Biological Weapon Ban

Negotiated: 1969ø1971.
Opened for signature: 10 April 1972.
Entered into force: 26 March 1975.
Depositaries: Russia (succeeding the USSR), the UK, the USA.

Introduction and status. Parties to the convention agree not to develop, produce, stockpile or acquire biological warfare agents. The convention established no verification mechanism. In recent years, an Ad Hoc Group (see below) has been negotiating a verification protocol to strengthen the convention. At the Fifth Review Conference in 2001, however, the United States rejected efforts to finalize the protocol and called for the Ad Hoc Group to be disbanded. The resulting lack of a mandate for future work led the GroupÕs members to adjourn until November 2002. The resumed session in November 2002 adopted a new approach to tackle the deliberate use of disease as a weapon and decided to hold annual meetings to lead up to the Sixth Review Conference in 2006. No decision was taken on the verification protocol.

Title. The full title is above; IDDS uses the short title ÒBiological Weapon ConventionÓ or ÒBWC.Ó

History. The 1925 Geneva Protocol banned the use of ÒbacteriologicalÓ as well as chemical methods of warfare (see 704 Chemical Weapon Convention).

Negotiations to ban the production of both chemical and biological weapons took place over many years in various fora. On 10 July 1969, the UK submitted a draft treaty to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (predecessor of the CD) calling for the elimination of biological weapons. The USA supported the proposal. On 25 November 1969, President Nixon unilaterally banned US development, production, and stockpiling of BW, and announced that the United States would ratify the Geneva Protocol. NixonÕs decision came during protests against the US use of herbicides in the Vietnam War. On 14 February 1970, Nixon extended the ban to toxins.

Soon thereafter, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on the text of a convention banning production of biological weapons. This was submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (another predecessor of the CD) and subsequently to the UN General Assembly. On 16 December 1971, the General Assembly approved a resolution commending the convention.

The Biological Weapon Convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1972. It entered into force in 1975 upon ratification by the United States.

Weapons. The treaty defines biological weapons as microbial or other biological agents (see 701e1BWC for list of selected BW agents and their properties). The treaty does not define ÒagentsÓ and hence leaves some ambiguity. The term usually refers to living organisms or infective material obtained from them (or the synthetic equivalent), which multiply inside the person, animal, or plant attacked. Toxins, not defined by the treaty, are substances that act like chemical agents but are ordinarily produced by biological or microbic processes.

The Final Declaration of Second Review Conference said: ÒThe Conference reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally applies to all natural or artificially created microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production. Consequently, toxins (both proteinaceous and nonproteinaceous) of a microbial, animal, or vegetable nature and their synthetically produced analogues are coveredÓ {text, Article I}. The Third Review Conference extended the scope to Òagents or toxins harmful to plants and animals, as well as humansÓ {text, Article I}.

Verification and compliance. Parties may consult with one another (Article V) and complaints may be made to the UN Security Council (Article VI). The 1986 Review Conference declaration called for a consultative meeting ÒpromptlyÓ upon request, and permitted the use of specialized assistance, including international procedures through the UN.

A consultative meeting was convened in 1997 to address Cuban allegations that the United States sprayed Cuba with thrips palmi {27.8.97}. The meeting ended inconclusively, but delegates determined that there was no need for a field investigation, which Cuba had requested.

Trilateral Agreement. On 10ø11 September 1992, Britain, Russia, and the United States agreed to set up visits to each otherÕs facilities as a means to resolve compliance concerns. The United States and the United Kingdom made informal visits to facilities at St. Petersburg, Pokrov, and Berdsk. Reciprocal Russian visits to the United States began in 1994. The United States remained dissatisfied with Russian compliance {19.7.95; 8.8.96; 13.8.97; 7.7.98}. In 1999, Russia and the United States planned more visits by Russian scientists and military officials for defense cooperation to counteract BW, but these visits were to take place outside the Trilateral Agreement {20.9.99}.

Review Conferences The convention has an unlimited duration and called for only one review conference, which was held on 3(21 March 1980. In 1982, a UN resolution called on the signatories to establish compliance procedures. Soviet opposition blocked a meeting. In June 1984, the United States opted for discussion of compliance measures at a future review conference.

The Second Review Conference met in Geneva 8(26 September 1986. The conference strengthened the procedures for consultation in the case of compliance concerns. It called for a meeting of experts, who met on 31 March(15 April 1987 and worked out details concerning confidence-building measure (CBMs). They called for annual exchanges of data about biological research. In later years, however, participation in the data exchange was low.

