Chemical Weapons

Negotiated: March 1980-3 September 1992 at the CD.
Opened for signature: 13-15 January 1993.
Entry into force: April 1997 (180 days after 65 ratifications).

Current Status. As of as of the end 2004, the CWC had 167 ratifications or accessions (see table of signatories and parties below).

The treaty faced a major controversy in 2002 when, under US pressure, the OPCW replaced its director general, who had attempted to make arrangements for CWC verification in Iraq (outside the UN Security Council channel). The Seventh Session of the Conference of States Parties met in October 2002 in a session that got bogged down in budgetary matters.

Introduction. On 26 August 1992, the Conference on Disarmament's (CD) Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons completed an effort begun in March 1980 to draft a ban on chemical weapons (CW). The UN General Assembly recommended the treaty text for adoption and opened the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC) for signature on 13 15 January 1993. At the ceremony, 130 states signed the convention. The CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the treaty's implementing organization, had successfully been launched by the time the First Conference of States Parties was held on 6 23 May 1997.

Under the treaty, each party agrees never "to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons," not to use or prepare to use CW, and not to assist others in acting against the prohibitions of the convention. The convention requires states parties to destroy any CW in their possession, to destroy any of their own CW abandoned on the territory of another state, and to dismantle their CW production facilities.

Title. The formal title is above; IDDS uses "Chemical Weapon Convention" or "CWC."

Weapons. Chemical agents act by toxic action to impair, incapacitate, or kill after they have touched the skin or been inhaled. They are usually delivered by shells. The term "munition" refers to the shell filled with the agent. Common agents are:
• Nerve agents such as Tabun, Sarin (GB), Soman, or VX.
• Blister agents such as sulfur mustard, or nitrogen mustard.
• Choking agents such as phosgene.
• Blood agents such as hydrogen cyanide.
• Toxins {see section 701}.
• Tear and harassing agents such as (in descending order of irritation) CS, DM (adamsite), CN, or BZ.
• Psychochemicals such as LSD.

Location and planned sessions. The treaty is implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), located in The Hague. Sessions planned for 2004 are:
• 2004 Executive Council Schedule: 23-26 March, 29 June?2 July, 14-17 Dec.
• Ninth Session of the Conference of the States Parties: 29 Nov.?3 Dec. 2004.
• Second Review Conference: 2008

US-Russian bilateral negotiations: The 1989 Wyoming MOU and the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States produced the 1989 Wyoming Joint Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), covering an information exchange on the CW stockpiles {blue pages 22-23.9.89}, and the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA), under which each side undertook to destroy much of its CW within 10 years {box 19.5.90; 1.6.90}. Phase I activities of the MOU were completed in February 1991. They included the exchange of general data on each other's chemical weapon capabilities and visits to relevant military and civil facilities chosen by the host country.

The United States recognized Russia as the successor party to both the BDA and the MOU {20.7.92}. Protocols to both agreements remained under negotiation in 1993 {22.3.93} but stalled when Russia sought to modify some provisions of the BDA {22-29.11.93}. In 1993, the BDA schedule was aligned with the CWC destruction schedule {7.7.98}.

In early 1994, the two sides signed an implementing agreement for Phase II of the MOU, calling for five reciprocal inspections {14.1.94}. The inspections were completed by 13 December 1994 {13.12.94; 22-27.11.94} and the two sides completed data exchanges in spring of 1994 {28.5.98; ACDA Fact Sheet 9.98}. However, US officials accused Russia of supplying incomplete data and held talks with Russian officials to discuss their complaints {10-14.10.94}.

US-Russian talks on the two negotiations continued into 1995 {late June 1995}. BDA negotiations deadlocked in mid-1996 when Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin suggested in a letter to US Vice President Gore that the BDA had "objectively accomplished...[its] useful role" {8.7.96}. Since the OPCW had designed its budgetary and inspection plans for the CWC on the assumption that the BDA would be in force, the lack of a BDA threatened the successful implementation of the CWC {3.10.96}.

At the end of 1998, the United States said that no "concrete progress toward implementation of the BDA" had been made. The United States also contended that there was no progress on resolving remaining US questions on items "not declared or declared inappropriately" by Russia under the MOU. Discussions on both negotiations continued {7.7.98}. A report on treaty compliance during 1998 by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said the United States had "fully complied with its obligations to declare its chemical weapons and related facilities as required under the Wyoming MOU. The United States has taken no action, which would defeat the object or purpose of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA), which has yet to enter into force" {9.11.99}. Subsequent years have seen no further action on the BDA and the agreement has not entered into force.

Australia Group. In 1985, Australia proposed creating an informal suppliers group to harmonize export controls on chemicals that could be used to produce biological and chemical weapons. The group first met in June 1985 in Brussels and continued to meet annually {9-12.11.88; box 19-22.9.89; 6.90 and 11.7.90; ACR 704e2CWC 24.5.91 and 10-12.12.91; ACR 704e2CWC 2-10.6.93 and 6-9.12.93; 704e2CWC 16-19.5.94; 16-19.10.95; 14-17.10.96; 6-9.10.97; 9-15.10.98; 6-8.10.99; 1-4.10.01; 3-6.02; 2-5 June; 7-10 June}.

As of 31 December 2004, the group consisted of 38 countries plus the European Commission (as observer): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the USA {http://www.australiagroup.net/}.

POSITIONS OF GOVERNMENTS

Egypt has urged Arab states not to sign the CWC until Israel signs the NPT. {ACR 453bMEN02 28.10}

The Hungarian Defense Ministry acknowledged that it possessed chemical weapons during the 1970s and 1980s, and conducted military exercises using small quantities of an agent {ACR 704e4CWC04 25.9}. The country has stated that since 1990 it has worked to reduce its CW stockpile to below permitted level, in accordance with its obligations under international law {25.9.04}.

