1998, protocols were completed for streamlining the inspection process at Votkinsk {9.11.98}. The United States relinquished the right to continuously monitor a production facility in Ukraine {31.5.95}.

National implementation bodies. The parties agreed to designate a single agency for communications. Each state has also formed a single agency to handle both inspections and the escort of foreign inspection teams.

Belarus. The National Agency for Verification and Inspection (NAKI) handles inspections {box 17.10.95}. A Continuous Communications Link was set up with Nunn-Lugar funds {Robert Yablonski in OSI 12.93}.

Kazakhstan. Government-to-Government Communications Link.

Russia. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center handles communications. Treaty Implementation Center handles inspections.

Ukraine. Government-to-Government Communications Link.

United States. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center handles communications. On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) handled inspections until 1998. Late in 1998, the OSIA was incorporated into the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). {250bWAS98 1.10} On 1 February 2000, the Department of State created the Bureau of Verification and Compliance (VC), which supports the Secretary and the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security in developing and implementing robust and rigorous verification and compliance policies.

Joint Compliance and Implementation Commission (JCIC) was established under Article XV of START I to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions; to resolve questions relating to implementation and compliance; and to agree upon any additional measures that may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the regime. The Protocol on JCIC, section VIII, permitted the parties to convene the JCIC before entry into force {see ACR 611aST195}.

JCIC Meetings. The JCIC meets in Geneva on a date when the US and at least one of the other parties to the Treaty have agreed to hold a meeting to effectively resolve issues unforeseen when the treaty was written.

I 18 Nov–19 Dec 1991. Statement 1.
II 31 July 1992.
III 31 Aug 1992.
IV 23 Oct–19 Nov 1992. Agreements 6, 8, 9, Statements 2?4.
V 15 March–15 April 1993. Agreement 7, Statements 8–10 (Agreement 11 23 Jan 1993.)
VI 4 Oct–5 Nov 1993. Five parties attended. Agreements 12–16, Statements 11–13.
VII 28 March?5 May 1994. Agreements 17–19, Statements 14–15.
VIII 3 Oct–3 Nov 1994. Agreements 20–27, Statements 16–18.
IX 23 Jan?–22 Feb 1995. Agreements 28–31, Statement 19.
X 12–22 June 1995. Agreements 32 and 33.
XI 9–29 Sept 1995. Agreement 34, Statements 20 and 21.
XII 15 Nov–12 Dec 1995. Agreement 35.
XIII 10 April–15 May 1996. Agreement 36, Statements 22–24, and S-1.
XIV 25 Sept–30 Oct 1996. Agreements 37–39, Statements 25 and 26; US statement of policy not to deploy silo launchers outside US territory.
XV 14 May–18 June 1997. Agreement 40, Statement 27 and S-2–14.
XV I 8 Oct–12 Nov 1997. Statement 28.
XVII 11 Feb–18 March 1998. Statements 29, S-15.
XVIII 2 June–29 July 1998. Agreements 41–42, Statement 30.
IXX 19 Feb–3 March 1999. Statement 31.
XX 23 June–28 July 1999. Statement 32.
XXI 19 Feb–3 March 2000. Statements 33, S-17.
XXII 11 December 2000. Statement 34.
XXIII 13-18 July 2001.

Agreements and Joint Statements. The parties agreed in 1994 to JCIC Agreement #17, which permits any party to release notices three months after the completion of activities described in the notice. The United States makes an agreement or joint statement available after the State Department sends it to Congress. According to the US State Department, “a joint statement is a clarification or affirmation of interpretation of a treaty provision that previously may have been subject to varying interpretation. It is not an amendment or a substantive change to the treaty.” {http://www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/ start1/other/jcic_joint_statements/joint_statements_toc.htm}

Titles of all JCIC Agreements and Joint Statements are included below.

POSITIONS OF GOVERNMENTS

Nuclear weapon transfer agreements. The Lisbon Protocol, while requiring Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to become NNWS, did not require them to transfer any nuclear warheads to Russia. But due to the lack of warhead dismantlement facilities in those three countries, their only practical option was to work out arrangements to transfer the warheads to Russia for dismantlement.
Under the Lisbon Protocol, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine agreed to meet the treaty’s reduction schedule. In letters attached to the Protocol {ACR 611dST192 23.5}, they committed themselves to eliminate all “strategic offensive arms” (the treaty calls for the reduction of “strategic offensive arms” but does not define this term) on their territory.