The Third Review Conference met on 9(27 September 1991. It decided that future conferences would be held at least every five years. It also strengthened the Convention. The parties decided to expand CBMs with additional content (see below) and asked the UN Secretary-General to allocate the resources of the Department of Disarmament Affairs (Geneva) to receive and compile the information. The conference established an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX, for Òverification expertsÓ) to examine possible verification measures and to draft proposals to strengthen the treaty. VEREX held three meetings in Geneva (30 Marchø10 April 1992, 23 Novemberø4 December 1992, 24 Mayø6 June 1993) before agreeing to a final report at its fourth session on 13ø24 September 1993. The final report evaluated 21 compliance measures, both individually and in a variety of combinations, and concluded that compliance measures could feasibly be implemented.

The Fourth Review Conference, which took place in Geneva on 25 Novemberø6 December 1996, was attended by 138 states parties. The conference was unable to achieve a consensus on a deadline for an Ad Hoc GroupÕs work on a verification protocol. It did, however, agree that the group should intensify its work Òwith a view to completing it as soon as possible before the commencement of the Fifth Review Conference,Ó scheduled for 2001.

The Fifth Review Conference, held in Geneva from 19 November to 7 December 2001, was attended by 91 of the 144 states parties. From the outset of the conference, the United States, in a new Bush administration policy, opposed the adoption of any verification protocol. On the last day of the meeting, less than two hour before the scheduled end of the conference, the United States called for the Ad Hoc GroupÕs negotiating mandate to end and be replaced by annual conferences of states parties and expert group meetings. The refusal of other participants to give up completely on concluding a verification protocol meant that the group could not agree on a final declaration. Instead the states parties took the unusual step of adjourning the review conference, with a plan to reconvene a year later (11ø22 November 2002).

The session in November 2002 found the parties still deadlocked. Under US pressure, the conference adopted a new approach called tackling Òthe deliberate use of disease as a weapon.Ó It also decided to hold week-long annual meetings to lead up to the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 {11-15.11}. The November 2003 November urged states parties to enact penalties aimed at enforcement of the BWC. NGOs accused the United States of restarting researches in biological weapons {10-14.03}. At the December 2004 Meeting of States, delegates discussed the need to strengthen the Treaty {6.12}. A group of scientists are designing verification procedure for implementation of the BWC {16.11.04}.

CBMs added by review conferences
At the Second Review Conference, parties agreed to begin reporting about their biological research programs, as a confidence-building measure. Reports should be provided to the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs on an annual basis no later than 15 April of each year and should cover the previous calendar year.

The Third Review Conference (9ø27.9.91) expanded the CBMs, as follows:
CBM A: A detailed declaration of high containment facilities and other biological defense programs and facilities.
CBM B: Reports of unusual outbreaks of disease (ÒunusualÓ not defined).
CBM C: Publication of biological research results related to the convention.
CBM D: Publication of information on visits to biological research centers.
CBM E: Declaration of the legislation and other regulations enacted to implement the provisions of the convention and to control the export or import of pathogenic microorganisms.
CBM F: Declaration of past activities in offensive or defensive biological research and development programs.
CBM G: Declaration of vaccine production facilities.
A large majority of countries fail to submit the recommended (but not legally required) CBM declarations to the UN on a consistent annual basis.

Special Conference and Establishment of the Ad Hoc Group
After receiving the VEREX report at the 1993 UNGA session, 53 BWC parties requested a special conference to consider compliance measures. A preparatory committee for the conference met in Geneva on 11ø15 April 1994 and established the conferenceÕs mandate: to decide whether to take further action toward strengthening the BWC.

The special conference convened on 19ø30 September 1994 and agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Group Òto consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the convention.Ó Advocates of adding a compliance protocol to the BWC hoped the group would complete its work before the 1996 Review Conference.

The Ad Hoc GroupÕs work in 1995 and 1996 did not make enough progress to provide draft proposals to the Fourth Review Conference (25 Novemberø6 December). However, the group asked the conference to endorse its work thus far and renew its mandate.

Continuing its work, the Ad Hoc Group released a Òrolling textÓ on a verification protocol at its seventh session {14.7ø1.8.97}. Almost every article was widely disputed within the group {15.9ø3.10.97}. With the groupÕs deliberations stalemated in 1998, 1999, and the early part of 2000, group chair Ambassador Tibor T—th of Hungary decided to hold informal consultations with individual delegations to expedite completion of the draft {10.7ø4.8.00}. By the last session in 2000 T—th had reportedly achieved enough progress to raise hopes of a draft chairmanÕs text by February 2001 {20.11ø8.12.00}.