Iran developed CW during the end of the Iran-Iraq War, which ended with a cease-fire in 1988. Iran claims it eliminated its CW stockpile after the war {ACR 704e2CWC98 17.11} but evidence of a continuing program continued to surface {ACR 704e2CWC98 17.6; ACR 704e2CWC99 26.1, 9.2}. In 1999, Iran informed the OPCW it could be added to a list of countries previously possessing CW {28.6-2.7.99}. The CIA has said that Iran continues to seek CW-related technologies, equipment, and precursor agents. {704e4CWC02 30.1} Iran's OPCW Representative Amb. Hoseyn Panahi-Azar said that Iran's is committed to banning chemical weapons {704bCWC03 22.10}. The OPCW Director General held negotiations in Iran, and improved the cooperation of the two entities and mutual campaign against chemical weapons {ACR 704bCWC04 28.9.04}

Iraq had significant outstanding questions regarding its CW programs, which UNSCOM was unable to resolve {ACR 704b2CWC99 box 1.4}. In 1998, the OPCW offered to take over UNSCOM's responsibilities, presumably on closing Iraq's CW file {ACR 704e2CWC98 box 1.11}. Following the withdrawal of UNSCOM personnel from Iraq in December 1998 {ACR 453b1MEN98 20.12}, Iraq stopped providing the Commission with declarations and notifications required under relevant Security Council resolutions {453b1MEN99 8.10}. The CIA asserted in its semi-annual reports to Congress that after the Gulf War, Baghdad had rebuilt key portions of its CW infrastructure, some of which could be converted fairly quickly CW production facilities {ACR 704e3CWC02}. Starting in the autumn of 2002, US officials, including President Bush and Secretary of State Powell, argued in public statements and at the UN that the United States had evidence that Iraq did continue to have programs to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction - most likely chemical weapons. This, plus the allegation that the Iraqi government had ties Al Qaeda, became the causus belli for the US-led attack on Iraq in 2003.

Japan abandoned hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of shells containing toxic chemicals in China during World War II. Under the CWC, Japan must dispose of these CW by 2007. Japan may have trouble meeting this deadline, however {ACR 704e2CWC 6.11.98, 7.5.99}. Construction of a Japanese-financed chemical destruction facility, agreed in a May 1999 8-point bilateral memorandum with China, was delayed in part due to varying estimates for numbers of munitions left behind. Japan estimated that the underground facilities contained 700,000 munitions, while China put the number at around two million {20.10.99}. A cult produced Sarin for an attack on a Japanese subway in 1995 {ACR 704e2CWC95 20.3}. The facilities they had used were destroyed by the Japanese government in 1998 {ACR 704e2CWC98 9.12}.

Libya tried establishing its own indigenous CW program, according to the CIA. {ACR 704b2CWC99 9.2; ACR 704e4CWC02 30.1}. In 2003 Libya announced that it will join the CWC and it asked for help in eliminating its chemical weapons {ACR 704bCWC03, 20.12}. In February 2004 Libya ratified the CWC, and a month later acknowledged stockpiling 20 tons of mustard gas and other chemical agents {13.2; 5.3.04}. Libya will begin dismantling its CW stockpile in the summer of 2004, and has asked the OPCW for an extension until 29 April 2007 {29.11-3.12; 20.4.04}.

North Korea has 2500-5000 tons of CW, mainly mustard gas, phosgene, Sarin, and VX agents, according to South Korea. {ACR 704e2CWC99 1.1, 1.10}

Pakistan's signature and ratification of the CWC were petitioned before the Pakistani Supreme Court in an effort to have them declared null and void. Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan said that "sensitive facilities" were "beyond the scope of the convention." {ACR 704bCWC99 7.2}

Russia ratified the CWC on 5 November 1997 after extensive debate {box 31.8.97} and a good deal of international pressure {ACR 704bCWC97 6-23.5, 17-18.9, 16.10}. It was having trouble acquiring the funding needed to destroy all of its chemical weapons by the convention's 2008 deadline. In late 1999 Russia requested that the OPCW Executive Council and States Parties allow conversion of some facilities to commercial purposes {ACR 704e2CWC98 23.6, box 1.10; ACR 704b2CWC99 boxes 30.4 and 1.12, 30.11-3.12}. In 1998, the CIA reported that some factions of the Russian government wished to circumvent the CWC {ACR 704e2CWC98 box 1.10; 704e2CWC99 box 30.7, 13.8}. In late 1999, Russian officials and scientists publicly disclosed the full scope of Russia's CW infrastructure and plans for conversion or destruction, in part due to the increasing need to secure foreign funding for these programs {ACR 704b2CWC99 box 1.12, 29.11}.

In 2000, the OPCW granted Russia an extension of the first deadline for the destruction of one percent of its CW stockpiles {ACR 704e1CWC00 15-18.2}. The US Congress helped increase CTR (cooperative threat reduction) funding for the Shchuchye destruction plant pending certification that Russia was providing matching contributions toward the cost of the plant {ACR 704e3CWC00 mid-May}. In October the Duma formed a commission on CW destruction {ACR 704e3CWC00}. In 2001, the Russian government established the Federal Directorate for Safe Storage and Elimination of Chemical Weapons to implement the Russian program {ACR 704e3CWC01 5.2} and the State Commission for Chemical Disarmament {ACR 704e3CWC01 4.5}. Russia also adopted a new CW destruction plan under which it would complete destruction of its stockpiles by 2012 {ACR 704e3CWC01 14.6}. Russia and the United States agreed on a new plan for CW destruction at the Shchuchye facility, after which the United States resumed its funding for the facility {ACR 704e3CWC01 7.6, 28.12}. In 2002, the Seventh Session of the Conference of States Parties granted Russia extensions of two of the CWC's intermediate deadlines {ACR 704e2CWC02 7-11.10}. In 2003, US President George W Bush released over $150 mn to build the Shchuch'ye plant in Russia {14.1.03}. Donor states had abstained from raising aid for lack of transparency. Russia's deadline for destruction of chemical weapons were extended due to lack of funding for its destruction programs and construction of facilities for detoxification of munitions containing poison gases {11-15.11.03}.