Belarus signed an agreement with Russia on 22–23 October 1992 for the temporary stationing of strategic offensive arms on Byelorussian territory (allowing Belarus to join the NPT even with nuclear warheads on its territory), and for the transfer of all of its warheads and missiles to Russia.
Having ratified both START I {4.2.93} and the NPT {22.7.93}, Belarus in 1993, agreed with Russia to transfer the missiles to Russia by the end of 1996, some years ahead of schedule {ACR 611e2ST193 10?12}. Byelorussian President Shushkevich held that only Russia among the CIS states had the capability to create nuclear weapons and thus had the moral right to possess them {31.8.93}. Belarus obtained security assurances from Britain and the USA. {26.3.93}

On 27 November 1996, the last 18 RS-12M (SS-25) missiles were moved to Russia, fulfilling Belarus’ obligation, and by 1997, Belarus no longer had START–accountable SNDVs {1.1.97}. However, Belarus still had to demolish the foundations for mobile missile launch pads {615bNUC97 box 10.5}. By the end of 1997, this had not yet been done because Belarus had problems getting contractors to the site {Reporter discussion with US government official 27.1.97}. Belarus’ timetable for the pads’ demolition remained unknown {20.2.98}. In 2004 the Defense Ministry had financial difficulty in finding an efficient and ecologically safe way to destroy 30 m deep concrete foundations for 79 Topol (SS-25 Sickel) pad launchers {15.3.04}. While START I requires the pads removal for them to be considered a non-nuclear state, their failure raised little international concern.

Kazakhstan signed a warhead transfer agreement with Russia on 28 March 1994. The agreement called for the transfer to be completed within 14 months {ACR 611e2ST94} and for Kazakhstan to receive some compensation for the fissile material in the warheads {25.12.93}.

Having ratified START I on 2 July 1992 {5.10.92} and the NPT {14.2.94}, Kazakhstan reached an agreement with Russia to withdraw the missiles and receive compensation for the highly-enriched uranium (HEU) {25.12.93, ACR 611e2ST194}. This agreement apparently also included recognition of formal Russian responsibility for the weapons, permitting Kazakhstan to join the NPT {25.12.93}. It has arranged with the United States for assistance in dismantling {ACR 611e393 13.12}, and the United States has also provided a security guarantee {14.2.94}.

On 24 April 1995, the withdrawal of the warheads was completed and Kazakhstan declared itself nuclear-free {24.5.95}. Russian forces destroyed the last silo during summer 1996 {box 31.7.96}. By the end of 1996, Kazakhstan had no START-accountable SNDVs { ACR 611eST01}.

Russia has rapidly dismantled its own warheads, destroyed silos, and received transfers of warheads and missiles from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The elimination has kept Russia ahead of the START I schedule despite some delays in US-Russian cooperative disarmament programs {1.7.97; 16.7.99}. Russia had questions regarding US compliance with the treaty {13.8.97; 16.6.98; 23.1.99}. As of 1 January 2000, Russia held under START I counting rules 756 deployed ICBMs, 504 deployed SLBMs, and 78 deployed strategic bombers {1.1.00}. A delegation from the National Nuclear Threat Reduction Center met with their US counterparts to improve working relations, and operational effectiveness of reciprocal information flows {22-26.3.04}. As of 31 January 2004, Russia retained 4978 warheads on 1031 delivery vehicles.

Ukraine agreed under the Trilateral Accord of 14 January 1994 to dismantle all nuclear weapons specified by START I and to begin removing warheads {box 14.1.94}. Ukraine acceded to the NPT on 5 December 1994, following a last-minute agreement that recognized Russian ownership of the nuclear weapons on Ukraine’s territory.