Over the period 1997ø2001, the major issues and lines of dispute fell into eight main areas:
1. The definitions, lists, and criteria for prohibited agents
2. Initial declarations of facilities, including rules and mechanisms for selecting facilities for declaration
3. Challenge inspections of facilities suspected of a treaty violation
4. Field investigations of unusual disease outbreaks possibly associated with the covert use of biological weapons or an accidental leak from a clandestine development or production facility
5. Non-challenge ÒclarificationÓ visits to declared facilities, which could be either ÒroutineÓ or ÒvoluntaryÓ in nature, random or non-random
6. Protection of confidential information (which is related to all previous issues)
7. Scientific and technological cooperation in the peaceful uses of biotechnology
8. The non-transfer of equipment and technology needed for the production of biological weapons {1997: 14.7ø1.8, 15.9ø3.10; 1998: 23.1, 9ø13.3, 6.6ø10.7, 14.9ø9.10;
1999: 4ø22.1, 29.3ø9.4, 28.6ø23.7, 13.9ø8.10, 22.11ø10.12; 2000: 17.1ø4.2}.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries generally favored weaker compliance measures (Protocol Article III), stronger measures for cooperative exchange of biotechnology and materials (Protocol Article VII), and weaker export controls (BWC Article X). The Western Group argued for the reverse. There were especially sharp disagreements about the Western-dominated inter-governmental Australia Group, which meets annually to restrict exports of dual-use items that could contribute to BW programs, particularly in developing countries. Although the dispute over the Australia Group remained unresolved {17.1ø4.2.00}, the NAM countries compromised on voluntary clarification visits to declared facilities {13.9ø8.10.99; 22.11ø10.12.99}.

Within the Western Group, there was a split between members who favored very strong protections for proprietary commercial and defense information (the United States, Germany, Japan) and other members. The United States drew closer to those nations favoring less intrusive methods of clarification for facility declarations, such as China and India, despite the overall US preference for strong compliance measures {13.9ø8.10.99}. The difficulty of distinguishing between treaty-permitted commercial or military programs and illicit BW activities was the key impediment to agreement on the protocol. Formal governmental studies and projects by non-governmental groups were carried out to supplement the original VEREX study. These efforts endeavored to identify means by which useful verification measures could be implemented while legitimate commercial and military activities were shielded, including state actions that could potentially ÒtriggerÓ a required inspection or clarification by national authorities or the international implementing organization. (See Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons Arms Control, University of Maryland Center for International and Security Studies Project on Rethinking Arms Control Paper No. 16, May 1996.)

Lessons of the Chemical Weapons Convention and OPCW Operations
Ad Hoc Group members discussed the potential applicability of the CWC and the lessons of its implementing organization for the final text of the BWC implementing protocol. Under the CWC, the criteria for Òtreaty-permittedÓ and illicit activities are well defined and support a strict verification regime. (See 704 and Jonathan B Tucker, ÒVerification Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Their Relevance to the Biological Weapons Convention,Ó Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action, Stimson Center Report No 24, January 1998.)

POSITIONS OF GOVERNMENTS

China, according to the United States, began a BW program before 1984 and probably maintains an offensive BW capability. The United States also suspects that China has not complied with the BWC {13.8.97, 7.7.98}. China reportedly experienced a serious disease outbreak believed to be a BW-related accident in the late 1980s near the Lop Nor region. This would put China in violation of BWC Article I {box 1.3.99}. In June 1998, however, Presidents Clinton and Jiang issued a ÒJoint Statement on Biological Weapons,Ó which called for the global elimination of all BW {27.6.98}.

In the protocol negotiations, China favored a state-centric approach in which only Biocontainment Level 3ø4 (BL-3 and BL-4) facilities would be declared and inspected {22.11ø10.12.99}. This would exclude smaller programs conducted by sub-state or state actors. It assumes that state-led BW programs would automatically use the maximum health and safety precautions available. In general, China supports weaker compliance mechanisms and stronger provisions for technology sharing. China adopted new BWC-related export controls in 2002. {14.10.02}

Egypt, according to the United States, made BW before 1972, did not definitely eliminate its BW thereafter, and most likely continues to retain some BW capability {13.8.97, 7.7.98}. Russia concluded in 1993 that Egypt Òhas a program of military-applied research...but no data has been obtained to indicate the creation of biological agents in support of military offensive programsÓ even though Òresearch in the area of BW dates back to the 1960sÓ {JaneÕs Intelligence Review 1.3.99}.