Russia did fulfill some of its obligations under the CWC by destroying 400 tons of chemical weapons in the settlement of Gorny {ACR 704bCWC03 12.5}. In early 2004 many concerns were raised concerning the progress of Russia's deconstruction program, as donor states had only provided limited amount of promised funds {ACR 704bCWC04 6.4.04; 23.4.04; 6.30}. By late 2004, Russia had doubled its federal budget for chemical destruction, and asserted it would fulfill its commitment to destroy 20 percent of its chemical stockpile by April 2007, and felt confident it would be completely destroyed by 2012 {ACR 704e2CWC 9.9; 17.9; 15.10}.

Serbia-Montenegro (then Yugoslavia) reportedly possessed CW, including mustard gas, Sarin, CS, and BZ. Reports emerged of CW use by Yugoslav forces against the Albanian KLA rebel forces during NATO's air war in March June 1999. {ACR 704b2CWC99 7.4, 13.4, 25.8}

South Africa's former CBW program was probed by a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In 1998, the commission released its final report noting that the CBW program "produced little of value or common good.... At best, the program succeeded in producing for manufacturing analogues of CR or BZ incapacitates, and in making local arrangements for protective clothing for troops against mass chemical and biological attack." {ACR 704e2CWC98 29.10}

A Sudanese factory suspected of producing CW was attacked in August 1998 by the United States {ACR 704e2CWC98 20.8}. Whether the factory actually produced CW remained unclear {ACR 704b2CWC99 8.2, 21.8, 13-27.10}, although the CIA holds that the country had possessed the capability to produce CW for many years. {ACR 704b2CWC99 9.2; 704e4CWC02 30.1} In late 2004 the Sudanese Amb. Abu-al-Qasim Abd-al-Wahid sent a letter to the OPCW Director refuting allegations that chemical weapons have been used in Darfur {7.11.04}

Syria reportedly has a stockpile of Sarin and may be trying to develop more toxic nerve agents, but remained dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, according to the CIA {ACR 704b2CWC 9.2.99; 15.7.99; ACR 704e4CWC02 30.1}. In November 1999, US intelligence agencies detected an apparent military test of CW bombs by Syria. {26.11.99} Syrian President Bashar Assad told the Daily Telegraph that he would not abandon the country's suspected chemical and biological programs unless Israel gave up its undeclared nuclear arsenal {ACR 704bCWC04 6.1}

The United States ratified the CWC on 26 April 1997. After the United States had been in technical non-compliance with the treaty for over a year {1.9.98}, Congress passed implementing legislation in October 1998 {21.10.98}. The legislation included restrictions on the convention's implementation that seriously undermined the convention and created a bad example for other countries {9.6.98}. In 1999, the US Commerce Department issued regulations for the chemical industry that allowed the implementing regulations to come into force {30.12.99}. In 2002, in a highly controversial move, the United States forced the removal of OPCW Director General Jose Bustani, who had been trying to conclude an arrangement with Iraq on CW inspections. {ACR 704bCWC02 19-22.3, 22.4}

The United States may have stored or tested CW in Panama, although its declaration, submitted on 27 May 1997, did not record such action. Panama submitted information about abandoned CW on its territory in its declaration to the OPCW {ACR 704e2CWC 19.11.98}. In August 1999, Panama called on the United States to clean up CW munitions buried on former military test sites {ACR 704b2CWC 23.8.99}. If such munitions exist, the United States would be in violation of the CWC {29.7.98}.

Under a 1984 domestic law the United States must destroy its CW stockpile by 2004 and would spend $33 million to do so {14.1.97}. In 1998, a study conducted by the US Army harshly criticized the Army's chemical destruction program {ACR 704e1CWC98 8.12}. In July 1999, the Defense Comptroller issued another critical audit {704b1CWC99 box 31.12}. Due in part to increasing environmental lawsuits and concerns by local citizens' groups, the Army was forced to consider alternative technologies for CW disposal as a replacement for current incineration facilities. This led to substantial delays in site construction {ACR 704b1CWC99 7.5, 1.10 box 31.12}. In 2000, the GAO faulted the slow pace of US stockpile destruction {ACR 704e1CWC00 8.5}. In 2001, the DOD approved a new schedule for stockpile destruction, extending the deadlines for completion of the destruction by 2-4 years. The cost of the program would also increase substantially {ACR 704e1CWC01 26.9}.

In 2002, the United States met its deadline for destroying 20 percent of its declared CW stocks. {ACR 704e1CWC02 7.10} In 2003, however, the United States asked the OPCW to extend its 29 April 2004 deadline {ACR 704dCWC03 4.9}. The US General Accounting Office reported in early 2004 that the US was far behind schedule of destroying its chemical weapons, suffered a lack of funding and poor planning, and would likely not meet the deadline set in the CWC, despite the DOD Chemical Demilitarization Program operating at an extended capacity, even if the deadline was extended to 2012 {ACR 704e1CWC04 1.4; 2.4; 23.4}.

OUTLINE OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Length of text. The Convention covers 45 pages; the Annex on Chemicals, 9; the Annex on Implementation and Verification, 113; and the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information, 6. The text on the Preparatory Commission covers 14 pages.