On 1 June 1996, Ukraine announced that all nuclear warheads were withdrawn from its territory and the country had become nuclear-free. In return, Ukraine would receive lightly-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel rods for its nuclear power plants and security assurances from Russia and the United States. {box 31.12.95}

In July 1996, Ukraine opened a station for missile destruction, funded by the United States, which would dismantle missiles at the rate of four per month. In August 1996, Germany agreed to help fund silo destruction {boxes 31.7.96, 9.9.96}. Russia remained interested in purchasing the Tu-160 bombers {ACR 615bNUC97 box 1.1}. This plan fell through and in 1998, destruction of 42 of Ukraine’s 44 strategic bombers {16.11.98} and 46 SS-24 silos {29.9.98} began. In February 1999, the last of Ukraine’s 130 SS-19 ICBMs was destroyed {26.2.99}. Russia again announced its interest in the bombers {6.8.99}, as did a US company {14.4.99}. In October, Russia decided to accept eight Tu-160 Blackjack bombers, three Tu-95 Bear bombers, and a maximum of 600 air-to-surface missiles in return for $285 million in Ukrainian debt to Russia {18.10.99}. Deliveries of the bombers and missiles were completed in February 2000. {21.2.00}

In July 2003, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a resolution criticizing the USA for cutting financing for dismantling the last stage of the utilization of the missile fuel forf the RS-22 ICBM {11.7.03}.

United States has agreed with each of the participating former Soviet nuclear republics to provide funds for dismantling and destruction, and these programs were extended to 2007 with both Ukraine {31.7.99} and Russia {17.8.99; ACR 612b1FIS99 15–16.6}. US dismantlement of nuclear weapons as required by START I is well underway {ACR 611eST199 27.10} and the United States was ahead of the START I schedule {1.7.97}. In 2004, the US Navy outsourced its START I compliance duties for the Tridents I, II to BAE Systems {25.10.04}. As of 31 January, the US retained 5968 treaty accountable warheads on 1227 delivery vehicles.

OUTLINE OF START I TREATY

For complete text: http://www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/start1/text.htm.

I. Each party shall reduce to the limits set forth in the treaty.
II. Reductions.
II.1. After seven years, each side shall have:
(a) 1,600 deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, including 154 deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers.
(b) 6,000 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, including:
(i) 4,900 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;
(ii) 1,100 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs;
(iii) 1,540 warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.
II.2. Limits after three and five years: SNDVs: 2,100 and 1,900. Total warheads: 9,150 and 7,950. ICBM and SLBM warheads: 8,050 and 6,750.
II.3. Aggregate throw-weight limit of 3,600 metric tons.
III. Counting rules.
III.4 (e) Bomber discounting.
III.5. Downloading a total of 1,250 permitted, but only 500 per type, and not more than four per missile. (This was overridden in part by START II.)
IV. Non-deployed, training, and test weapons.
IV.10. Existing types.
V. Prohibitions
V.1. Modernization permitted.
V.2. No new type of heavy ICBMs, no SLBMs.
V.3. No ICBMs except on silos, road-mobile, rail-mobile.
V.4. No new mobile ICBMs except with one warhead.
V.18. No ballistic missiles on surface ships or on seabed.
V.20. United States agrees not to equip bombers for more than 20 ALCMs.
VI. Basing of road- and rail-mobile launchers.
VII. Conversion or elimination. Fixed ICBMs and SLBMs to be rendered inoperable. Silos to be blown up or excavated. SLBM launchers to be cut out of the SSBN and cut up.
VIII. Database (see protocols).
IX. Verification (see protocols).
X. Telemetry encryption (see protocols).
XI. Inspections (see protocols).
XII. Cooperative measures.
XIII. Exercise dispersals of mobile missiles; major strategic exercises with heavy bombers.
XIV. Operational dispersals of mobile missiles, SSBNs, and heavy bombers.
XV. Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
XVI. No obligations to the contrary.
XVII. In force for 15 years. One year before expiration, extension conference can extend for successive five-year periods, unless superseded by a subsequent agreement. Withdrawal with six months’ notice if supreme interests jeopardized.
XVIII. Amendments.
XIX. Registered with the UN.