The European Union adopted a new common position on the BWC protocol, replacing an older position initiated by Britain in 1998, calling for generally strong declaration and compliance measures {17.5.99}.

France destroyed all BW in 1972 {Mitterand statement late 11.88 in JaneÕs NATO Report 29.11.88}.

Germany (FRG) was bound by the 1954 Brussels treaty not to acquire BW.

Iran Òprobably produced BW agentsÓ and has Òapparently weaponized a small quantity of those agents,Ó according to the United States {13.8.97, 7.7.98}. Reports surfaced in 1997 and 2002 that China had sold Iran dual-use equipment that could aid IraqÕs BW efforts {8.1.97; 24.1.02}. In December 1998, Iran reportedly attempted to hire ex-Soviet scientists to develop BW {8.12.98}. In 1993, RussiaÕs Foreign Intelligence Service had concluded that ÒIran does not have offensive biological weapons at this time, but it is possible to say with confidence that there is a military-applied biological program. There is a possibility that small stocks of biological agents have already been producedÓ {JaneÕs Intelligence Review 1.3.99}.

Iraq admitted it had conducted BW research {30.12.92} but claimed it did not have a production program; UNSCOM inspectors found no evidence of a program. In 1993, UNSCOM declared that Iraq provided Òfull, final, and complete disclosureÓ (FFCD) of its research activities {8.10.93}. Earlier, Iraq was alleged to possess tularemia and anthrax {13.8.90} and the capability to deliver them {13.11.90}. Iraq later revealed its past development of a full-scale BW program, including attempted weaponization {box 31.10.95}.

In 1996, UNSCOM believed Iraq still had 6ø16 missiles with BW warheads {20.3.96}. In 1997 and 1998, concerns over IraqÕs BW program grew. After rejecting IraqÕs declarations as inadequate and incomplete, late in 1998, UNSCOM declared itself unable to close the BW file because of IraqÕs failure to cooperate {box 1.12.98}. In 1999, UNSCOM concluded that innumerable details on IraqÕs BW program remained unknown. In a comprehensive report, it outlined multiple areas that needed extensive clarification {boxes 30.1.99; 31.3.99}. The declaration Iraq submitted to UNMOVIC in December 2002 under Security Council Resolution 1441 contained no new information on its BW programs {701e2BWC02 12.12}.

JapanÕs former BW program was developed before and during World War II. Recent reports suggest that Japan used BW in present-day Burma, China, Indonesia, Russia, Singapore, and Thailand {box 1.3.99}.

Libya, according to the United States, is moving from a research into a weaponized BW program {7.7.98}. However, a 1996 US defense report also said that Libya remained Òhampered by its inadequate biotechnical foundationÓ and was still Òin the early research and development stage.Ó The report concluded that, ÒThese shortcomings, combined with limitations in LibyaÕs overall ability to put agents into deliverable munitions, will preclude production of militarily effective BW systems for the foreseeable futureÓ {JaneÕs Intelligence Review 1.3.99}.

North Korea Òbegan to emphasize an offensive BW program during the early 1960s...and probably has the ability to produce limited quantities of traditional infectious BW agents or toxinsÓ according to the United States (see ACR 457b) {9.2.99; JaneÕs Intelligence Review 1.3.99}. In 1993, Russian Intelligence concluded that North Korea was Òperforming applied military-biological research at a whole series of universities, medical institutes, and specialized research establishments. Work is being performed there with pathogens for malignant anthrax, cholera, bubonic plague, and smallpox. Biological weapons are being tested on island territoriesÓ {JaneÕs Intelligence Review 1.3.99}.

Pakistan Òhas the resources and capabilities appropriate to conducting R&D relating to BW,Ó according to a 1996 report by the US Department of Defense {JaneÕs Intelligence Review 1.3.99}. In 1993, Russia concluded, Òin Pakistan research is being conducted in the area of the chemistry of toxic and especially dangerous substances and microbiology. The main scientific centers conducting this work are microbiology labs of the scientific and technical subdivision of the Defense Ministry...and the microbiology faculty of the University of Karachi. All the subject matter (at these centers) related to chemical and biological weapons is classifiedÓ {JaneÕs Intelligence Review 1.3.99}. In 2004, the National Assembly and Senate passed a bill which referred to the obligations to strengthen controls over sensitive materials and technologies as set out under UN Security Council resolution 1541 entered into force, called the Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act {14-18.9.04}.

South Korea was covertly developing a BW arsenal, according to North Korea {box 1.3.99}.

Taiwan, according to the United States, Òhas been upgrading its biotechnology capabilitiesÓ but is probably not in violation of the BWC {13.8.97, 7.7.98}.