Preamble: "Recognizing the prohibition, embodied in the pertinent agreements and relevant principles of international law, of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare...."

I. General Obligations

I.1. Each party agrees never: "(a) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or retain chemical weapons;" (b) to use CW; (c) to prepare to use CW {18.11-20.12.91}; (d) to assist others in acting against the prohibitions of the convention.

I.2. To destroy CW in its possession.

I.3. To destroy CW it abandoned on the territory of another state.

I.4. To destroy production facilities.

1.5. Not "to use riot control agents as a method of warfare."

II. Definitions and Criteria

II.1. Chemical weapons include (a) "toxic chemicals and their precursors," (b) munitions, and (c) any equipment.

II.2.Toxic chemicals.

II.3.Precursor. (For the purposes of the convention, toxic chemicals and their precursors are listed in Schedules in the Annex on Chemicals. See below.)

II.4. Key Component of Binary or Multicomponent Chemical Systems.

II.8. Chemical weapon production facility. Covers facilities in which material flows contain Schedule I chemicals. Does not include facilities with annual capacity for synthesis less than 1000 kilograms (one metric ton).

III. Declarations

III.1. Each party is to declare 30 days after entry into force whether it has under its jurisdiction or control (a) CW, general plan for destruction, locations, and whether it transferred chemical weapons to anyone since 1 January 1946, (b) old and abandoned CW, (c) CW production facilities and general plan for destruction, (d) other facilities such as laboratories, or (e) riot control agents. Each party is to declare within 30 days of entry into force (a) any CW production facilities, (b) any transfer of equipment, (c) actions to close each facility, (d) general plan for destruction, (e) general plan for temporary conversion into CW destruction facility.

IV. Chemical Weapons

IV.4. Systematic international on-site inspection to follow immediately to verify the declaration, with continuous monitoring by instrument and on-site inspection to ensure the CW is not moved.

IV.5. Access to destruction facility provided for verification by "continuous presence of inspectors and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments."

IV.6. Each party to destroy all CW pursuant to the order in Annex to Article IV, beginning not later than two years after the convention enters into force for that party and finishing not later than 10 years after general entry into force.

IV.7 Detailed plans for destruction to be provided not later than 60 days before the beginning of each destruction period.

IV.13 "[T]he Organization shall consider measures to avoid unnecessary duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on verification of chemical weapons."

IV.16 "Each party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapons it is obliged to destroy. It shall also meet the costs of verification of storage and destruction of these chemical weapons unless the Executive Council decides otherwise."

V. Chemical Weapons Production Facilities

V.7. Each party is to close, 90 days after Convention enters into force, each production facility, and shall permit periodic on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments.

V.8. Each party is to destroy all facilities according to the schedule in the Annex to Article V, beginning not later than 12 months after entry into force for that party and finishing not later than 10 years after entry into force.

V.9. Each party is to submit detailed plans for destruction not later than 180 days before the elimination of the facility.

V.12-13. The Conference of States Parties may permit "in exceptional cases of compelling need" conversion of production facilities "for purposes not prohibited under this Convention."

V.16. "[T]he Organization shall consider measures to avoid unnecessary duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on verification of chemical weapons."

V.19. "Each party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapon production facilities it is obliged to destroy. It shall also meet the costs of verification under this Article unless the Executive Council decides otherwise."

VI. Activities Not Prohibited under this Convention

VI.1. Each party has the right to use toxic chemicals "for purposes not prohibited under this Convention."

VI.2. "Each State Party shall subject toxic chemicals and their precursors listed in Schedules 1, 2, and 3 of the Annex on Chemicals, facilities related to such chemicals, and other facilities as specified in the Verification Annex, that are located on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control, to the verification measures as provided in the Verification Annex."

VII. National Implementation Measures

Each party is to adopt national measures to carry out the convention. A national authority is to be designated. Each party is to enact penal legislation (a) to "prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party"; (b) not to permit in any place under its control any activity prohibited to a state-party under the Convention; and (c) to extend "to any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken anywhere by natural persons, possessing its nationality." {boxes 29.3.91 (Working Group C); box 4.9.91; 16.3.92}

VIII. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

VIII.A.7 Costs paid according to UN scale of assessment.

VIII.B Conference of the States Parties. Shall meet annually and in a special session, if requested. Shall be the principal organ of the Organization. Shall act upon a vote of two-thirds majority if no consensus.

VIII.B.21(h). Scientific Advisory Board.
The Conference "direct[s] the Director General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him, in the performance of his functions, to render ... specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to the Convention to the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council, or States Parties."

VIII.B.22 Review Conferences are to be held 5 and 10 years after entry into force, and every five years thereafter unless otherwise decided upon.

VIII.C. Executive Council

VIII.C.23. The Executive Council will have 41 members. Each party has the right to serve. Members are elected for a term of two years from five regions.

Region	No. of Seats	No. by Industrial Criteria
Africa	9	3
Asia	9	4
Eastern Europe	5	1
Latin America	7	3
Western Europe/other	10	5
Asia, Latin America	1 (rotating)
Total	41	16

The states-parties of each region are required to elect the numbers of representatives shown above (some on the basis of industrial criteria).

VIII.C.29 Each member has one vote. Decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of all its members.

VIII.D Technical secretariat. Does inspections.

IX. Consultations, Cooperation, and Fact-finding

IX.1-2. Parties will make every effort to resolve problems among themselves. A Party shall respond to a request to resolve concerns within 10 days.

IX.3-7. Procedures for requesting the Executive Council to assist in clarification.