ANNEX ON AGREED STATEMENTS

1. Non-transfer of Strategic Offensive Arms
2. New Kinds of Strategic Offensive Arms
3. SS-11 Reentry Vehicle Attribution
4. ASBM Definition
5. Replacement of Heavy ICBM Silos
6. Bison Airplanes
7. Purpose of Operational Dispersals
8. Strategic Offensive Arms Operations Outside National Territory
9. Lighter-than-air Aircraft
10. Heavy Bomber Inspections at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base
11. Elimination of Liquid Mobiles and Heavy Bombers without Tail Sections
12. Exclusion of Certain Bear Aircraft from START
13. Engineering Silos at Hill Air Force Base
14. Soviet Storage Facilities Exempt from Locational Restriction
15. Soviet Training Facilities Exempt from Locational Restrictions
16. Launcher Capability for Existing Launchers
17. “Not Equipped” for Heavy Bombers
18. Andersen Air Force Base, Guam
19. Mobile Space Launchers
20. Reuse of Launch Canisters
21. Changes to the MOU
22. Relationship Between START and the INF Treaty
23. The Term “Accessible” with Respect to Underground Facilities
24. Front Section of Fundamentally New Design
25. Definition of “Variant” for ICBM and SLBMs
26. Declaration of Space Launch Facilities at Eliminated ICBM Bases
27. Exemption for Soft-Site Launchers at Cape Canaveral
28. Restriction on ICBM and SLBM First Stages
29. STARS Boosters Exempt from START
30. Space Launch Vehicles from Ships Other Than Submarines and from Airplanes Other Than Heavy Bombers
31. Telemetry Protocol Applicability to Objects in Orbit
32. Throw-weight of New Types of Missiles Deployed before the Eighth Flight Test
33. Special Purpose Submarines
34. Verifying Length and Throw-weight for New Types
35. Reimbursement of Costs for Telemetry Tape Exchange
36. Ban on Multiple Inspections of Certain US Airbases
37. Management of Retired and Former Types of ICBM and SLBMs
38. Reference Cylinders for ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs with Liquid-Propellant Rocket Engines

ANNEX ON TERMS AND THEIR DEFINITONS

Definitions of 124 terms are set forth in alphabetical order. {For a complete listing see: http://www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/start1/annexes/ definitions.htm}

PROTOCOL ON PRECEDURES GOVERNING CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION

Section I: ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and Their Launch Canisters
Section II: Silo Launchers, Silo Training Launchers, and Silo Test Launchers
Section III: Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, Mobile Training Launchers and Fixed Structures for Mobiles Launchers of ICBMs
Section IV: SLBM Launchers
Section V: Soft-Site Launchers
Section VI: Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers
Section VII: Removal from Accountability of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs as a Result of Flight Tests or Static Testing
Section VIII: Other Procedures for Removal from or Changes in Accountability
Section IX: Facilities

PROTOCOL ON INSPECTIONS AND CONTINOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES

Section I: General Obligations
Section II: Legal Status of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members
Section III: Notifications of Inspections and Continuous Monitoring
Section IV: Arrangements for Air Transportation
Section V: Activities Beginning at the Point of Entry
Section VI: General Rules
Section VII: Baseline Data, Data Update, and New Facility Inspections
Section VIII: Suspect-Site Inspections
Section IX: Reentry Vehicle Inspections
Section X: Post-Dispersal Inspections
Section XI: Conversion or Elimination Inspections
Section XII: Close-out Inspections
Section XIII: Formerly Declared Facility Inspections
Section XIV: Technical Characteristics Exhibitions and Inspections
Section XV: Distinguishability and Baseline Exhibitions and Inspection
Section XVI: Continuous Monitoring Activities
Section XVII: Cancellation of Inspections
Section XVIII: Inspection and Report and Continuous Monitoring Report

Annex 1: Inspection of Covered Objects, Containers, Launch Canisters, Vehicles, and Structures
Annex 2: Inspections of Silo Launchers of ICBMs, Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, and SLBM Launchers
Annex 3: Reentry Vehicle Inspections
Annex 4: Inspections of Heavy Bombers, Former Heavy Bombers, Long-Range ALCMs, and their Facilities
Annex 5: Continuous Monitoring
Annex 6: Unique Identifiers
Annex 7: Delivering and Examining Equipment and Supplies Transported
by Inspection Airplanes
Annex 8: Equipment for Inspections and Continuous Monitoring
Annex 9: Equipment for the Perimeter and Portal Continuous Monitoring
System
Annex 10: Types of Inspection Airplanes
Annex 11: Confirming the Dimensions of ICBMs and SLBMs
Annex 12: Size Criteria to be Used During Inspections and Continuous Monitoring