The UK built BW bombs in World War II and conducted secret BW research between 1964ø1977 (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists JanuaryøFebruary 1987).
The United Kingdom has supported strong and relatively intrusive verification measures in CD talks. During the 1998 deliberations {5ø23.1.98}, Britain called for detailed information not only on specific declarable facilities such as biodefense laboratories but also on nearby buildings at the same site, such as waste treatment plants. BritainÕs position was linked to its preference for random visits to declared sites, which would be facilitated by more detailed declarations (see UK studies supporting the VEREX process above). In 2002, the UK proposed new ideas for strengthening the BWC {29.4.02}. In early 2004 a the Royal Society and House of Lords consulted on the BWC, finding it critically weakened for lacking an international scientific body and does not contain any verification procedures to ensure signatory compliance {19.1.04}

The United States had no biological weapons according to the ACDA Treaty List of 1982 (see Data section for 1989): it had destroyed them by 26 December 1975. Since that time, however, the United States has conducted BW research {10.4.87; 21.10.90; 1.4.92}. Recent US activities have focused on developing counter-BW detection equipment {22.3.96; 15.9.99; boxes 1.3.99, 31.12.99}.

In September 2001, the New York Times published an article indicating that the US government had been working on clandestine programs to develop biological weapon agents and dispensers for the purpose of studying defenses since at least 1997. In December, another Times article indicated that the anthrax used in mail attacks on several US sites resembled that manufactured in the US BW program. A 13 December Baltimore Sun article said that the strain of anthrax used in the attack on Sen. DaschleÕs office was identical to a strain developed by scientists at the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. A Dugway spokesperson responded that a small amount of anthrax powder produced in 1998 was for a strain different from that used in the Senate office building.

Under the Reagan administration, the United States considered the BW treaty Òcritically deficient and unfixableÓ {8.8.86}. It found the Second Review Conference worthwhile {31.3ø15.4.87}, but opposed new verification measures {30.3ø10.4.92}. Under Clinton, the United States supported convening a special conference to consider BWC compliance measures {10.11.93}, but also pursued BW military defense programs at a new defensive research facility at Dugway {19.9.88; 29.1.90; 19.11.91; 27.3.93}. At the Fourth Review Conference, the United States unsuccessfully pushed to establish a 1998 deadline for completion of the Ad Hoc GroupÕs work {25.11ø6.12.96}.

For the first three years of the Ad Hoc Group talks, a deadlock among US government agencies kept the United States from taking a leading role in negotiations. Some agencies wanted to exclude random visits to declared facilities. The deadlock was ended by BaghdadÕs continuing defiance of UN weapons inspectors and growing concern that Iraq had retained a BW capability in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. In January 1998, the Clinton Administration adopted a new policy that supported Ònon-challenge clarifying visitsÓ to sites initially declared by national authorities under the BW implementing protocol {28.1.98}. The United States remained opposed to CWC-type random inspections for the BWC, however; and it called for a special process for challenge inspections, in which a simple majority of the BWC international governing body would have to vote to approve such an inspection.

In 1999, the US Congress mandated comprehensive trial inspections of US pharmaceutical and biotech industries, which were skeptical that proprietary information could be protected under a new BWC protocol {29.11.99}. Some US officials still believed that the dual-use nature of biological agents would make a rigorous inspection regime unworkable {3.3.98}.

Under President Bush, in 2001 and 2002 the United States blocked progress on the verification protocol and insisted on shifting the focus of CD work to the use of disease as a weapon. After 2002, lacking US support, the CD no longer had a mandate to develop a BW verification protocol; and, since the CD requires a consensus among all member States to approve its program of work, it ceased work on this topic {11ø15.11.02}.

On US advice, based on US intelligence estimates of other countriesÕ BW capabilities, the UN World Health Organization decided in June 1999 not to destroy the only remaining stocks of the smallpox virus {24.5.99}. In 2002, President Bush ordered the resumption of limited vaccinations against small pox {13.12.02}.

The USSR (see weapon data section 1989) reported eight BW establishments with maximum containment units {4.89}. The United States alleged that the USSR continued work on BW after the treaty entered into force in 1975 {22.8.90, 21.10.91, 22.9.92, 3.2.98}. In 1998 there were reports that the Soviet Union might have developed vaccine-resistant anthrax {3.2.98}. In 1999, the former deputy director of the main Soviet agency for BW development and weaponization, Biopreparat, revealed in detail a sharp increase in BW activity under Gorbachev in the 1980s, including BW-tipped ICBMs and development of a new class of weapons called bioregulators in 1989 {box 1.3.99}.