Procedure for challenge inspection

IX.8. Each state has the right to request a mandatory inspection by the Technical Secretariat any time, anywhere, without delay. "Each State Party is under the obligation to keep the request within the scope of the Convention and to provide in the inspection request all appropriate information on the basis of which a concern has arisen regarding possible non-compliance with the Convention."

IX.9. "For the purposes of verifying compliance with the provisions of this Convention, each State Party shall permit the Technical Secretariat to conduct on-site challenge inspections pursuant to paragraph 8."

IX.11The inspected state has the right to, and is under the obligation to, demonstrate compliance, and has "the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations, and to prevent disclosure of confidential information, not related to this convention."

IX.12 "The requesting State Party may, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party, send a representative who may be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third State Party to observe the conduct of the inspection."

IX.13-15. The request is to be submitted to the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, and to the Executive Council who shall notify the state to be inspected "not less than 12 hours prior to the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry."

IX.16-17. "The Executive Council may, not later than 12 hours after having received the inspection request, decide by a three-quarter majority of all its members against carrying out the challenge inspection, if it considers the inspection request to be frivolous, abusive, or clearly beyond the scope of this Convention as described in paragraph 8."

IX.18-19. The Director-General is to issue the mandate; the team is to inspect in least intrusive manner.

IX.20. "If the inspected State Party proposes...arrangements to demonstrate compliance with the Convention, alternative to full and comprehensive access, it shall make every reasonable effort, through consultations with the inspection team, to reach agreement on the modalities for establishing the facts with the aim of demonstrating its compliance."

X. Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons

X.1. Covers "detection equipment and alarm systems, protective equipment, decontamination equipment and decontaminants, medical antidotes and treatments, and advice on any of these protective measures."

X.2. Each state may develop and produce its own protective measures.

X.3. "Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons."

X.4. "[E]ach State Party shall provide annually to the Technical Secretariat information on its program."

X.5. Technical Secretariat data bank.

X.6. Right to request and receive assistance bilaterally.

X.7. Each state can elect to contribute to the voluntary fund for assistance, conclude an agreement to provide assistance, or declare the kind of assistance it might provide. "If, however, a State Party is unable to provide the kind of assistance envisaged in its declaration, it is still under obligation to provide assistance in accordance with this paragraph."

X.8. Each state party has the right to request protection against the use or threat of use.

X.9. Director General to initiate investigation within 24 hours of request for assistance, and complete it within 72 hours.

X.10. Executive Council to meet not later than 24 hours after Director General report, to decide on rendering assistance.

XI. Economic and Technological Development
States-parties shall: facilitate exchanges and "not maintain among themselves any restrictions including those in any international agreement, incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would impede trade and development."

XII. Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions
The Conference may suspend a state-party, recommend collective measures, or bring the issue to the attention of the UNGA or UN Security Council.

XIII. Relation to Other International Agreements
The convention does not limit or detract from states-parties' obligations under Geneva Protocol or BW Convention.

XIV. Settlement of Disputes
Parties may settle these with the good offices of others, or submit disputes between them to the International Court of Justice.

XV. Amendments

XV.2. Amendments submitted to an amendment conference called by one-third of parties, to be held immediately after a regular session of the Conference.

XV.3. Amendments enter into force after adoption by a positive vote of a majority of all states-parties, without any no votes, and after ratification by all parties casting a positive vote.

XV.4. Schedules and guidelines amended by simplified procedure.

XVI. Duration and Withdrawal
Unlimited duration. Withdrawal would not affect obligations under 1925 Geneva Protocol.

XVII. Status of the Annexes

XVIII. Signature

XIX. Ratification

XX. Accession

XXI. Entry into Force

XXII. Reservations
Annexes of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object and purposes."

XXIII. Depositary Secretary-General of the United Nations.

XXIV. Authentic Texts Languages are to be the six UN languages.

Annex on Chemicals (excerpts)

Schedule 1. This includes chemicals "developed, produced, stockpiled, or used as a chemical weapon" or that could have comparable properties, or that could be used as "a precursor in the final single technological stage."

Schedule 2. This includes a chemical: (a) possessing lethal or incapacitating toxicity so it could become a chemical weapon, (b) used in the final stage of a Schedule I chemical, or (c) posing a significant risk by virtue of its importance in production of a Schedule 1 chemical.

Schedule 3. Dual-purpose chemicals (produced in large commercial quantities but also stockpiled as a chemical weapon or able to be used for chemical weapons purposes) and precursor chemicals.

Annex on Implementation and Verification

I. Definitions

II. General rules of verification.

III. General rules for verification of destruction of CW and CW facilities

IV(A). Destruction of chemical weapons and its verification pursuant to Article IV

IV(A) A.2 (d). "In cases involving mixtures of two or more chemicals, each chemical shall be identified and the percentage of each shall be provided, and the mixture shall be declared under the category of most toxic chemical. If a component of a binary chemical weapon consists of a mixture of two or more chemicals, each chemical should be identified and the percentage of each chemical provided."

IV(A) B.9-10. "While a storage facility remains closed for any movement of chemical weapons other than their removal for destruction, a State Party may continue at the facility standard maintenance activities, including standard maintenance of chemical weapons." Maintenance does not include replacement of agent.

IV(A) C.15. "The order of destruction of chemical weapons is based on the obligations specified in Article I and the other Articles, including obligations regarding systematic international on-site verification. It takes into account interests of States Parties for undiminished security during the destruction period; confidence-building in the early part of the destruction stage; gradual acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons; and applicability irrespective of the actual composition of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the destruction of the chemical weapons. The order of destruction is based on the principle of leveling out."

IV(A) C.16. Category 1 CW includes Schedule 1 and their components; Category 2 includes all other CW and their components; Category 3 includes unfilled munitions and devices.