PROTOCOL ON NOTIFICATIONS

Section I: Data Contained in the Memorandum of Understanding
Section II: Movement of Items Subject to Limitation in the Treaty
Section III: ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight
Section IV: Conversion or Elimination
Section V: Cooperative Measures
Section VI: Flight Tests of ICBMs and SLBMs
Section VII: New Types and NEW Kinds of Strategic Offensive Arms
Section VIII: Changes in Information Provided Pursuant to Article VIII
Section IX: Inspections and Continuous Monitoring
Section X: Operational Dispersals

PROTOCOL ON ICBM AND SLBM THROW-WEIGHT

Section I: Determination and Accountability of Throw-weight
Section II: Verification

PROTOCOL ON TELEMETRIC INFORMATION

Section I: Provision of Tapes
Section II: Data Associated with Analysis of Telemetric Information
Section III: Encapsulation and Encryption of Telemetric Information
Section IV: Provisional Application

PROTOCOL ON THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION

Section I: Composition
Section II: Convening
Section III: Special Session
Section IV: Agenda
Section V: Work of the Commission
Section VI: Costs
Section VII: Communications
Section VIII: Additional Procedures

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DATABASE

Section I: Warhead and Throw-weight Attributions
Section II: Aggregate Numbers
Section III: Attribution with Reduced Numbers of Warheads
Section IV: Additional Aggregate Numbers
Annex A: ICBMs and ICBM Launchers
Annex B: SLBMs and SLBM Launchers
Annex C: Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers
Annex D: Space Launch Facilities
Annex E: Eliminated Facilities
Annex F: ICBM and SLBM Technical Data
Annex G: Heavy Bomber Technical Data
Annex H: Long-Range Nuclear ALCM Technical Data
Annex I: Other Data required by the Treaty
Annex J: Other Requirement

RELATED AGREEMENTS

- Agreement on Early Exhibition of Strategic Offensive Arms
- Agreement on Early Exchange of Lists of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members Proposed for Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities
- Agreement on Exchange of Coordinate and Site Diagrams (Not Released to the Public)
- Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises
- Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Ballistic Missiles (1998)

LETTERS SIGNED BY US AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES

- Phased Reductions of Heavy ICBMs
- Bear D
- B-1
- Silo Launch Control Centers
- Launch Canisters
- Engineering Site Survey
- Providing Photographs

CERTAIN CORRESPONDENCE RELATED TO THE TREATY

- Letters on Tacit Rainbow, 19 May 1990.
- Letters on ALCMs with Multiple Weapons, 6 December 1990.
- Letters on Third Country Basing, 31 July 1991.
- Letters on Relocation of Heavy ICBM Silos, no date.

OTHER STATEMENTS

13 June 1991
- US Statement Concerning the START-ABM Relationship

27 July 1991
- Soviet Statement Concerning the Information of the US Side on the TSSAM Cruise Missile
- US Statement Concerning the Statement of the Soviet Side on the TSSAM Cruise Missile

29 July 1991
- Unilateral Statement by the US Concerning the B-2 Heavy Bomber
- Unilateral Statement by the US Concerning Encryption and Jamming
- Statement of Policy by the USSR Concerning Encryption and Jamming
- US Statement on Consultation Relating to the Release to the Public of Data and Other Information
- Soviet Statement on Consultations Relating to the Release to the Public of Data and Other Information
- US Statement in Launch-Associated Support Vehicles and Driver Training Vehicles
- Soviet Statement on Launch-Associated Support Vehicles and Driver Training Vehicles
- US Statement on Non-Circumvention of the START Treaty
- Soviet Statement on Non-Circumvention of the START Treaty
- Soviet Statement on the SLBM SS-N-23
- US Statement on Attachment Joints
- Soviet Statement Concerning the Purposes of Inclusion in the Memorandum of Understanding of Data on the Distance between Joints for Attaching Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs
- US Statement on Underground Structures
- Soviet Statement on Underground Structures

31 July 1991
- Soviet Statement Concerning Existing Patterns of Cooperation
- US Statement on the SS-N-23
- Soviet Statement Concerning the Interrelationship between the Reduction in Strategic Offensive Arms and Compliance with the ABM Treaty