Russia admitted that its BW program continued into 1992 {box 31.8.92; 22.9.92; 17.2.93}, and said that the program ended in 1993 {15.2.93}. Reports of continuing BW research persisted, however {1.4.97; 25.6.97}, as did concerns about Russian lack of openness {13.7.95; 8.8.96; 13.8.97; 7.7.98}. There were reports in 1998 and 1999 that Russia continued to develop new biological agents and maintained a production facility {3.2.98; box 31.12.99}. Russia denied these allegations {27.2.98}.

At the CD, the Russian delegation argued that the general-purpose criterion of the BWCÕs Article I is too vague and that more precise definitions are needed if inspectors are to make objective assessments of BWC compliance. Russia seeks to amend Article I de facto by having the protocol provide specific definitions of banned activities, agents and quantities {15.9ø3.10.97}. Russia supports the investigation of alleged use of biological weapons, but opposes investigations of suspicious outbreaks of disease.

In regard to the need for an international implementing body like the OPCWÕs Executive Council and Secretariat, the Russian delegation argued that since compliance complaints would be rare, there is no need for a costly new bureaucracy to handle them. Instead, Moscow has sought to retain the existing procedure under Article VI of the BWC, in which formal complaints of noncompliance are lodged with the UN Security Council.

Other countries (see 8ø26 September 1986). Some 27 states parties took part in at least one of the 1987ø1989 rounds of the data exchange {31.10.90}, and ten participated in all three rounds. Nearly 20 countries have been alleged by one source or another to have BW programs {11.7.90; see also weapon subsection 1993 and 13.7.95}. In 1996, ACDA said Òroughly a dozen countriesÓ might have BW programs {26.11ø6.12.96}.

SUMMARY OF THE CONVENTION

I. No state to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents, etc.
II. Each state to destroy existing stocks.
III. No transfer.
IV. States-parties required to take measures to prohibit work on biological agents within their territories.
V-VII. Consultation, referral to Security Council, assistance to any state attacked.
VIII. 1925 Geneva Protocol (prohibiting use) remains in effect.
IX. Obligation to pursue chemical weapon treaty.
X. Use for peaceful purposes.
XI-XV. Amendment, duration (unlimited), entry into force, reviews, depositing.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPON CONVENTION
Status as of 31 December 2004