IV(A) C.17. Each state-party "shall start the destruction of Category I chemical weapons not later than two years after it becomes a Party to the Convention, and shall complete it not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the Convention." One percent of Category 1 is to be destroyed after three years; 20 percent after five years; 45 percent after seven years; and all after ten years. For Category 2 and 3, destruction is to be complete five years after entry into force, in equal annual increments.

IV(A) C.18. Special provisions on binary chemical weapons.

IV(A) C.24-26. Extension of deadlines possible.

IV(B). Old and abandoned chemical weapons

V. Destruction of chemical weapon production facilities and its verification pursuant to Article V

V.B. Principles and Methods for Closure, Maintenance, Temporary Conversion and Destruction

V.B.13. Measures for closure include "disconnection of equipment" and "decommissioning of protective installations."

V.B.15. A state-party may carry out standard maintenance activities at its chemical weapon production facilities only for safety reasons, including visual inspection, preventive maintenance, and routine repairs.

V.B.28. Order of Destruction Same as Part IV(A)C.15 on principles.

V.B.30(a). The overall period shall be divided into three separate destruction periods, namely years 2-5, years 6-8, and years 9-10.

V.B.30(b). Production capacity shall be used as the comparison factor for such facilities.

V.B.30(c). Appropriate agreed thresholds of production capacity shall be established for the end of the eighth year after the Convention enters into force. Production capacity that exceeds the relevant level shall be destroyed in equal increments during the first two destruction periods.

VI. Activities Not Prohibited under this Convention in Accordance with Article VI Regime for Schedule 1 Chemicals and Related Facilities

Schedule 1 chemicals may be produced only for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective purposes.

2. The aggregate amount to be kept for these purposes is one metric ton.

8. Production may be done at only one small-scale facility, except:

10. "Production of Schedule 1 chemicals in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10 kilograms per year may be carried out for protective purposes at one facility outside a single small-scale facility."

11. "Production of Schedule I chemicals in quantities of more than 100 grams per year may be carried out for research, medical or pharmaceutical purposes outside a single small-scale facility in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10 kilograms per year per facility."

12. "Synthesis of Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical, or pharmaceutical purposes, but not for protective purposes, may be carried out at laboratories in aggregate quantities less than 100 grams per year per facility. These facilities shall not be subject to any obligation relating to declaration and verification as specified in Sections D and E."

22. The single small-scale facility would be subject to systematic on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments.

29. Facilities 10 and 11 would be subject to systematic on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments.

Regime for Schedule 2 Chemicals and Related Facilities

Facilities producing schedule 2 chemicals

12. Would be subject to on-site inspection if the facility produced during any of the three previous calendar years, or would produce in the next calendar year:

(a) 10 kilograms of a chemical designated in Schedule 2, part A;

(b) 1 metric ton of any other chemical listed in Schedule 2, part A; or

(c) 10 metric tons of a chemical listed in Schedule 2, part B.

16. Each plant under 12 "shall receive an initial inspection as soon as possible but preferably not later than three years after entry into force of this Convention."

20. "In selecting particular plants for inspection and in deciding on the frequency and intensity of inspections, the Technical Secretariat shall give due consideration to the risk to the object and purpose of this Convention posed by the relevant chemical, the characteristics of the plant site, and the nature of the activities carried out there."

22. "No plant site shall receive more than two inspections per calendar year under the provisions of this Section."

Regime for Schedule 3 Chemicals and Related Facilities

12. "Verification shall be carried out through on-site inspections at those declared plant sites which produced during the previous calendar year or are anticipated to produce in the next calendar year in excess of 200 tons aggregate of any Schedule 3 chemical above the declaration threshold of 30 tons."

15. "No site shall receive more than two inspections per year."

IX. Activities Not Prohibited under this Convention in Accordance with Article VI Regime for other Chemical Production Facilities

1. Declare all plant sites that "produced by synthesis during the previous calendar year (a) more than 200 tons of unscheduled discrete organic chemicals," or (b) "more than 30 tons of an unscheduled discrete organic chemical containing the elements phosphorus, sulfur, or fluorine (hereinafter referred to as 'PSF-plants')."

9. Verification by on-site inspection.

11. Random selection, weighted for (a) equitable geographic distribution, (b) information available, and (c) "Proposals by States Parties as decided by the Conference in the third year after entry into force."

X. Challenge inspections pursuant to Article IX.

X.A. Designation and selection of inspectors and inspection assistants.

X.B. Pre-inspection activities.

Notification

6. The requesting state-party notifies the Director General of the site location and the requested perimeter only so the Director General may inform the inspected state-party 12 hours in advance of the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry into the territory of the inspected state-party or host state.

Alternative determination of final perimeter

16. If the inspected state-party does not accept requested perimeter, it proposes an alternative within 24 hours of arrival of the team.

18-19. Whether acceptable or not, transportation "shall be completed" to the site no later than 36 hours after arrival at the point of entry. If no negotiated perimeter is agreed, the team must accept the alternative perimeter.

Verification of location

Securing the site, exit monitoring

23. Within 12 hours of arrival at the point of entry, the team is permitted to monitor exits.

Pre-inspection briefing

Perimeter Activities

X.C. Conduct of Inspections

General rules

39. Access within perimeter provided not later than 108 hours after arrival at point of entry.

41. "[T]he inspected State Party shall be under the obligation to allow the greatest degree of access taking into account any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures."

43. Immediate access to declared facilities. Managed access (removal of sensitive papers, shrouding of displays, shrouding of equipment, logging off of computer systems).