1 July 1998
- START Treaty Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Data for Ukraine
- START Treaty (MOU) Data for Republic of Kazakhstan
- START Treaty (MOU) Data for Russian Federation
- START Treaty (MOU) Data for Republic of Belarus
- START Treaty (MOU) Data for United States

Joint Statements Exchanged at the Final Plenary (29 July 1991)
- Statement on New Missile Production Technology Processes
- Statement Regarding Data Updates with Respect to Categories of Data Contained in the Memorandum of Understanding
- Statement on the Costs Related to the Convening of a Session of JCIC on the Territory of One of the Parties
- Statement on the Ban on Support Equipment at Eliminated Facilities
- Statement on Narrow Direction Beaming
- Statement on the Term “Ton”
- Statement on Charter Flights
- Statement Concerning Currency of Payment for Costs Relating to Implementation of the START Treaty
- Statement Concerning Interpretive Data
- Statement on Weapon Storage Areas
- Statement on Exchange of Site Diagrams
- Statement in Connection with Procedures of Confirming Launch Weight

DECLARATIONS

US declaration on nuclear SLCMs, 31 July 1991: The United States undertook not to deploy, on surface ships or submarines, more than 880 nuclear-armed SLCMs with a range greater than 600 km in any one of the first five years of the treaty. It stated it would supply the USSR with an annual declaration on how many SLCMs would be deployed each year START was in force.

USSR DECLARATION ON SLCMS. (Same as above.)

USSR declaration on Tu-22M Bomber (Backfire),31 July 1991: USSR will not give the bomber intercontinental range by any means, including supplying in-flight refueling. The USSR would not have more than 300 Tu-22Ms in any one year, and naval Tu-22Ms would not exceed 200.

Outline of Lisbon Protocol 23 May 1992
I. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine assume USSR obligations.
II. The four republics make arrangements among themselves to implement the treaty.
III. National territory includes only the four republics.
IV. JCIC participation to be worked out.
V. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine to join NPT.
VI. Ratification. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine provided side letters saying each would eliminate all nuclear weapons, “including strategic offensive arms,” located on its territory during the seven-year period. {See each republic’s text in 1992 Reporter}

OTHER DOCUMENTS

Provided 30 October 1996
- Statement of Policy by the United States of America on Not Locating Silo Launchers Outside National Territory.

Initialed 3 March 2000
- Statement of Policy by the United States Concerning the One-Time Observation Visit to the Structures of the Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Silverdale, Washington.