State	Geneva Protocol		BWC Signed	BWC in Force
Afghanistan	9-Dec-86		10-Apr-72	6-Mar-75
Albania	20-Dec-89			3-Jun-92
Algeria	27-Jan-92	*	22-Jul-01	22-Jul-01
Angola	8-Dec-90	*
Antigua & Barbuda	1-Jan-89		29-Jan-03	3-Mar-03
Argentina	12-May-69		1-Aug-72	27-Nov-79
Armenia				7-Jun-94
Australia	24-May-30	*	10-Apr-72	5-Oct-77
Austria	9-May-28		10-Apr-72	10-Aug-73	*
Azerbaijan				26-Feb-04
Bahamas				26-Nov-86
Bahrain	9-Dec-88	*		28-Oct-88
Bangladesh	20-May-89	*		11-Mar-85
Barbados	16-Jul-76	*	16-Feb-73	16-Feb-73
Belarus			10-Apr-72	26-Mar-75
Belgium	4-Dec-28	*	10-Apr-72	15-Mar-79
Belize				20-Oct-86
Benin	9-Dec-86		10-Apr-72	25-Apr-75
Bhutan	19-Feb-79			8-Jun-78
Bolivia	14-Jan-85		10-Apr-72	30-Oct-75
Bosnia & Herzegovina				15-Aug-94
Botswana			10-Apr-72	5-Feb-92
Brazil	28-Aug-70		10-Apr-72	27-Feb-73
Brunei Darussalam				31-Jan-91
Bulgaria	7-Mar-34		10-Apr-72	2-Aug-72
Burkina Faso	3-Mar-71			17-Apr-91
Cambodia	15-Mar-83	*	10-Apr-72	9-Mar-83
Cameroon	20-Jul-89
Canada	30-Jun-30	*	10-Apr-72	18-Sep-72
Cape Verde	15-Oct-91			20-Oct-77
Central African Republic	31-Jul-70		10-Apr-72
Chile	2-Jul-35		10-Apr-72	22-Apr-80
China	24-Aug-29			15-Nov-84
Colombia			10-Apr-72	19-Dec-83
Congo				23-Oct-78
Costa Rica			10-Apr-72	17-Dec-73
C™te dÕIvoire	27-Jun-70		23-May-72
Croatia				28-Apr-93
Cuba	24-Jun-66	*	12-Apr-72	21-Apr-76
Cyprus	12-Dec-66		14-Apr-72	6-Nov-73
Czech Republic	17-Dec-93			5-Apr-93
Dem P Rep of Korea	1-Apr-89	*		13-Mar-87
Dem Rep of the Congo			10-Apr-72	16-Sep-75
Denmark	5-May-30		10-Apr-72	1-Mar-73
Dominica				8-Nov-78
Dominican Republic	8-Dec-70		10-Apr-72	23-Feb-73
Ecuador	16-Dec-70		14-Jun-72	12-Mar-75
Egypt	6-Dec-28		10-Apr-72
El Salvador			10-Apr-72	31-Dec-91
Equatorial Guinea	20-May-89			16-Jan-89
Estonia	28-Aug-31	*		1-Jul-93
Ethiopia	7-Oct-35	*	10-Apr-72	26-May-75
Fiji	21-Mar-73		22-Feb-73	4-Sep-73
Finland	26-Jun-29		10-Apr-72	4-Feb-74
France	10-May-26			27-Sep-84
Gabon			10-Apr-72
Gambia	5-Nov-66		2-Jun-72	21-Nov-91
Georgia				22-May-96
Germany	25-Apr-29		10-Apr-72	7-Apr-83
Ghana	3-May-67		10-Apr-72	6-Jun-75
Greece	30-May-31		10-Apr-72	10-Dec-75
Grenada	20-May-89			22-Oct-86
Guatemala	3-May-83		9-May-72	19-Sep-73
Guinea-Bissau	20-May-89			20-Aug-76
Guyana			3-Jan-73
Haiti			10-Apr-72
Holy See	18-Oct-66			4-Jan-02
Honduras			10-Apr-72	14-Mar-79
Hungary	11-Oct-52	*	10-Apr-72	27-Dec-72
Iceland	2-Nov-67		10-Apr-72	15-Feb-73
India	9-Apr-30	*	15-Jan-73	15-Jul-74	*
Indonesia	21-Jan-71		20-Jun-72	4-Feb-92
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	5-Nov-29		10-Apr-72	22-Aug-73
Iraq	8-Sep-31	*	11-May-72	19-Jun-91
Ireland	29-Aug-30		10-Apr-72	27-Oct-72
Israel	20-Feb-69	*
Italy	3-Apr-28		10-Apr-72	30-May-75
Jamaica	28-Jul-70			13-Aug-75
Japan	21-Jul-70		10-Apr-72	8-Jun-82
Jordan	20-Jan-77	*	10-Apr-72	30-May-75
Kenya	6-Jul-70			7-Jan-76
Kuwait	15-Dec-71		14-Apr-72	18-Jul-72	*
Lao PeopleÕs Dem Rep	20-May-89		10-Apr-72	20-Mar-73
Latvia	3-Jun-31			6-Feb-97
Lebanon	17-Apr-69		10-Apr-72	26-Mar-75
Lesotho	10-Mar-72		10-Apr-72	6-Sep-77
Liberia	17-Jun-27		10-Apr-72
Libya	29-Dec-71	*		19-Jan-82
Liechtenstein	6-Sep-91			30-May-91
Lithuania	15-Jun-33			10-Feb-98
Luxembourg	1-Sep-36		10-Apr-72	23-Mar-76
Madagascar	2-Aug-67		13-Oct-72
Malawi	14-Sep-70		10-Apr-72
Malaysia	10-Dec-70		10-Apr-72	6-Sep-91	*
Maldives	27-Dec-66			2-Aug-93
Mali			10-Apr-72	25-Nov-02
Malta	15-Oct-70		11-Sep-72	7-Apr-75
Mauritius	8-Jan-71	*	10-Apr-72	7-Aug-72
Mexico	28-May-32		10-Apr-72	8-Apr-74
Monaco	6-Jan-67			30-Apr-99
Mongolia	6-Dec-68		10-Apr-72	5-Sep-72
Morocco	13-Oct-70		2-May-72	21-Mar-02
Myanmar			10-Apr-72
Nepal	9-May-69		10-Apr-72
Netherlands	3-Oct-30	*	10-Apr-72	10-Apr-72	*
New Zealand	24-May-30		10-Apr-72	13-Dec-72
Nicaragua	5-Oct-90		10-Apr-72	7-Aug-75
Niger	5-Apr-67		21-Apr-72	23-Jun-72
Nigeria	15-Oct-68	*	3-Jul-72	3-Jul-73
Norway	27-Jul-32		10-Apr-72	1-Aug-73
Oman				31-Mar-92
Pakistan	15-Apr-60	*	10-Apr-72	25-Sep-74
Palau			20-Feb-03	23-Mar-03
Panama	4-Dec-70		2-May-72	20-Mar-74
Papua New Guinea	2-Sep-80	*		27-Oct-80
Paraguay	22-Oct-33			9-Jun-76
Peru	5-Jun-85		10-Apr-72	5-Jun-85
Philippines	8-Jun-73		21-Jun-72	21-May-73
Poland	4-Feb-29	*	10-Apr-72	25-Jan-73
Portugal	1-Jul-30	*	29-Jun-72	15-May-72
Qatar	18-Oct-76		14-Nov-72	17-Apr-75
Rep of Korea	4-Jan-89	*	10-Apr-72	25-Jun-87
Romania	23-Aug-29		10-Apr-72	25-Jul-79
Russian Federation	5-Apr-28		10-Apr-72	26-Mar-75
Rwanda	11-May-64		10-Apr-72	20-May-75
Saint Kitts & Nevis	15-Nov-89			2-Apr-91
Saint Lucia	21-Dec-88			26-Nov-86
Saint Vincent & the Gre.	24-Mar-99			13-May-99
San Marino			12-Sep-72	11-Mar-75
Sao Tome & Principe				24-Aug-79
Saudi Arabia	27-Jan-71		12-Apr-72	24-May-72
Senegal	15-Jun-77		10-Apr-72	26-Mar-75
Serbia & Montenegro	12-Apr-29	*	10-Apr-72	25-Oct-73
Seychelles				11-Oct-79
Sierra Leone	20-Mar-67		7-Nov-72	29-Jun-76
Singapore			19-Jun-72	2-Dec-75
Slovakia	22-Sep-93	*		17-May-93
Slovenia				7-Apr-92
Solomon Islands	1-Jun-81	*		17-Jun-81
Somalia			3-Jul-72
South Africa	24-May-30	*	10-Apr-72	3-Nov-75
Spain	22-Aug-29	*	10-Apr-72	20-Jun-79
Sri Lanka	20-Jan-54		10-Apr-72	18-Nov-86
Sudan	17-Dec-80		17-Oct-03	16-Nov-03
Suriname				6-Jan-93
Swaziland	23-Jul-91			18-Jun-91
Sweden	25-Apr-30		27-Feb-75	5-Feb-76
Switzerland	12-Jul-32		10-Apr-72	4-May-76	*
Syria	17-Dec-68	*	14-Apr-72
Thailand	6-Jun-31		17-Jan-73	28-May-75
The FY Rep of Macedonia				24-Dec-96
Timor Leste			5-May-03	4-Jun-03
Togo	5-Apr-71		10-Apr-72	10-Nov-76
Tonga	19-Jul-71			28-Sep-76
Trinidad & Tobago	30-Nov-70
Tunisia	12-Jul-67		10-Apr-72	18-May-73
Turkey	5-Oct-29		10-Apr-72	25-Oct-74
Turkmenistan				11-Jan-96
Uganda	24-May-65			12-May-92
Ukraine			10-Apr-72	26-Mar-75
United Arab Emirates			28-Sep-73
United Kingdom	9-Apr-30	*	10-Apr-72	26-Mar-75
United Rep of Tanzania	22-Apr-63		16-Aug-72
United States	10-Apr-75	*	10-Apr-72	26-Mar-75
Uruguay	12-Apr-77			6-Apr-81
Uzbekistan				12-Jan-96
Vanuatu				12-Oct-90
Venezuela	8-Feb-28		10-Apr-72	18-Oct-78
Viet Nam	15-Dec-80	*		20-Jun-80
Yemen	17-Mar-71		26-Apr-72	1-Jun-79
Zimbabwe				5-Nov-90
Total: Countries: 168	132		108	152

*=Ratified with reservations.

In addition to the 148 states that have ratified the BWC, 15 that have not ratified (including 10 BWC signers shown with (s)) have ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of "bacteriological" (and chemical) weapons: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic (s), C™te d'Ivoire (s), Egypt (s), Holy See, Israel, Liberia (s), Madagascar (s), Malawi (s), Morocco (s), Nepal (s), Syria (s), Tanzania (s), and Trinidad & Tobago. Seventeen countries signed but did not ratify the BWC. In addition to the 10 shown above with (s), seven other countries that signed the BWC did not ratify: Gabo