51. For declared facilities, access unimpeded. For undeclared facilities, negotiated access.

Observer {see Article IX}

Duration of inspection

X.D. Post-inspection activities

Departure

Reports

XI. Inspections in the case of alleged use of chemical weapons.

Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information

Preparatory Commission

SIGNATORIES AND PARTIES
As of 19 November 2004

1925 Geneva Protocol. Signed on 17 June 1925, the Geneva Protocol entered force for each signatory on the date of deposit with France of the ratification or accession. The Protocol bans the use of chemical and "bacteriological" weapons. (For text, see http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf.) On 7-11 January 1989, a conference was held in Paris to strengthen the Protocol.

*=Ratified with reservations. Six states in bold - Belize, Niue, Sao Tome & Principe, Somalia, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu - have not ratified either treaty:

State	1925 Geneva Protocol		CWC Signed	CWC Deposited	CWC In Force
Afghanistan	9-Dec-86		14-Jan-93	24-Sep-03	24-Oct-03
Albania	20-Dec-89		14-Jan-93	11-May-94	29-Apr-97
Algeria	27-Jan-92	*	13-Jan-93	14-Aug-95	29-Apr-97
Andorra				27-Feb-03	29-Mar-03
Angola	8-Dec-90	*
Antigua & Barbuda	1-Jan-89
Argentina	12-May-69		13-Jan-93	2-Oct-95	29-Apr-97
Armenia			19-Mar-93	27-Jan-95	29-Apr-97
Australia	24-May-30	*	13-Jan-93	6-May-94	29-Apr-97
Austria	9-May-28		13-Jan-93	17-Aug-95	29-Apr-97
Azerbaijan			13-Jan-93	29-Feb-00	30-Mar-00
Bahamas			2-Mar-94
Bahrain	9-Dec-88	*	24-Feb-93	28-Apr-97	29-Apr-97
Bangladesh	20-May-89	*	14-Jan-93	25-Apr-97	29-Apr-97
Barbados	16-Jul-76	*
Belarus			14-Jan-93	11-Jul-96	29-Apr-97
Belgium	4-Dec-28	*	13-Jan-93	27-Jan-97	29-Apr-97
Belize				1-Dec-03	31-Dec-03
Benin	9-Dec-86		14-Jan-93	14-May-98	13-Jun-98
Bhutan	19-Feb-79		24-Apr-97
Bolivia	14-Jan-85		14-Jan-93	14-Aug-98	13-Sep-98
Bosnia & Herzegovina			16-Jan-97	25-Feb-97	29-Apr-97
Botswana			31-Aug-98	31-Aug-98	30-Sep-98
Brazil	28-Aug-70		13-Jan-93	13-Mar-96	29-Apr-97
Brunei Darussalam			13-Jan-93	28-Jul-97	27-Aug-97
Bulgaria	7-Mar-34		13-Jan-93	10-Aug-94	29-Apr-97
Burkina Faso	3-Mar-71		14-Jan-93	8-Jul-97	7-Aug-97
Burundi			15-Jan-93	4-Sep-98	4-Oct-98
Cambodia	15-Mar-83	*	15-Jan-93
Cameroon	20-Jul-89		14-Jan-93	16-Sep-96	29-Apr-97
Canada	30-Jun-30	*	13-Jan-93	26-Sep-95	29-Apr-97
Cape Verde	15-Oct-91		15-Jan-93	10-Oct-03	9-Nov-03
Central African Rep.	31-Jul-70		14-Jan-93
Chad			11-Oct-94	13-Feb-04	12-Apr-04
Chile	2-Jul-35		14-Jan-93	12-Jul-96	29-Apr-97
China	24-Aug-29		13-Jan-93	25-Apr-97	29-Apr-97
Colombia			13-Jan-93	5-Apr-00	5-May-00
Comoros			13-Jan-93
Congo (DR of)			14-Jan-93
Congo (R of )			15-Jan-93
Cook Islands			14-Jan-93	15-Jul-94	29-Apr-97
Costa Rica			14-Jan-93	31-May-96	29-Apr-97
C™te dÕIvoire	27-Jun-70		13-Jan-93	18-Dec-95	29-Apr-97
Croatia			13-Jan-93	23-May-95	29-Apr-97
Cuba	24-Jun-66	*	13-Jan-93	29-Apr-97	29-May-97
Cyprus	12-Dec-66		13-Jan-93	28-Aug-98	27-Sep-98
Czech Republic	17-Dec-93		14-Jan-93	6-Mar-96	29-Apr-97
Denmark	5-May-30		14-Jan-93	13-Jul-95	29-Apr-97
Djibouti			28-Sep-93
Dominica			2-Aug-93	9-Feb-01	14-Mar-01
Dominican Republic	8-Dec-70		13-Jan-93
Ecuador	16-Dec-70		14-Jan-93	6-Sep-95	29-Apr-97
Egypt	6-Dec-28
El Salvador			14-Jan-93	30-Oct-95	29-Apr-97
Equatorial Guinea	20-May-89		14-Jan-93	25-Apr-97	29-Apr-97
Eritrea				14-Feb-00	15-Mar-00
Estonia	28-Aug-31	*	14-Jan-93	26-May-99	25-Jun-99
Ethiopia	7-Oct-35	*	14-Jan-93	13-May-96	29-Apr-97
Fiji	21-Mar-73		14-Jan-93	20-Jan-93	29-Apr-97
Finland	26-Jun-29		14-Jan-93	7-Feb-95	29-Apr-97
France	10-May-26		13-Jan-93	2-Mar-95	29-Apr-97
Gabon			13-Jan-93	7-Sep-00	8-Oct-00
Gambia	5-Nov-66		13-Jan-93	19-May-98	18-Jun-98
Georgia			14-Jan-93	27-Nov-95	29-Apr-97
Germany	25-Apr-29		13-Jan-93	12-Aug-94	29-Apr-97
Ghana	3-May-67		14-Jan-93	9-Jul-97	8-Aug-97
Greece	30-May-31		13-Jan-93	22-Dec-94	29-Apr-97
Grenada	20-May-89		9-Apr-97
Guatemala	3-May-83		14-Jan-93	12-Feb-03	14-Mar-03
Guinea			14-Jan-93	9-Jun-97	9-Jul-97
Guinea-Bissau	20-May-89		14-Jan-93
Guyana			6-Oct-93	12-Sep-97	12-Oct-97
Haiti			14-Jan-93
Holy See	18-Oct-66		14-Jan-93	12-May-99	11-Jun-99
Honduras			13-Jan-93
Hungary	11-Oct-52	*	13-Jan-93	31-Oct-96	29-Apr-97
Iceland	2-Nov-67		13-Jan-93	28-Apr-97	29-Apr-97
India	9-Apr-30	*	14-Jan-93	3-Sep-96	29-Apr-97
Indonesia	21-Jan-71		13-Jan-93	12-Nov-98	12-Dec-98
Iran (Islamic R of)	5-Nov-29		13-Jan-93	3-Nov-97	3-Dec-97
Iraq	8-Sep-31	*
Ireland	29-Aug-30		14-Jan-93	24-Jun-96	29-Apr-97
Israel	20-Feb-69	*	13-Jan-93
Italy	3-Apr-28		13-Jan-93	8-Dec-95	29-Apr-97
Jamaica	28-Jul-70		18-Apr-97	8-Sep-00	8-Oct-00
Japan	21-Jul-70		13-Jan-93	15-Sep-95	29-Apr-97
Jordan	20-Jan-77	*		29-Oct-97	28-Nov-97
Kazakhstan			14-Jan-93	23-Mar-00	22-Apr-00
Kenya	6-Jul-70		15-Jan-93	25-Apr-97	29-Apr-97
Kiribati				7-Sep-00	7-Oct-00
Korea (DPR of)	1-Apr-89	*
Korea (R of)	4-Jan-89	*	14-Jan-93	28-Apr-97	29-Apr-97
Kuwait	15-Dec-71		27-Jan-93	29-May-97	28-Jun-97
Kyrgyzstan			22-Feb-93	29-Sep-03	29-Oct-03
Lao PeopleÕs DR	20-May-89		13-May-93	25-Feb-97	29-Apr-97
Latvia	3-Jun-31		6-May-93	23-Jul-96	29-Apr-97
Lebanon	17-Apr-69
Lesotho	10-Mar-72		7-Dec-94	7-Dec-94	29-Apr-97
Liberia	17-Jun-27		15-Jan-93
Libya	29-Dec-71	*		6-Jan-04	5-Feb-04
Liechtenstein	6-Sep-91		21-Jul-93	24-Nov-99	24-Dec-99
Lithuania	15-Jun-33		13-Jan-93	15-Apr-98	15-May-98
Luxembourg	1-Sep-36		13-Jan-93	15-Apr-97	29-Apr-97
Macedonia (TFYR of)				20-Jun-97	20-Jul-97
Madagascar	2-Aug-67		15-Jan-93	20-Oct-04	19-Nov-04
Malawi	14-Sep-70		14-Jan-93	11-Jun-98	11-Jul-98
Malaysia	10-Dec-70		13-Jan-93	20-Apr-00	20-May-00
Maldives	27-Dec-66		1-Oct-93	31-May-94	29-Apr-97
Mali (R of)			13-Jan-93	28-Apr-97	29-Apr-97
Malta	15-Oct-70		13-Jan-93	28-Apr-97	29-Apr-97
Marshall Islands			13-Jan-93	19-May-04	18-Jun-04
Mauritania			13-Jan-93	9-Feb-98	11-Mar-98
Mauritius	8-Jan-71	*	14-Jan-93	9-Feb-93	29-Apr-97
Mexico	28-May-32		13-Jan-93	29-Aug-94	29-Apr-97
Micronesia (FS of)			13-Jan-93	21-Jun-99	21-Jul-99
Moldova (R of)			13-Jan-93	8-Jul-96	29-Apr-97
Monaco	6-Jan-67		13-Jan-93	1-Jun-95	29-Apr-97
Mongolia	6-Dec-68		14-Jan-93	17-Jan-95	29-Apr-97
Morocco	13-Oct-70		13-Jan-93	28-Dec-95	29-Apr-97
Mozambique				15-Aug-00	14-Sep-00
Myanmar			14-Jan-93
Namibia			13-Jan-93	27-Nov-95	29-Apr-97
Nauru			13-Jan-93	12-Feb-01	12-Dec-01
Nepal	9-May-69		19-Jan-93	18-Nov-97	18-Dec-97
Netherlands	3-Oct-30	*	14-Jan-93	30-Jun-95	29-Apr-97
New Zealand	24-May-30		14-Jan-93	15-Jul-96	29-Apr-97
Nicaragua	5-Oct-90		9-Mar-93	5-Nov-99	5-Dec-99
Niger	5-Apr-67		14-Jan-93	9-Apr-97	29-Apr-97
Nigeria	15-Oct-68	*	13-Jan-93	20-May-99	19-Jun-99
Niue
Norway	27-Jul-32		13-Jan-93	7-Apr-94	29-Apr-97
Oman			2-Feb-93	8-Feb-95	29-Apr-97
Pakistan	15-Apr-60	*	13-Jan-93	28-Oct-97	27-Nov-97
Palau (R of)				3-Feb-03	5-Mar-03
Panama	4-Dec-70		16-Jun-93	7-Oct-98	6-Nov-98
Papua New Guinea	2-Sep-80	*