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS

JCIC Agreements
1. Additional Procedures Governing the Operation of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
2. Corrections to the Inspection Protocol and the Memorandum of Understanding.
3. Corrections to Coordinate Data.
4. Maximum Weight of Equipment and Supplies.
5. Providing Inventory of Cargo, Repacking of Cargo, and Notification of Location for Conducting Cargo Examination.
6. Provision and Installation of Equipment Necessary for, and Equipment Related to, Playback of Telemetric Information that is Contained on Tapes.
7. Procedures for Additional Confirmation of the Dimensions of First Stages of SLBMs.
8. Notification of Changes to Routes for Flights of Inspection Airplanes.
9. Corrections for Technical Data on Fixed Structures for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs.
10. Provision and Installation of Equipment Necessary for Playback of Telemetric Information that is Contained on Tapes.
11. Provision of Tapes and Data Associated with the Analysis of Telemetric Information, and the Use of Recording Media.
12. IL-76 Inspection Airplanes.
13. The Waters Within Five Kilometers of the Coastlines of Submarine Bases.
14. Points of Entry.
15. Exhibition of the First Stage of the Silo-Based Variant of the SS-24 ICBM.
16. Exhibition of the RS-12M ICBM, Variant 2, for Silo Launcher.
17. Releasibility of START Treaty Information.
18. Logistical and Administrative Procedures for Conducting Training and Maintenance and for Providing Spare Parts and Replacement Parts for Telemetry Equipment.
19. Procedures for the Use of Satellite System Receivers.
20. Notifications Concerning Rescheduling of Activities.
21. Inspections of Soft-Site Launchers at Test Ranges.
22. Change of Size Criteria in Connection with the RS-12M, Variant 2, for Silo Launcher.
23. Diplomatic Officials Meeting and Accompanying Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members at Points of Entry.
24. Procedures for the Use of Radiation Detection Equipment at Weapons Storage Areas.
25. The Use of Radiation Detection Equipment During Long-Range Non-Nuclear ALCM Distinguishability Exhibitions.
26. Provision of Summaries for Tapes that Contain a Recording of Telemetric Information.
27. Notification Prior to the Change in Function of a Facility.
28. Changes to the Periods for Conducting Baseline Data Inspections, Data Update Inspections and Reentry Vehicle Inspections.
29. Changes to Boundaries on Site Diagrams of Facilities.
30. Settlement of Accounts.
31. Conduct of Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities on the Territory of the United States of America.
32. Changes to the List of Inspection Equipment.
33. Changes to Annex 1 of the Notification Protocol.
34. Procedures for the Use of Radiation Detection Equipment.
35. (Extending the time periods in the telemetry regime.)
36. Changes to Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.
37. Changes to Section I of the Notification Protocol.
38. Agreeing on Procedures for Weighing or for Other Means of Determining the Weight of ICBMs or SLBMs.
39. Changes in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding.
40. Change to the Format Used in Annex 8 of the Protocol On Inspections.
41. Changes to Section One of the Telemetry Protocol.
42. KC-10 and KC-135 Inspection Airplanes.
43. Concurrent Continuous Monitoring Activities and Continuous Monitoring at
the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Accordance with the START Treaty
and the INF Treaty.
44. Phased Elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs.
45. Changes in the Aggregate Number of Silo and Mobile Launchers of ICBMs
at Space Launch Facilities.
46. C-17 Inspection Airplane.
47. Addition to Annex 5 to the Inspection Protocol Regarding Procedures for
Reversing Direction of Railcars at a Monitored Facility.

JCIC Joint Correspondence
- Statement on New Missile Production Technology Processes
- Letters on Telemetric Playback Demonstration November 26, 1991
- Letters on Corrigenda, 19 December 1991
- Statement of Policy by the Republic of Belarus Concerning Inspection Activities Under the START Treaty, 3 February 1995
- Statement of Policy by the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Inspection Activities Under the START Treaty, 3 February 1995
- Statement of Policy by the Russian Federation Concerning Inspection Activities Under the START Treaty, 3 February 1995
- Statement of Policy by Ukraine Concerning Inspection Activities Under the START Treaty, 3 February 1995
- Statement of Policy by the United States of America Concerning Inspection Activities Under the START Treaty, 3 February 1995
- Statement of Policy by the Republic of Belarus Concerning Reimbursement of Inspection Costs, 3 February 1995
- Statement of Policy by the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Reimbursement of Inspection Costs, 3 February 1995
- Statement of Policy by Ukraine Concerning Reimbursement of Inspection Costs, 3 February 1995
- Statement of Policy by the United States of America Concerning Reimbursement of Inspection Costs (Belarus), 3 February 1995
- Statement of Policy by the United States of America Concerning Reimbursement of Inspection Costs (Kazakhstan), 3 February 1995
- Statement of Policy by the United States of America Concerning Reimbursement of Inspection Costs (Ukraine), 3 February 1995
- Statement of Policy by the United States on Not Locating Silo Launchers at Space Launch Facilities Outside National Territory, 30 October 1996
- Statements of Policy by Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan on Not Locating Silo Launchers at Space Launch Facilities Outside National Territory, 30 October 1996
- Statement of Policy by US on Withdrawal of Radiation Detection Equipment in Ukraine, 17 June 1997
- Statement of Policy by Ukraine on Withdrawal of Radiation Detection Equipment, 17 June 1997
- Statements of Policy by US on Assisting Inspectors in Confirming the Maximum Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs For Which the B-52H Heavy Bomber Is Equipped, 12 November 1997
- Statements of Policy by Belarus , Kazakhstan , Russian Federation , and Ukraine on Assisting Inspectors in Confirming the Maximum Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs For Which the Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack Heavy Bomber Is Equipped, 12 November 1997
- Letters Regarding the Use of Ground Transportation at Votkinsk & Statement of Policy by the United States Regarding the Use of Ground Transportation at Votkinsk, 20 March 2002

JCIC Joint Statements
1. Designations for Parking Sites.
2. Consent to be Bound by Joint Statements.
3. Inspectability of Silo Training Launchers.
4. Normal Practice for Cargo Examination.
5. On the Agreed Form for JCIC Agreements.
6. Commencement of the Application of Rights and Obligations.
7. Inspectability of ICBM Emplacement Equipment.
8. Training Models of Missiles.
9. Additional Confirmation of First Stages of SLBMs.
10. Technical Specifications of US Equipment for the Conduct of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the Machine Building Plant at Votkinsk, Russia.
11. The Pre-Inspection Restrictions at Yagel'naya and Olen'ya Submarine Bases.
12. Procedures for Refueling IL-76 Inspection Airplanes at Anchorage International Airport.
13. Technical Specifications of US Equipment for the Conduct of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the Pavlograd Machine Plant, Pavlograd, Ukraine.
14. On the Capabilities of Satellite System Receivers to Provide Information on the Coordinates of Silo Launchers of ICBMs.
15. On the Issue of the SS-N-8 at SLBM Storage Facilities.
16. On Information To Be Provided to Inspectors Upon Their Arrival at the Inspection Site.
17. On Changes in the Functions of Facilities.
18. On the Exchange of Site Diagrams of Facilities.
19. On Provision of Notifications Through Continuous Communication Channels.
20. On the Use of Radiation Detection Equipment during Reentry Vehicle Inspections.
21. On Space Launch Vehicles that Incorporate First Stages of ICBMs or SLBMs {611d}.
22. On Additional Differences between Training Models of the SS-19 Type of Missile and ICBMs of the Corresponding Type.
23. On First Stages without Nozzles Attached of US ICBMs and SLBMs.
24. On First Stages without Nozzles Attached of SS-24 ICBMs.
25. On Measuring Items of Inspection in Containers, Vehicles, or ICBM Emplacement Equipment.
26. On Confirming Types of ICBMs and SLBMs.
27. Changes to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Joint Statement S-1.
28. On the Use of Tamper Detection Equipment.
29. On SS-24 ICBMs and their attached first stages with coupling devices attached.
30. On Changes to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Joint Statement # 26.
31. On Provision in Advance on Space Launch Vehicles.
32. On Launchers, Support Equipment, and Launch Canisters at Space Launch Facilities Declared Outside National Territory.
33. On Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Beyond Repair.
34. On Phased Elimination of SS-24 ICBMS Located in Ukraine
35. On Confirming That Covert Assembly of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs or Covert Assembly of First Stages of Such ICBMs is Not Occurring at Facilities Subject to Suspect-Site Inspections
36. On Additional Differences of the Upper and Lower Sections of Launch Canisters of SS-24 ICBMs for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMS

JCIC Joint Statements “S” Series
- Statement on New Missile Production Technology Processes
- S-1 On Changes to the Boundary of the Teykovo ICBM Base For Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs
- S-2 On Changes to the Boundary of the Ryazan' Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other Than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMS
- S-3 On Changes to the Boundary of the Sacramento Facility Subject to Suspect-Site Inspections
- S-4 On Changes to the Boundary of the Hill Repair Facility for ICBMS
- S-5 On Changes to the Boundary of the Mamlstrom ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMS
- S-6 On Changes to the Boundary of the Oasis Convention or Elimination Facility
- S-7 On Changes to the Boundary of the Grand Forks ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMS
- S-8 On Changes to the Boundary of the Ellsworth ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMS
- S-9 On Changes to the Boundary of the Pavlograd Facility Subject to Suspect-Site Inspections
- S-10 On Changes to the Boundary of the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility
- S-11 On Changes to the Boundary of the F.E. Warren ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMS
- S-12 On Changes to the Boundary of the Vandenberg Test Range
- S-13 On Changes to the Boundary of the Silverdale Submarine Base
- S-14 On Changes to the Boundary of the Charleston Storage Facility for SLBMs
- S-15 On Changes to the Boundary of the Perm' Training Facility
- S-16 On Changes to the Boundary of the Priluki Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs
- S-17 On Changes to the Boundary of the Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Silverdale, Washington
- S-18 On Changes to the Boundary of the McConnell Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other Than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs
- S-19 On Changes to the Boundary of the Minot ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs